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ERIC J. MILLER*
This article analyzes two of the central claims made on behalf of drug courts:
that they divert offenders from incapacitatory prison regimes and that they treat
drug addicts. Taken together, these claims form the central justification of the
drug court's existence and the basis of the court's unusual style of procedure.
The court often resembles something between a revivalist meeting and an
Alcoholics Anonymous session. The judge has tremendous discretion over the
manner in which rewards and sanctions are meted out. Sanctions can involve
repeating parts of the program, referral to a variety of progressively more
residential treatment programs, or short terms of imprisonment. Liberal critics
tolerate these sanctions and the courtroom "theater" more generally as part of
their rejection of imprisonment as a solution to the severity revolution in penal
policy. Yet the effect of formalizing the diversion process has led, not to
increasing the numbers of drug addicts escaping the reach of the criminal justice
system, but rather to bringing more low-level offenders into the system. Thanks
to a policing based on risk management, law enforcement agents are pressured
to divert offenders "up" into the system, rather than out of the system. This "net
widening" effect results in increased numbers of offenders in drug court, many
of whom have no criminal record and no record of addiction. Despite the
increased number of citizens caught under the drug court net, liberal critics
embrace the drug court's practice of invasive behavior modification as a
therapeutic alternative to incarceration. The drug court, however, often
functions more as a form of coercive drug monitoring than a drug treatment
regime. These courts' express goal may be understood as an attempt to change
the addicts' "social norms" by isolating the offender from malignant social
influences and substitute the judge as the sole authoritative arbiter of
appropriate behavior. Yet many of these "clients " may not be addicted to drugs,
and so any treatment is better understood as a form of incapacitation in which
the length of the treatment is often much longer than the alternative prison
sentence. I suggest that the emphasis on therapy is blinding liberal critics to the
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highly incapacitative effects of the drug court. If they are to embrace the drug
court, legal liberals need to reformulate a theory of punishment that is able to
endorse the prison as an alternative to drug court. Of the available theories,
some form of retributivism would appear to provide the most likely candidate.
Such a theory would permit us to balance, on a court-by-court basis, the social
harm of drug crime, the punishment imposed by a particularjurisdiction for such
crime, and the alternative drug court sanction, so as to endorse or reject the
drug court in terms of its treatment program and incapacitatory effect.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Drug courts may be the most significant penal innovation in the last twenty
years. Emerging as a direct response to the "severity revolution" in penal policy,'
they are an incredibly popular alternative to the War on Drugs.2 They present a
vibrant counter to the stalled legislative and liigative strategies developed to stem
the flow of drug users into the criminal justice system. Rather than targeting the
scope or application of drug statutes, drug courts work at the level of court
process and procedure to re-institutionalize the penological goals of diversion and
rehabilitation.
Since its first appearance in the early 1990s,3 the drug court movement has
sought to restructure court practice and procedure. Its goal is to use the court's
sanctioning power to treat drug offenders rather than expedite the process of
incarceration. Instead of challenging the drug laws, these courts operate within the
current legislative framework but attempt to channel offenders away from prison
and into treatment. Drug courts, therefore, constitute an altemative to the
dominant liberal reaction to the War on Drugs-a reaction that either opposes the
criminalization of drugs in general or seeks to end the disparate impact of drug
laws on minority populations.
Created as problem-solving courts, drug courts operate at the pre- or post-trial
stage to divert offenders into designated drug treatment programs. 4 The court
monitors the offenders' progress by reconstituting the roles of judge, prosecutor,
and defense counsel into partners in a treatment team. 5 The team's goal is to
ensure that the defendant stays in treatment throughout the rehabilitation process.
Drug courts enforce rehabilitation using an expressly therapeutic and non-
adversarial approach to transform the courtroom.6 Reconstituted as a treatment
center, the court becomes something akin to a cross between a revivalist meeting
and Alcoholics Anonymous.7 The judge, as team leader, takes a direct and
I See generally Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America's Severity
Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 217 (2001) (providing an overview of the history of the
punishment practice in politically and economically developed nations from a practice focused
on humanity to a practice focused on severity).
2 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 118, 132 (2001) (describing the War on Drugs as an event that
"utterly transformed law enforcement in the USA").
3 See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT
MOVEMENT, 39-44 (2001).
4 Hon. Sheila M. Murphy, Drug Courts: An Effective, Efficient Weapon in the War on
Drugs, 85 ILL. B.J. 474,476 (1997).
5 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 75-76.
6 Id at 48-51, 76.
7 Id at 111-32.
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interventionist role in supervising the rehabilitation process.8 He or she becomes
less a passive arbiter of guilt and innocence9 and more a partisan participant in the
rehabilitative process.10 In an effort to establish a relationship with the offender,
the judge "empathizes with," is "concemed for,"1 I and "care[s] about" the
defendant. 12
So far, the shadow cast by the War on Drugs has shielded drug courts from
criticism of a broad range of controversies. 13 The court's highly invasive
therapeutic procedures escape censure so long as the court diverts offenders from
prison and cures drug addicts. These liberal justifications depend upon claiming
that the drug court presents a social-welfare type of safety net for drug addicts.
The court provides a beneficial, therapeutic interaction between the courts and
those problem people otherwise lost to society or the criminal justice system.
My goal is to place drug court practice and procedure in the context of
traditional categories used to evaluate success in the criminal justice process.
Drug courts do not appear in a conceptual vacuum. Generally, the relatively few
critical assessments of the drug court movement have only chipped away at the
edges of drug court practice when traditional due process rights are at risk.14
8 See, e.g., Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug
Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug
Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 476-77, 531 (1999); NOLAN,
supra note 3, at 43 ("[T]he players' roles are altered, modified, inextricably changed.... Legal
justice becomes therapeutic jurisprudence." (quoting Miami, Fla., drug court Judge Jeff
Rosnik)).
9 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281,
1286 (1976); see also Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374, 377-79
(1982).
10 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 102-04.
11 A group of a dozen drug court judges listed among the most important characteristics of
a drug court judge 'the ability to be empathic or to show genuine concern."' NOLAN, supra
note 3, at 99. See also id. at 101 ("Judge McKinney ... [believes drug court judges] are telling
these clients 'I care about you, and I care about some of the things that are troubling you."').
12 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 101.
13 The exception is the Hon. Morris B. Hoffman, who is perhaps the most outspoken
judicial critic of drug courts. See Hon. Morris B. Hofftman, Commentary, The Drug Court
Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437 (2000) [hereinafter Hoffman, Scandal]; Hon. Morris B.
Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The
Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2085-97
(2002). Richard C. Boldt has also provided an expansive critique of certain drug court practices.
See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1256-59 (1998).
14 Boldt, supra note 13, at 1256-59; Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway?
Musings of a Public Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 37, 55-56, 61-63 (2000-2001); see also Hora et al., supra note 8, at 522-23.
Boldt's arguments on the defendant's due process rights are substantially repeated in Richard C.
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Although their advocates often suggest they are therapeutic institutions, 15 drug
courts can and should be understood as advancing some of the traditional goals of
the criminal justice system.
To the extent that the drug court holds itself out as a tool for policing
recalcitrant drug offenders, there are a variety of perspectives that may be
employed to evaluate it. Herbert Packer famously suggested that there are two
models of criminal procedure: the crime-control model and the due process
model. 16 His models have their modem day correlates, two of which might be
called the social norms model of crime control and the liberal legal models of due
process.17 Packer's two models of criminal procedure may be supplemented by a
third: rehabilitation or "penal welfarism" (which has its modem correlate in
"therapeutic jurisprudence"). 18 These three models propose to account for the
values that do or should underlie the criminal justice system. They offer a means
by which to gauge and critique different procedural and penal initiatives. The
penal-welfarist critique focuses on how effectively drug courts engage in the
practice of therapeutic character transformation and how well the court
procedures permit that transformation to occur. The crime-control critique
traditionally evaluates the success with which drug courts channel offenders into
incapacitating penal regimes and the degree to which they deter future re-offense.
The due process critique evaluates the success with which the criminal justice
system protects the dignity of the individual against state interference and tailors
any sanction in proportion to the offense charged. Each of these models provides
a standard against which to measure the practice and point of drug courts; taken
Boldt, The Adversary System and Attorney Role in the Drug Treatment Court Movement, in
DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 115 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002).
15 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 48-51.
16 See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-
23 (1964).
17 For an account of the social norms school of legal theory, see, for example, David Cole,
Twenty-Eighth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure-Foreword Discretion and
Discrimination Reconsidered- A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO.
L.J. 1059, 1062 (1999) (describing social norms theorists as "new discretion" scholars);
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 664-65 (1998) (describing
features of social norms scholarship); Neil Duxbury, Signalling and Social Norms, 21 Oxford J.
Leg. Stud. 719, 719-21 (2001) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000)).
18 For a description of penal welfarism, see GARLAND, supra note 2, at 27; Francis A.
Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 23 (Andrew von
Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1981) (describing penal welfarism in terms of the
"rehabilitative ideal."). On therapeutic jurisprudence, see LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds.,
1996). See generally JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
COURTS (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003) (providing analyses and examples of
the application of therapeutic jurisprudence).
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together, however, they pursue criminal justice goals that conflict at different
points and in different ways.
Traditionally, due process critiques of administrative objectives limit the
goals of deterrence and incapacitation using principles of proportionality and
individual dignity. In this way, both the length of sentence and type of carceral
regime are the major subjects at issue in debates between the two perspectives as
to which type of punishments to pursue. This debate is complicated further by
both the particularly high rate of incarceration and the changed attitude to the
rehabilitation of incarcerated offenders resulting from the "severity revolution."
Many advocates of the due process model are simply opposed to the new goals of
imprisonment and welcome any form of diversion, especially for victimless drug
crimes. On this view, some loss of individual autonomy and institutional integrity
is the price to pay for diversion from lengthy prison sentences. These due process
critics resist any form of imprisonment as antithetical to core due process values.
They tend to favor decriminalization as the only legitimate response to minor
drug offenses.
What is wrong with the War on Drugs, however, is not imprisonment per se
but excessive imprisonment. What is required in response is a liberal theory of
incapacitation. Such a theory must be capable of acknowledging that, on
occasion, rational agents should be punished for breaking the law. Those unable
to choose rationally may deserve some form of treatment. Nonetheless, we must
recognize that what constitutes treatment for one offender may constitute
punishment for another. On a practical level, a liberal theory of punishment must
account for the variety of public and private methods of incapacitating offenders
and evaluate the relative merits of each.
Separated from the allure of diversion, 19 the real question presented by drug
courts is whether their version of rehabilitative interventionism is an appropriate
goal for judges to pursue. Certainly, interventionism has its attractions. The social
norms version of crime control and the therapeutic version of penal welfarism are
both strongly interventionist. 20 As a method of interacting with offenders,
19 The theoretical clarity to be achieved by separating the interventionist and diversionary
strains in drug courts is derived from Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread. Diversion in
Juvenile Justice, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2477, 2483-84 (2000).
20 On the social norms version of interventionism, see, for example, Tracey L. Meares, It's
a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579, 593 (1997) [hereinafter Meares,
Connections] (promoting curfews, gang-loitering laws, and order-maintenance strategies). See
also Tracey L. Meares, Symposium on Race and Criminal Law: Place And Crime, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 669, 695 (1998) [hereinafter Meares, Place] (same); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M.
Kahan, Law and (Norms o) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 805 (1998)
[hereinafter Meares & Kahan, Inner City]; Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Twenty-Seventh
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure-Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure,
86 Geo. L.J. 1153, 1160-66 (1998) [Kahan & Meares, Coming Crisis]. For therapeutic
approaches to interventionism, see, for example, Barbara A. Babb & Jeffrey A. Kuhn,
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interventionism highlights the failure of courts to engage with the defendants
processed through the criminal justice system. Penal welfarism's attempts to
know the offender illustrate the pro forma nature of much of the criminal process
under the crime-control and due process models of criminal justice procedure. If
successful, drug courts stand as a glaring rebuke to business as usual in a criminal
justice system that frustrates and alienates many litigants. Lawyers and litigants
alike condemn the current system's formalistic rules of procedure and limited
access to a remote and passive judge. Drug courts attempt to short-circuit some of
these representational problems and establish the real issues out of the mouths of
litigants who present their concerns directly to a sympathetic but fair judge.
Furthermore, the drug court model takes seriously the notion of treating even
recalcitrant drug addicts. Under the social norms crime-control model, drug courts
reflect and use community values to modify the behavior of recalcitrant drug
offenders. Drug court provides an alternative set of social influences to instill
norms of law-abidingness and to counter the values normally supported by
addicts and their peers.21 This social norms approach highlights issues of
recidivism and re-offense. The therapeutic penal welfarist accepts the inevitability
of relapse and instead suggests measuring a drug court's success by how well it
catches drug addicts in its safety net. Penal welfarism is more concerned with the
quality of the therapeutic relationship established between addict and judge than
reduced rates of recidivism. If drug courts are judged as a safety net diverting
offenders from prison, recidivism rates are ill-fitting criteria to evaluate success.
Instead, retention rates more effectively assess a court's ability to create an
individually tailored, complete treatment regime that is actually utilized by
addicted offenders.22
Whereas social norms crime-control theorists are concerned with the formal
and informal norms of decision that may structure rational choice, 23 rehabilitative
interventionism theorists promote a more or less psychological or
characterological form of treatment for drug offenders.24 Both embrace a form of
behavior modification normally associated with traditional conceptions of
rehabilitation. They privilege certain forms of personally and socially invasive
Maryland's Family Divisions Performance Standard 5.1: A Therapeutic, Holistic, Ecological
Approach to Family Law Decision Making, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 18,
at 125; Vision Statement for District Court of Clark County, Washington, in JUDGING IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 18, at 124 (2003).
21 See, e.g., Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 20, at 811-16.
22 See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 8, at 468 (describing drug court's focus on offender's
needs).
23 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 17, at 664-71.
24 See, e.g., David B. Wexler, Relapse Prevention Planning Principles for Criminal Law
Practice, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 237,
238-39 (Dennis P. Stolle et al., eds. 2000).
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treatment and encourage the judge to reconstitute herself as a penal specialist or
expert in informal methods of behavior modification.
An essential part of the drug court process is the increased surveillance and
incapacitation of individuals who may be entitled to less onerous forms of
diversion from jail. Drug courts generally require some form of incapacitation if
they are to alter the social influences to which an addict is subjected.25 The drug
court process of incapacitation and character transformation revitalizes concerns
surrounding the arbitrariness of punishment that infected prior rehabilitation
schemes. 26 It remains far from clear that character reformation is an appropriate
goal for the criminal justice system to undertake. It is even less evident that
judges, who are generally untrained in the appropriate techniques of supervision
and control, should be the officials dispensing this sort of invasive therapy.
Due process adherents often mistakenly conflate invasive rehabilitative
practices and diversion. They assume that rehabilitation is either an unbridled
good or a sufficient price to pay for diversion. On occasion, however, invasive
practices significantly undermine core due process values. Of particular concern,
given the drug court's structure, are aesthetic and substantive due process values.
The aesthetic due process values27 require "a fair and dignified legal process" 28
designed to "treat[ ] all criminal suspects with dignity and respect."'29 Substantive
or structural due process values require the court to give flesh to the rights
25 See id. at 145; see, e.g., Alan Feuer, Out of Jail, Into Temptation: A Day in a Life, in
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 18, at 18-21. Isolation from degenerate social
influences is a major feature of the social norms movement. See, e.g., Meares, Connections,
supra note 20, at 593 (describing the use of curfews and anti-loitering ordinances to isolate law-
breakers from law-abiders); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLuM. L. REv. 551, 640-45
(1997) (discussing curfews and civil injunctions to exclude gangs from law-abiding
neighborhoods).
26 According to its critics, rehabilitation or penal welfarism depends upon unaccountable
experts engaged in "a new style of exercising power, and a new type of social authority-that
of social expertise." GARLAND, supra note 2, at 46. Garland describes penal-welfarist officials
as "criminological experts and knowledge-professionals," utilizing "top-down mechanisms that
minimize the involvement of ordinary people and spontaneous social processes, and maximize
the role of professional expertise and 'government knowledge."' Id at 40, 34.
27 H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration
of the Current Rules ofAccess andRestraint, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1137-38 (1987).
28 1d at 1138; see also Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure:
The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 219 (1983);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), cited with
approval in Arenella, supra, at 203.
29 Arenella, supra note 28, at 190; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966)
("[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against self-incrimination] is the
respect a government--state or federal--must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens.").
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protected by that process. Penal welfarism, to the extent that it engages in an
invasive therapeutic regime, may conflict with these due process values. In that
case, liberals may be confronted with a Hobson's Choice between endorsing long
periods of supervised diversion versus short periods of incarceration. 30
Somewhat surprisingly, where individual autonomy and dignity are at stake,
these values may be better protected by short periods of incarceration than the
invasive surveillance and behavior modification schemes promoted by therapeutic
justice penal-welfarist and social norms crime-control models. Simply put, even
on the due process model, for certain offenders, prison may be preferable to drug
court.
The solution, however, is not a straightforward endorsement or rejection of
all drug courts as necessarily better or worse than the possible alternatives,
including incarceration. The force of that conclusion, however, depends upon the
length and type of incarceration as compared with the length and type of
rehabilitation provided through the drug courts.
This Article is divided into six general parts. Part II presents a general
account of the drug court's practice and procedure. Part III describes the three
major theories of criminal justice procedure used to evaluate the drug court's
performance. Parts IV, V, and VI use those theories to critique two issues central
to the drug court: treatment and diversion. Part IV explores the manner in which
the penal-welfarist emphasis on treatment competes with, but does not replace,
the crime-control and due process models' emphasis on individual responsibility.
In the context of addiction, treatment and punishment share many of the same
goals. Consequently, the rhetoric of treatment fails to conceal or justify the
punitive nature of much of the rehabilitative process. The social norms version of
crime control is able to endorse the invasive and penal aspects of drug courts:
social norms theorists propose a highly invasive role for drug courts as part of the
process of regulating social norms.3 1 The therapeutic model employed by drug
courts and the judges that operate them adopts a much different view of the role
of punishment in drug courts.32 In Part V, I take a close look at the manner in
which drug courts match offenders to treatment to determine whether drug courts
really engage in therapy or simply use treatment as a form of incapacitation or
detention. In Part VI, I consider whether, and to what extent, drug courts divert
30 Carceral institutions include not only prisons but mental institutions as well. See
GARLAND, supra note 2, at 32-42.
31 Thus, for example, Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel propose that: "one sanction for
non-compliance will be denial of secondary benefits such as housing, employment assistance,
or daycare, and the ultimate sanction for repeated failure or disruption would likely be exclusion
from all but medically urgent services." Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment
Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831,871 (2000).
32 See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 3, at 195 ("As one judge put it, 'he did not see himself as
imposing punishment but providing help."').
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offenders from prison. If drug courts are moderately punitive institutions, then
longer periods of diversion may be worse than shorter periods of incarceration.
Part VII concludes by evaluating the success of drug courts in terms of the three
models and proposes that, from a due process perspective, drug courts raise
serious problems.
II. DRUG COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
In 1989, the Florida Eleventh Judicial Circuit created the first drug court by
administrative order of the Hon. Gerald Weatherington, the then-Chief Justice.
33
The Miami program was set up as a diversion program, "combin[ing] treatment,
including traditional treatment methods such as counseling, fellowship meetings,
education, and rather non-traditional (at least then) methods like acupuncture and
vocational services, with intense judicial review, including frequent reviews of
urinalysis results."34
The exponential growth in the numbers of drug courts is nothing short of
astounding.35 From the first, in Dade County, there were more than eight hundred
drug courts started or in the planning and implementation stages by 2000.36 All
fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico have
founded drug courts.37 By now, drug courts have had a significant impact upon
the lives of thousands of drug offenders. The courts' therapeutic problem-solving
orientation is becoming commonplace in other areas of the legal system.
38
Initially, however, the drug court movement developed without federal regulation
or funding of the various courts. 39 It developed as an ad hoc movement of like-
33 See Hora et al., supra note 8, at 454-55; John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response:
Issues and Implications for Justice Change, 63 ALB. L. REv. 923, 947 (2000); Hoffman,
Scandal, supra note 13, at 1461.
34 Hoffman, Scandal, supra note 13, at 1461.
35 Goldkamp, supra note 33, at 948-50.
36 See NoLAN, supra note 3, at 5.
37 See id at 39.
38 Goldkamp, supra note 33, at 958-60; see also JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra
note 18, at 73-86, 31-72 (discussing problem-solving courts generally, and specifically,
juvenile drug treatment court, "teen court" (or youth court), mental health court, and reentry
court).
39 Goldkamp, supra note 33, at 948. Goldkamp notes:
The first courts were established because of the emergence of a small network of
committed officials, judges, administrators, treatment providers, prosecutors, and
defenders who shared their experiences and newfound expertise, who traveled to one
another's courts at their own expense to observe or to provide assistance. The first courts
were the product of local innovation and "elbow grease," and, as a rule, produced new
initiatives with broad-based support from local justice officials and with very little, usually
locally generated funding.
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minded judges and practitioners, loosely affiliated by 1993 into the National
Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP).40
This section provides a general description of the central features shared by
most drug courts. Three features are of particular importance when assessing the
drug courts' mission. The first is the particularly close therapeutic relationship
between the drug court judge and the offender. The second is the drug courts' role
in matching offender to different types and levels of treatment, and the last is in
the relatively unconstrained power of the judge to reward or sanction the drug
addict.
A. The Central Elements of Drug Court Practice
A lack of uniform characteristics shared by all the courts complicates
comprehensive analysis of drug court practice and procedure. In practice, there is
no ideal or standard drug court; there are, rather, an immense number of local
variations on the basic model.4 1
Drug courts channel offenders into treatment at a variety of different stages of
the criminal justice process. There are, however, two general channeling policies:
deferred prosecution and post-adjudication diversion. Deferred prosecution drug
courts require that the defendant waive his right to a speedy trial and enter
treatment as soon after being charged as possible.42 Under the post-adjudication
model, the defendant is, in fact, convicted, either after trial or after a plea bargain.
In that event, an incarcerative sentence is deferred pending completion of a drug
treatment program.43 Currently, thirty percent of drug courts divert offenders at
the pretrial stage and before a plea agreement ("pretrial" and "preplea"); sixteen
percent are pretrial and post-plea; twelve percent are post-conviction sentencing
institutions; and the rest, forty-two percent, are some combination of the above.44
Federal funding and general procedural standards ensure some degree of
uniformity. 45 These standards, promulgated initially by the NADCP, include a
Id.
4 0 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 39 ("By 1998 more than 2,500 drug court professionals
attended the fourth annual conference of the NADCP, and in 1999 attendance ... exceeded
three thousand.").
41 For some theorists, this experimentalist orientation is the main attraction of drug courts.
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 31, at 841.
42 Murphy, supra note 4, at 476.
43 Id. at 476.
44 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 41.
4 5 See DRUG COURT STANDARDs COMM., THE NAT'L ASW'N OF DRUG COURTS PROF'LS,
DEFINING DRUG COURTs: THE KEY COMPONENTs (1997). These standards were established in
conjunction with the Department of Justice. See Quinn, supra note 14, at 45-46; Drug
Treatment Options for the Justice System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice,
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series of ten "key components" of the drug court4 6 and a set of guidelines
governing the sanctions or rewards applicable to drug court defendants. 47 These
guidelines are tremendously influential. They embody the therapeutic practices of
reward for compliance, limited tolerance of relapse, and graduated sanctions for
non-compliance with the treatment program that are at the core of the drug court's
methodology. In addition, the American Bar Association (ABA) has published a
series of drug court standards to supplement the NADCP guidelines and ensure
that defendants' procedural rights are protected.48
Although neither set of standards is binding on any drug court unless adopted
as the court's operating procedures, Congress has conditioned federal funding
upon the adoption of the NADCP standards. 49 Many state legislatures or judicial
counsels, in formulating their local drug court procedures, clearly respond to the
NADCP and ABA standards. 50 Thus, although drug courts come in a variety of
different models, in general they share certain common features.
51
Based on the NADCP model standards, Judge Peggy Hora has identified five
features generally attributable to drug courts.52 First, drug courts use eligibility
criteria to identify potential participants in the drug court program.53 These
criteria generally require that the defendant be an addict 54 who is either a
nonviolent offender or an offender who poses no security risk to the
Drug Policy, and Human Res. of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 106th Cong. 2 (2000).
This structure has been described as experimentalist because local organizations employ
different problem-solving techniques, sharing their results through "linked systems of local and
inter-local or federal pooling of information." Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 287 (1998).
46 DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMM., supra note 45, at iii-iv.
47 See id at 23-25.
48 JUDICIAL DIVISION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING To TRIAL
COURTS: STANDARD 2.77: PROCEDURES IN DRUG TREATMENT COURTS (2001).
49 See Hoffman, Scandal, supra note 13, at 1529.
50 Because certain programs, such as the Oakland F.I.R.S.T. program, antedate the
NADCP guidelines, they formulated their own procedural rules. Oakland, for example,
formulated its rules under authority delegated by the Judicial Coordinating Committee of
Alameda County. See Brooke Bedrick & Jerome H. Skolnick, From "Treatment" to "Justice"
in Oakland, California, in THE EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INNOVATION
43, 49-50 (W. Clinton Terry, III ed., 1999).
51 See, e.g., DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMM., supra note 45.
52 Hora et al., supra note 8, at 453.
53 Id. at 477-78.
54 The issue of addiction is a complicated one, though at the heart of drug court practice.
In part, these issues arise around the practice of determining who is an addict and whether
addicts are the offenders channeled into drug court. In part, these issues arise around the very
nature of addiction, how to properly describe addiction, whether it can be cured, and what
constitutes a cure. These issues shall be addressed infra.
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community.55 Second, drug court procedure embodies a non-adversarial
partnership among the criminal justice, correctional, and treatment systems.56
This partnership "work[s] together to find care for defendants and to ensure that
they remain in treatment. '57 The procedure is designed to maintain the courts'
continuing jurisdiction over offenders by "delay[ing] the final disposition of cases
[enabling] judges to maintain frequent ongoing contact with defendants. ' 58 Third,
the procedures effect a change in roles of judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel,
each of whom participates as part of a treatment team.59 Fourth, the courts require
offenders to attend a designated treatment program.60 Fifth, courts are able to
accept and account for the potential of relapse by providing a range of prescribed
and known sanctions for defendants who fail to comply with the program.61 Drug
courts use a "system of graduated penalties .... [, which] may include more
frequent contact with the court, increased urine testing, and short periods of so-
called 'shock incarceration,' 62 to ensure compliance with their rehabilitation
program.
The most striking feature of the drug court, and the feature most touted by its
supporters, is its significantly reorganized court procedure premised upon
therapeutic principles of justice. Accordingly, an evaluation of the drug court's
claim to have changed business as usual in the criminal justice system must start
by considering its procedural innovations.
B. The Drug Courts'Procedural Revolution
The alleged novelty of drug courts consists, first, in the judge's role as
personal, hands-on supervisor of individual defendants, 63 and, second, in "the
55 See Hora et al., supra note 8, at 452.
56 Id. at 453.
57 William D. Mccoll, Comment, Baltimore City's Drug Treatment Court.- Theory and
Practice in an Emerging Field, 55 MD. L. REV. 467, 472 (1996).
58 Boldt, supra note 13, at 1209.
59 1d. at 1210.
60 Id. at 1211.
61 Id. at 1212.
62 1d. at 1211.
63 As one commentator put it:
These judges are not neutral fact finders; they actively direct the proceedings, track the
progress of participants, and administer a system of rewards and sanctions sua sponte. This
novel judicial role confers great institutional power-including the power to sentence
offenders to periods of incarceration--4o someone assuming a role traditionally played by
a probation officer. While conflating these institutional roles may be efficient, it departs
considerably from the traditional American conception of the judicial role.
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supervised referral of identified defendants into treatment. '64 Both innovations
work to reinstate the central, active role of the judge and the team orientation
found under the administrative model. This change of focus has been represented
as a "fundamental paradigm shift injustice."65
Drug courts replace the predominantly punitive orientation of traditional
approaches to crime control66 and rehabilitation with "an approach that seeks to
confront and meliorate the problems associated with persons who appear in the
criminal caseload."'67 These courts eschew the due process accusatorial or
adversarial model of courtroom practice. Under that form of procedure, the judge
adopts a passive role that tasks the parties with investigating facts, interrogating
witnesses, and developing proposals for treatment. The drug court judge no
longer relies upon treatment proposals developed by a probation officer, subject
to the prosecutor's and defense counsel's arguments over their propriety for the
particular defendant. Instead, the drug court incorporates an invasive model of
criminal procedure within the courtroom with the judge at the helm. "[J]ustice
and therapy are no longer separate enterprises. Instead, they are fully merged into
the common endeavor of therapeutic justice."68
In drug court, the judge not only retains his authority to set the terms of
treatment but now also assumes the role of regulating it. The court, rather than the
treatment center, becomes the focal point of the treatment process. The other
participants-prosecutor, defender, and defendant (or the drug court's "client")--
are required to adopt non-traditional roles.69 They are supposed to form, along
with the judge, a treatment team dedicated to the rehabilitation of the drug-
addicted defendant. 70 The team organization replaces the adversarial, adjudicative
orientation of traditional courts with a therapeutic approach to drug addiction. The
prosecutor and defender become partners collaborating in an effort to rehabilitate
Developments in the Law: Alternatives To Incarceration, Il1 HARV. L. REv. 1863, 1918
(1998) (footnotes omitted).
64 Boldt, supra note 13, at 1210.
65 Goldkamp, supra note 33, at 924.
66 See GARLAND, supra note 2 at 1-3.
67 Goldkamp, supra note 33, at 925. See also Hora et al., supra note 8, at 468.
But this opportunity to intervene and break the cycle of drugs and crime requires
something other than the traditional criminal justice methods that have thus far proved
costly and ineffective. DTCs represent just the kind of new, therapeutically based system
which is capable of addressing the root cause of drug-related crimes.
Id.
68 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 37.
69 See id at 75-89.
70 Id at 75-76.
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the addicted client.71 The defender must modify or mute her traditional role, "take
a step back, [and] not intervene actively between the judge and the participant...
[to] allow that relationship to develop and do its work."'72 Under the treatment
team model, the offender's most direct relationships are, therefore, not with his or
her counsel, but with the judge and the treatment officer.
The judge's primary role shifts from the determination of guilt to the
provision of therapeutic aid. The judge's dominant concern is to ensure the
treatment and rehabilitation of the offender.73 The court's procedure emphasizes
"knowledge" of the "self-as-addict" and treatment.74 The treatment process is
organized around disclosure: "the identification, assessment, and communication
of emotions are central to the change process that distinguishes the drug court
program." 75 The judge "will frequently engage in a dialogue with the offender,"76
adopting the roles of "confessor, taskmaster, cheerleader, and mentor; in turn
exhorting, threatening, encouraging and congratulating the participant for his or
her progress, or lack thereof."77
71 See, e.g., id. at 72-89; Pamela L. Simmons, Comment, Solving the Nation's Drug
Problem: Drug Courts Signal a Move Toward Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 35 GONZ. L. REV.
237, 258 (1999-2000); Hora et al., supra note 8, at 469 (stating that the team approach requires
"cooperation and collaboration ... 'between communities that have been traditionally at odds
and foreign to each other--treatment communities, court communities, prosecutors, defense
attorneys").
72 Quinn, supra note 14, at 47. This description is bome out by the JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, MANUAL FOR OPERATION OF ADULT DRUG COURTS IN NEW JERSEY
(2002), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/dctman.pdf The manual explains
that "[i]n the courtroom setting, the team should function as a collective unit, fully supporting
whatever decision the team and the judge make involving a response to the participant's
behavior." Id. at 29. The New Jersey treatment team, though larger than the Oakland or
Brooklyn variants, includes judge, prosecutor, defender, and probation officer. Id at 28-29. The
manual does, however, emphasize that the defender should "perform traditional defense
counsel functions with regard to the plea and sentencing processes." Id at 31.
73 See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 141 (quoting Judge McKinney of Syracuse for the
proposition that 'the issue of guilt/innocence is not of concern'); see also id at 142 (quoting
Judge Schma's statement that "the admittance of guilt is 'pretty much immaterial').
74 Id. at 140 ("[T]he notion of guilt is made increasingly less relevant .... Guilt ... is
philosophically non-germane... to such a process.").
75 Id at 112.
76 Philip Bean, Drug Courts, the Judge, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in DRUG COURTS: A
REVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 236 (1999).
77 Drug Treatment Options, supra note 45, at 16 (testimony of Judge Jeffrey Tauber).
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1. Therapeutic Relationship Between Judge and Offender
The central focus of the drug court is the relationship between judge and
offender. Under the new, therapeutic orientation, the hallmarks of the drug court
judge's role are, first, discretion in responding to the needs of her "clients" 78 and,
second, establishing "a personal 'on-going, working relationship' with the
offender."79 Over the course of his or her participation in drug court, each
offender engages in an intense and direct interaction with the judge directed
towards "hold[ing] the defendant accountable for her actions during the course of
treatment and reinforc[ing] one another in actions taken to ensure that the
defendant stays in treatment whenever possible and appropriate." 80
The judge "[N]o longer plays the role of neutral fact-finder, but rather
"actively direct[s] the proceedings, track[s] the progress of the participants, and
administer[s] a system of rewards and sanctions sua sponte."81 The judge
therefore participates in a relationship with the offender, championing the
offender's successful rehabilitation, as well as the difficulties and dangers of
relapse. By entering into a relation with the offender, drug court judges suggest
that they are better able to promote therapeutic goals by gaining a particular and
personal knowledge of each offender. The judge's aim is to develop a flexible,
individuated, responsive interaction with each offender, directed at curing the
offender of his or her addiction, and in which "there are no hard and fast rules"
governing how the judge does so.82
The drug courts' methodology marks a dual attack on old-style criminal
justice. Its strong emphasis on interventionist styles of interaction and authority
reject the propriety of due process restrictions on the courts' therapeutic models.
Drug courts also, however, dismiss the supposedly soft approach of prior
rehabilitative regimes. They seek to bolster the safety net model of rehabilitation
with tough love. Drug courts treat the addicted offender as in need of the shock
and structure provided by sanctions, so long as those sanctions are consistently
applied and so graduated as to recognize the role relapse plays in the therapeutic
process. Rehabilitation in the drug court is not a process of 'referring, re-
referring, and re-re-referring' recalcitrant offenders to treatment regimes in hope
78 See Hora et al., supra note 8, at 469 ("The drug offender becomes a client of the court,
and judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel must shed their traditional roles and take on roles
that will facilitate an offender's recovery from the disease of addiction."); see also NOLAN,
supra note 3, at 112.
79 Simmons, supra note 71, at 259.
80 Hora et al., supra note 8, at 472.
81 Simmons, supra note 71, at 259.
82 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 105. See generally id. at 100-06.
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of effecting a cure.83 Rather, drug courts envisage the consistent application of
sanctions as part of the therapeutic process, one that imposes structure on the
addicts' lives.
2. Provision of Treatment to Offenders
Generally, the court mandates supervision of drug offenders for one year and
spreads treatment over a variety of phases, from intake, to counseling and drug
education, to aftercare and transition issues.84 Each phase employs progressively
less intensive supervision of the offender.85 The first phases are generally highly
intensive and can require as much as four days per week of group and individual
counseling and education or attendance at treatment providers as well as regular,
often weekly, court appearances. 86 Frequent urine testing is generally required
throughout the program.
Matching offenders to particular treatment providers is central to the court's
mission. In determining what treatment is appropriate, the drug court judge
generally has a range of available treatment options from which to choose. Most
require visits with a probation officer and a drug education component, along
with the mandatory urine tests. In addition, some form of group or individual
counseling is required.
Of the programs offered by treatment providers, the least restrictive are the
self-help programs modeled upon Alcoholics Anonymous or its drug counterpart,
Narcotics Anonymous.
These programs are designed to promote themes of acceptance, moral
responsibility and spiritual growth through a process of achieving twelve steps.
In the first three steps, the abuser recognizes powerlessness over the substance
and develops a commitment to a higher spiritual power. In steps four through
nine, the abuser deals with character defects and guilt and begins to develop
ways to rebuild self-esteem and relationships. The last three steps involve a
renewed commitment to past steps and spreading the message to others. 87
Outpatient drug-free treatment programs also employ some form of "informal
peer discussions, twelve-step meetings, recovery training or self-help and relapse
83 Sam Torres, Should Corrections Treat or Punish Substance-Abusing Criminals?, FED.
PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 18, 20.
84 Hora et al., supra note 8, at 475.
85 See id.
86 James R. Brown, Note, Drug Diversion Courts: Are They Needed And Will They
Succeed In Breaking The Cycle Of Drug-Related Crime?, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 63, 90-91 (1997).
87 William G. Meyer & Jack Lutes, Sentencing the Drug Offender, 21 COLO. LAw. 657,
662 (1992).
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prevention strategies."88 The proportion of drug offenders in such programs is
relatively high: "Almost 50 percent of all persons in drug treatment are involved
in this type of clinical program. The type of treatment available varies widely.
The treatment emphasizes counseling instead of medication but may consist of
loosely structured 'rap' groups or very structured clinical approaches."89 Inpatient
treatment programs, which generally last from three to four weeks,90 utilize
similar approaches in a hospital setting.91 Residential treatment is a more
intensive therapeutic modality. It usually lasts from three to six months and
"focus[es] the addict on eliminating drug usage, reestablishing family ties and
providing the addict with basic survival skills."92
The most restrictive and longest lasting treatment program is the therapeutic
community. Communities such as Synanon, Daytop, and The Phoenix House, are
"known for their hands-on, confrontational approach to addictive behavior."93 In
the therapeutic community, the goal is to force the offender to confront his or her
addiction and "change personality traits and behavior, ' 94 and "[t]reatment is
conceptualized as a process of emotional maturation achieved through heightened
self-awareness and self-discipline. In this process, the community serves as the
primary therapeutic agent, challenging the resident to accept responsibility
through forced self- reflection and acceptance of menial chores."9 5 Such
programs are of long duration, often lasting from six to twenty-four months, and
some form of aftercare may be mandatory.96 Drug courts may use each of these
treatment options depending upon their availability and the addict's progress
through the treatment process.
3. Expressing Empathy Using Praise and Sanction
The central feature of drug court is its novel style of courtroom practice. The
NADCP standards empower the judge to reward compliance with the program by
88 Lisa Rosenblum, Note, Mandating Effective Treatment for Drug Offenders, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1227 (2002).
89 Meyer & Lutes, supra note 87, at 662.
90 Id.
91 See Rosenblum, supra note 88, at 1227-28; Hon. Stephen C. Cooper, The Carrot and
the Stick How Effective Sanctions and Incentives Succeed in Overcoming Addiction, MICH.
B.J., Jan. 2003, at 20, 24; Meyer & Lutes, supra note 87, at 662.
92 Meyer & Lutes, supra note 87, at 662.
93 Timothy Edwards, The Theory and Practice of Compulsory Drug Treatment in the
Criminal Justice System: The Wisconsin Experiment, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 283, 318.
94 Meyer & Lutes, supra note 87, at 662.
95 Edwards, supra note 93, at 319.
96 Meyer & Lutes, supra note 87, at 662; see also Rosenblum, supra note 88, at 1226-27.
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providing "[e]ncouragement and praise from the bench; [and c]eremonies and
tokens of progress," 97 and to respond to or sanction noncompliance by issuing
"[w]arnings and admonishment from the bench in open court ... [or]
[c]onfinement in the courtroom or jury box."98 The goal, which is embedded in
the structure of the treatment model most drug courts employ, is to encourage the
offender to realize that the program is designed for his or her own benefit, so that
he or she eventually comes to identify with the judge and the drug court system,
expressing "appreciat[ion] [for] the help and care offered."99
There are at least two ways in which to understand the distinctive courtroom
practice employed by drug court judges. One version (which, as we shall see, is
compatible with the penal-welfarist model) regards drug court offenders as, at the
very least, incipient addicts who have a non-voluntary and irrational craving for
their drug of choice.100 This is the disease model of addiction favored by many
judicial proponents of therapeutic justice.' 0' Treatment, on the disease model,
consists in isolating the addict from the drug she craves and modifying her
behavior by a process of training such that she internalizes non-addictive
norms. 102 Social norms theory suggests a different understanding of addiction. It
is compatible with treating drug offenders as---at least moderately--rational and
so susceptible to formal and informal pressure to accept norms promoting law-
97 DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMM., supra note 45, at 24.
9 8 1d at 24.
99 Bean, supra note 76, at 241.
100 Hora et al., supra note 8, at 464-68.
101 The disease model of addiction claims that addiction is a biological or psychological
propensity to crave drugs. See, e.g., id. In contrast, other theorists explain addiction by primarily
environmental or social factors. See, e.g., Herbert Fingarette, Addiction and Criminal
Responsibility, 84 YALE L.J. 413 (1974-1975) [hereinafter Fingarette, Addiction]; Herbert
Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In Search of a Factual Foundation for the "Disease Concept
of Alcoholism", 83 HARV. L. REv. 793 (1969-1970) [hereinafter Fingarette, Perils]. For a
graphical description of the difference between the disease model and environmental model, see
STANTON PEELE & CHARLES BUFE, RESISTING 12-STEP COERCION: How TO FIGHT FORCED
PARTICIPATION IN AA, NA, OR 12-STEP TREATMENT 133 (2000). Two of the most prominent
advocates of therapeutic jurisprudence have contested the link between the disease model and
therapeutic jurisprudence. See Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug Treatment Court:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 18, at 108-
09. Nonetheless, many judges associate drug courts, and the therapeutic model espoused
therein, with the 12-step model of addiction. In addition to Judge Hora, for example, Judge
Lawrence Terry of the Santa Clara drug court "tells people [that] ... he's going to push them,
shove them, box them by using the threat of incarceration to get them to start down the path of
12-step recovery." Shannon Lafferty, Terry Emphasizes Counseling in San Jose, in JUDGING IN
A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 18, at 26.
102 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 91, at 23 (emphasizing role of training in treating
offenders).
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abiding behavior. 103 The rational choice model favored by social norms theorists
is, as we shall see, compatible with the crime-control model.
Under the therapeutic justice version of drug court procedure, rewards and
sanctions are part and parcel of a training process in which the offender is to be
weaned off his or her anti-social behavior.' 0 4 Any opportunity to reward positive
behavior may be utilized: one judge awards drug "[t]est subjects who had a
negative test result ... the opportunity to draw from a fish bowl for prizes, which
ranged from nothing at all to nominal prizes (a dollar, a pencil, etc.) up to a
TV."1°5 The policy behind such rewards can be quite explicit. As the judge
explains:
Anyone who has tried to train a pet knows how important [are immediate,
consistent, and certain consequences for both negative and positive behavior]. If
your pet messes up when you are not at home and the sanction comes hours later
when you get home, the pet doesn't connect the punishment with the behavior
but rather with you and your coming home. If the pet obeys a command, but
your praise is not automatic, that reinforcement is lost.... This truth has recently
been confinmed by scientists studying human brains. All rewards, even verbal
praise, seem to register as part of the dopamine reward system within the
brain. 106
Training takes a variety of forms. In some courts, the judge delivers
motivational talks and encourages offenders to testify about their life experiences,
with each offender's contribution receiving, as reinforcement, a round of
applause. Graduation ceremonies are a common reward for the offenders who
have successfully completed a stage of the rehabilitation process.' 0 7 In the course
103 See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and
Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 633 & n.39 (2001) (reviewing POSNER, supra note
17) (suggesting, as part of a rational choice model of action, that actors with "bad" social norms
are likely to be obese or addicted (citing POSNER, supra note 17, at 21)). Tracey Meares
provides an extended discussion of the relation between social norms, drug possession, and
drug trafficking. See Meares, Place, supra note 20, at 684-94. For a slightly different take on
the relation between social norms and crimes premised upon addiction, such as alcoholism and
drug crime, see William J. Stuntz, Essay, Race, Class, And Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795
(1998).
104 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 71; NOLAN, supra note 3, at 37; Hora et al., supra note
8, at 442-54; McColl, supra note 57, at 468-70.
105 Cooper, supra note 91, at 23.
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 3, at 102; Claire McCaskill, Combat Drug Court: An
Innovative Approach to Dealing with Drug Abusing First Time Offenders, 66 UMKC L. REV.
493, 498 (1998) (noting that purpose of ceremony is to recognize each drug addict for their
success).
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of such ceremonies, each of the graduates receives a token of success, such as a
certificate, a T-shirt, and, with some judges, a hug. 108
Sanctions are also part of the therapeutic process. They vary from the quite
traditional to the exotic.109 Although most courts publish guidelines setting forth
the range of applicable sanctions,' 10 some do not. 111 The more traditional
sanctions "include: (1) a verbal warning from the judge; (2) demotion to a
previous stage; (3) incarceration for a period of days or weeks depending on the
program number and severity of the violation; and (4) an increase in status
hearings, treatment sessions, or urine tests."11 2 Prolonged relapse results in
termination from participation in the program. The terminated offender returns to
the court system or is imprisoned depending on whether the drug court is a pre- or
post-sentencing program. Depending on the court, short spells of imprisonment
may be used to punish relapse at an early stage of the process or as a last resort. 113
In some programs, many, if not most, of the offenders will spend a short period of
time in prison due to some sort of violation.' 14
Alternatively, the judge can impose sanctions that are more "expressive,"" 15
more in the manner of "shaming" sanctions. 116 One of the more usual early
108 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 102. In the Hampden County Juvenile Drug Court, located in
Springfield, Massachusetts, for example, success is celebrated by giving offenders Burger King
vouchers. Conversation with court officer, Hampden County Juvenile Drug Court, in
Springfield, Mass. (Oct. 6, 2004).
109 Two of the major proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence clearly worry about the
nature of some drug court sanctioning programs, admonishing that the due process limits
articulated in In re Gault must be respected. See Introduction, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC
KEY, supra note 20, at 3-4.
110 For example, "Florida's Broward County drug court has specific guidelines for
increased sanctions for clients failing urine analysis." See Brown, supra note 86, at 91 n.280
(citing Ronnie Green, Drug Court Audit Praises 'Favorable Results,' But Pans Judge, THE
HERALD, Feb. 18, 1995, at 1BR).
111 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 91, at 23.
112 Lynne M. Brennan, Comment, Drug Courts: A New Beginning for Non-Violent Drug
Addicted Offenders-An End to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 355,380
(1998); see also Brown, supra note 86, at 91.
113 Compare the Broward County, Florida program where the judge may impose weekend
incarceration on offenders who fail two tests and dismiss offenders who return ten failed tests,
Brown, supra note 86, at 91 n.280 (citing Green, supra note 110, at IBR) with Dorf and Sabel's
claim that "[d]rug courts, for their part, recognizing both the special nature of prison, and its
continuity with other sanctions, use it very sparingly." Dorf& Sabel, supra note 31, at 870.
114 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 86, at 91 n.283 ("In Miami's drug court, as many as 60%
of the clients spend a short time in jail for failing to adhere consistently to their treatment plan.")
(citing PETER FINN & ANDREA K. NEWLYN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DADE COUNTY DIVERTS
DRUG DEFENDANTS TO COURT RUN REHABILITATION PROGRAM 10 (1993)).
115 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591,611 (1996). Kahan is one of the major social norms theorists.
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sanctions is an increase in frequency of court appearances. Appearances that are
more frequent enable the judge to admonish the offender and empathize with the
consequences of future relapse. Another shaming sanction requires offenders to
spend the hearing sitting in the jury box. The jury box becomes a sort of rogues
gallery or penalty box for relapsing offenders. From there, they are exposed to
others who have successfully modified their behavior as a result of the treatment
program.11 7 The NADCP standards explicitly recommend this simple way of
modeling good behavior. "18
Again, the purpose of expressive sanctions may be understood from a social
norms or therapeutic jurisprudence perspective. From the point of view of rational
choice theory, expressive sanctions help communicate the "social meaning" of the
offense. 119 They provide an alternative community response to drug addiction,
one that both models law-abiding behavior and condemns law-breaking by
providing a community of drug court peers to support or sanction the relevant
conduct. 120
From a therapeutic perspective, these sanctions are part of the process of
training and behavior modification. They communicate to the offender the court's
attitude to his or her progress. 121 The different punishments are often justified
116 See Brown, supra note 86, at 92 ("In some courts, clients make weekly appearances
before the judge, along with treatment and probation officials, to report on the client's status and
progress."). For example, one judge conducts random urinalysis tests in the court itself,
requiring the director of the treatment program to test samples before the bench. This sanction is
so effective that "[s]ome of [the offenders] who haven't used [drugs] get so scared they might
be willing to say they use, just to not put them through the anxiety of going through the test."
NOLAN, supra note 3, at 75.
117 See Brown, supra note 86, at 92.
118 DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMM., supra note 45, at iii-iv.
119 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 609, 615-17 (1998); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar
Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365,
380-83 (1999).
120 For the importance of peer support to social norms theories, see, for example, Dan M.
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349,354 (1997).
121 For example, Hon. Stephen C. Cooper suggests that:
REALITY IS IN THE EYES OF THE BEHAVER.
... [S]ome defendants [do not] mind jail or work release-it gets them away from
unpleasant family situations and provides meals and a bed. Others look upon having been
in jail as a badge of honor and report to their friends how they survived. Some see jail as
easier to do than fines, therapy, daily testing, or other intrusive requirements....
... The same sanction may have no real effect on a wealthy person who can easily pay, or
a poor person who would be frustrated by having no chance whatsoever of paying.
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because imposed "therapeutically" rather than punitively. They are "a weapon to
keep clients on the road to success."1 22
Short terms of incarceration have been called "shock therapy," "motivational
jail," and "my motel." The imposition of a "sanction" is not a form of punishment
but a parent-like response. "[Incarceration] is not really punishment at all, but a
therapeutic response to the realistic behavior of drug offenders in the grip of
addiction" and sanctions are really just the "restructuring of the defendant's
lifestyle."' 123
The drug court's courtroom practice is expressly modeled upon therapeutic
principles. The court's informal, invasive structure permits the judge great leeway
to "know" offenders by appreciating "the personalities and backgrounds of [the]
offenders" and gaining "the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics." 124 The judge has tremendous discretion to
use that knowledge to restructure the offender's life and social relations.' 25 As an
empathetic expert, the judge is expected to tailor the system of rewards and
punishments to best suit the individual offender's treatment needs. 126 The other
experts on the treatment team, including rehabilitative experts and treatment
providers, supply additional information. Offenders participate by accepting the
normative values imposed by the court or the treatment provider and modifying
their behavior accordingly. This offender-oriented practice is a distinctive feature
of the therapeutic style of practice. 127
The therapeutic imperative underlying much of what the drug court does is
expressly premised upon a rejection of the traditional prescription to treat like
cases alike and of other due process protections that stand in the way of the
relationship between judge and client.' 28 Instead, court practitioners promote an
ad hoc, case-by-case client-centered model ofjudging.
Cooper, supra note 91, at 23.
122 Brown, supra note 86, at 91.
123 Hora et al., supra note 8, at 470, 523.
124 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,246,247 (1949).
125 Here the penal-welfarist model provides a useful guide to further research. The issue is
to determine whether this is truly penal welfarism or some system of court practice more
bounded by due process restraints. Studies could be conducted of individual courts or by
comparing courts to establish the ways in which the judge uses his or her discretion to punish
and/or reward offenders and the extent to which his or her discretion is bounded by specific
court rules or policies.
126 Some court-by-court study of the training provided to individual judges would help
establish how seriously the drug court takes this treatment role.
127 See GARLAND, supra note 2, at 137 (contrasting offender-oriented penal welfarism
with victim-oriented severity).
128 See JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIc KEY, supra note 18, at 129-55.
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The judge may cite the results of the latest drug test, showing that he or she
is pleased or disappointed with the results of the offender's progress, but there is
no attempt to determine the validity of the tests, or allow defense lawyers to put
any plea [in] mitigation. The offender's family may corroborate or discount the
offender's story, again with little or no apparent concern for evidential or
procedural rules. In some courts the offender's "significant other"... may
participate in the program, again with no apparent regard for the rules of
evidence or other procedural matters, including matters of jurisdiction where
"significant others" become subject to the same sanctions as the offenders. 129
In drug court, partiality thus becomes an important aspect of the judge's
commitment to the therapeutic ideal. "The goal of getting the drug court client
well ... now supersedes the goal of consistency and impartiality,"' 130 and so the
judge is no longer an aloof dispenser of justice but rather the offender-client's
stem but steadfast friend, someone "on the same level" as the defendant.131 It is
the judge who is now the client's advocate, empowered on the basis of his or her
relationship with the individual offenders to embrace and cry with then-
literally132-when they celebrate their success and punish the offender's failures
as a passionate, engaged, heroic advocate for their client's health.
The judicial role is that of the therapeutic expert empowered to determine the
best interests of the offender. The drug court's therapeutic paradigm requires the
judge to discount the offenders' accounts of their goals for or responses to
treatment unless they fit a fairly rigid script. Offenders are required to get with the
program, both as a therapeutic imperative and on pain of punishment. Failure to
do so results in the imposition of sanctions that are often justified as the sort of
short, sharp shock necessary to alert addicts to the consequences of continued
relapse. 133
The rhetoric of treatment and therapy is thus used to impose periods of
detention inside and outside of prison. Some forms of detention emphasize
behavior or character modification. Others simply incapacitate. Some do so in
prison, others in the courtroom or private facilities. The underlying justification
for such sanctions is that they are not punishment but therapeutic treatment and
training. They are not penal decisions, requiring due process procedure to protect
129 Bean, supra note 76, at 237.
130 Id at 104.
131 See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 101. Drug court advocates do not discuss the
contradiction inherent in the roles of equal and superior. It is here that the comparison with
juvenile courts and the rejection of parens patriae has most bite. At least one judge has
expressed the relationship between judge and defendant in terms of "parenting." Id. at 103.
132 Seeid at 102.
133 Seeid at 196.
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the offender's rights. 134 Rather, they are justified as treatment decisions made by
the judge as rehabilitation expert. 135 The availability of treatment to occupy the
field of penal justifications in this context is the subject of the next two sections.
III. THREE MODELS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
In this section, I propose to provide three models against which to evaluate
the drug court's claim to provide a "revolutionary,"' 136 "innovative"13 7 approach
to court-dispensed justice. The attractiveness (and necessity) of the drug courts'
procedural, managerial, and therapeutic imperatives helps explain these courts'
exponential rise since they first appeared in 1989.138 Drug courts are appealing, I
claim, precisely because they accommodate traditional criminal justice values
expressed through the administrative, due process, and penal welfare descriptions
of crime control. By representing these traditional values in a modem guise, drug
courts can appear as all things to all people, while acting upon a much more
limited range of penal goals.
134 See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (holding that a decision to
impose more punitive sanction requires due process hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471,486-487 (1972) (requiring due process hearing prior to revoking probation).
135 See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 231 (1990) (finding an inmate's
interests "adequately protected" where treatment decision is made "by medical professionals
rather than ajudge").
136 See Hora et al., supra note 8 at 439; NOLAN, supra note 3, at 39, 216 n.3; HON.
JEFFREY TAUBER, Preface, in DRUG COURTS, supra note 76.
137 The idea that the drug court is an innovative form of justice is repeated like a mantra
by its supporters. See Goldkamp, supra note 33, at 936, 937, 939 (referring to "the drug court
innovation"); JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE AND TREATMENT
INNOVATION: THE DRUG COURT MOVEMENT (1993); John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing
Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 291 (2000)
(identifying drug courts as a "new policy innovation"); McCaskill, supra note 107, at 493;
Brown, supra note 86, at 64 ("One exciting and innovative approach to addressing drug-related
crime has been the establishment of 'drug diversion courts."'); Hon. William D. Hunter,
Feature, Drug Treatment Courts: An Innovative Approach to the Drug Problem in Louisiana,
44 LA. B.J. 418, 418 (1997); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 31, at 843.
138 The Florida Court of Appeals has noted that:
There are currently drug courts in forty-eight of our fifty states, and in England, Canada,
Australia, South America, Bermuda, and the Caribbean. There are currently seventy-four
drug courts (thirty-eight adult, twenty-two juvenile, twelve dependency, and two re-entry)
in the State of Florida.
Smith v. State, 840 So. 2d 404,407-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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A. The Three Models: Crime Control, Due Process, and Penal Welfarist
The drug court can be understood from a number of different perspectives:
for present purposes the two most important are as a model for court practice or as
a law-enforcement institution. Traditionally, courts occupy a neutral role in the
criminal justice system. 139 The adversarial courtroom proceedings generally
empowered the adjudicative function of the court.140 The court's role in the
criminal justice system, in the traditional model, is as neutral arbiter of the
competing interests in the criminal justice system.141 Accordingly, some of the
main issues facing those concerned with the role of courts in the criminal justice
system have been at what point to invoke the power of the court, how much
power to give the court, and how much discretion to give the court to effect
whatever power it enjoys.
Herbert Packer famously articulated two sets of values by which to assess
and critique the actual practices and procedures employed within the criminal
justice system at any given time.142 Each provides a different set of goals or
priorities by which to determine what should be the role of the government in
apprehending and prosecuting offenders, what should be the offender's rights and
duties once apprehended, and when and how the court should oversee the process
of detention, apprehension, and sentencing. Each therefore promotes a discrete
procedural style in processing the offender through the criminal justice system.
139 See Chayes, supra note 9, at 1286.
[T]he traditional conception of adjudication carried with it a set of strong notions about the
role of the trial judge. In general he was passive. He was to decide only those issues
identified by the parties, in accordance with the rules established by the appellate courts,
or, infrequently, the legislature.
Id. See also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 376, 376 (1982) (stating the
"classical view of the judicial role . . . [in which] judges are not supposed to have an
involvement or interest in the controversies they adjudicate.").
140 See Chayes, supra note 9 at, 1282--84 (suggesting that adversarial posture is important
for neutral, passive, adjudicative role ofjudge).
141 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment requires due process to be assessed by "neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime").
14 2 See Packer, supra note 16. These models have been resurrected by Peter Arenella, see
Arenella, supra note 18, and most recently by Professor Ogletree. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR.,
The Rehnquist Revolution in Criminal Procedure, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL
AcTIvisM ON THE RIGHT (H. Schwartz, ed., 2002). See also Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the
Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 591, 592 (1990). However, the distinction is
now a matter of hornbook analysis. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 2.01 [B], at 22-25 (2d ed. 1997).
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The crime-control model is organized around the principle of repression of
crime and affords the executive branch wide discretion in pursuing and
prosecuting criminals. 143 It limits or delays the use of formal procedural checks
enforced through neutral judicial scrutiny. 44 The crime-control model's primary
goal is to empower the executive branch in combating crime; accordingly, it
"exhibits significant confidence in the government's identification of suspects as
guilty of the crime with which they are charged."' 145
An influential and purportedly liberal, modem version of the crime-control
model has variously been described as legal pragmatism, 146 "norm focused
scholarship," the "New Chicago School,"'147 and the "new discretion scholars."'1 48
These scholars suggest, first, that social norms are a more important factor in
explaining compliance with the law than legal sanctions and, second, that the law
143 This discretion includes the use of deceptive or borderline violent practices to ensure
the waiver of rights before the accusatorial process begins. See Akhil Reed Amar & Rene B.
Lettow, Fifih Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV.
857, 873-74 (1995) (describing deceptive and intimidating practices used in modem criminal
interrogations). The use of deception has been justified using an approach reminiscent of the
crime-control model. See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L.
REV. 761, 785 (1989) (characterizing defendant's Fourth-Amendment rights as protection
against police misconduct). On Stuntz's account, rights ought to be available only to the
factually innocent, rather than every criminal accused.
144 For example, the requirement that a neutral magistrate issue a warrant (the so called
"warrant requirement.") See, e.g., Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14. Packer calls these forms ofjudicial
oversight "ceremonious rituals." Packer, supra note 116, at 10.
145 OGLETREE, supra note 142, at 56; Arenella, supra note 28, at 224 ("[C]rime control
ideology suggests that criminal procedure should function exclusively to punish the guilty. It
values fair process norms primarily for their instrumental tendency to promote good 'results'
.... .).
146 William H. Simon, Solving Problems v. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge
to Liberal Legalism 48-74 (August 1, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(describing social norms theorists as legal pragmatists).
147 Bernard E. Harcourt, Afier the "Social Meaning Turn ": Implications for Research
Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 179, 179 (2000).
148 Cole, supra note 17, at 1062. Cole emphasizes discretion both because it is a common
response by the various scholars under discussion, though particularly the Chicago and
Columbia schools. His response is to control discretion through clear, mandatory norms. He
thus participates in a tradition of what might be called legalism scholars that would include
LaFave, Amsterdam, and Davis. Because I suggest that the newness of the new discretion is its
focus on community standards of behavior--social norms-and am sympathetic to, but
dubious of, the efficacy of legalistic responses as the only solution to the issues he identifies, I
prefer to emphasize the social and normative aspects of the scholarship.
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is most likely to be obeyed when legal norms reflect social norms. 149 Where
social and criminal law norms are strongly correlated, persons are highly likely to
obey the law voluntarily; where the social and criminal norms are poorly
correlated, or where social norms are fragmented, compliance with the law is
minimal or random. 150
Norms scholars also seek to shift our assessment of the criminal law's impact
away from persons, particularly criminals, and onto communities generally
described by some relatively small locality, for example, "the neighborhood."
Normative scholarship on law-enforcement can best be understood in terms of its
oppositions to an older tradition of liberal legalism: social norms scholars focus
on insiders rather than outsiders, law-abiders rather than law breakers, public
order issues rather than major crimes, local experimentation rather than
centralized standards. They tend to emphasize discretion rather than legalism and
rule-of-law issues and to favor race-neutral rather than race-based explanations of
current policing practices. 151 The emphasis of the social norms is to empower
police by rejecting broad, court-enforced standards of policing or checks on
prosecutorial discretion in favor of highly discretionary forms of policing
designed to reflect a sensitivity to social norms. 152
The governing principle of the due process model the protection of individual
liberty from governmental interference or invasion. The individual's rights are
respected and expressed through an adversarial type of procedure in which the
power of the court is invoked early and often. Due process constrains executive
discretion to surveil, detain, and search suspects. Formal judicial oversight begins
at the pre-trial process and extends throughout the criminal justice process. 153
Guilt must be established formally, through legal adjudicative processes, rather
than assumed or established informally. 154 Defendants are afforded significant
rights and protections, including rights against self-incrimination and the right to
149 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Symposium: The Legal Construction of Norms: Law and
Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REv. 1781 (2000) (examining the
norms and behaviors surrounding tax compliance).
150 Meares, Connections, supra note 20, at 582.
151 For a general discussion of social norms theories, see Simon, supra note 146, at 21-
26; 47-7 1.
152 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 25; Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 20; Dan
M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1153 (1998).
153 Arenella suggests that the due process model constrains executive power by diffusing
through different officials and "allocates considerable power to the judiciary and the
community to review the executive's decisions." Arenella, supra note 28, at 223.
154 See id at 214 (critiquing Packer's distinction between factual and legal guilt, and
suggesting that guilt is to some extent always established normatively).
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counsel. The presumption of innocence and the burden of proof establish core
limits on governmental power.155
Liberal legalism has attempted to revitalize the due process model, most
recently in contrast to the social norms version of crime control. 156 Many of the
liberal legal scholars attempt to impose substantive limits on police power by
requiring transparency and accountability in the enforcement process. More
generally, liberal legalism scholars emphasize the important role that clear norms
of executive conduct play in limiting the power of the police during the
investigatory process.157
Another way in which to distinguish social norms theories from legal
liberalism are their distinctive grounds for imposing punishment. Social norms
theories emphasize that "the individual who complies for normative reasons does
so because she feels an intemal obligation to do so," rather than on the basis of
some external stimulus. 158 In the legal context, legitimate authority is particularly
155 See OGLETREE, supra note 142; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); and
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
156 See, e.g., Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock
Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, U. Cm. LEGAL F. 215, 239-42 (1998).
157 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349 (1973-74); Cole, supra note 17; Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51
U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and
Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 13 (1998).
158 Tracey L. Meares, A Colloquium on Community Policing: Praying for Community
Policing, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1593, 1616 (2002) [hereinafter Meares, Praying]; see also Tracey L.
Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 191, 214
(1998) [hereinafter Meares, Social Organization] (noting that compliance with norms can be
based on agent's internal perception of government legitimacy). The manner in which Meares
distinguishes legitimate from justified authority is substantially identical to the analytic
description. The concepts of legitimacy and justification are normative; they entail a particular,
internal attitude on the part of the law's subjects. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections
to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedure-And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REv. 851, 864-65 (2002); Meares, Place, supra note 20, at 670-80. The sociological model
relies on a psychology-based "theory of procedural justice that does account for the regular
conference in legitimacy in the face of repeated negative outcomes." Tracey L. Meares,
Symposium: New and Critical Approaches to Law and Economics (Part II) Norms Theory:
Norms, Legitimacy andLaw Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REv. 391,402 (2000) [hereinafter Meares,
Norms]. Meares, one of the more prominent scholars of normative criminal law, has indicated a
distrust of philosophical categories of legitimation and justification. She contrasts the "very
distinct and crisp models of legitimacy" with "philosophical notions of what is 'right' and
'just,"' and seems to suggest that the essential difference is that the sociological models "can be
empirically tested and so are more useful to the policymaking enterprise." Id. The psychological
account, however, is strongly reminiscent of the philosophical account provided so far; it
stresses the internal aspect of legitimacy and justification as contrasted with an externalist focus
on outcomes alone. See, e.g., id at 399; Tracey L. Meares, Signaling, Legitimacy, and
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associated with the type of authority exercised by government and consists in "an
amalgamation of perceptions that individuals hold of the law and authorities that
enforce it.' 59 The greater the popular perception of governmental legitimacy, the
greater the likelihood of popular compliance with the law.160
Social norms theories claim to guarantee governmental legitimacy, despite
invasive police, prosecutorial, and sentencing practices, through executive
responsiveness to local concerns: they propose a variety of programs for
including local communities in the process of creating and enforcing executive
norms.161 Accordingly, community or neighborhood participation in enacting or
executing invasive policing and sentencing practices is sufficient to justify the
resulting crime-control regime.162
What I shall call a retributive or moral liberalism version of legal liberalism
asserts a moral basis for punishment: punishment is part of a social conversation
that attempts to determine how one is to participate in society and interact with
others as a moral being. 163 What I shall call, following Jean Hampton, neutral
liberalism asserts that punishments must be those identified by some morally
neutral process that "eschews commitment to any particular moral or religious
code."' 164 Moral liberalism endorses some form of retributivism and apportions
culpability based upon some assessment of moral culpability. 165 Neutral liberal
Compliance: A Comment on Posner's Law and Social Norms and Criminal Law Policy, 36 U.
RICH. L. REV. 407, 410 (2002) [hereinafter Meares, Signaling]; Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When
Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 993 (2003); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility
of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 475-76 (1997). This is far from surprising. Analytic
philosophy is far from being concerned only, or even primarily, with what is just or right. While
sociological and analytic theories similarly distinguish between legitimate and justified
authority, the sociological account rests upon an empirical theory of legitimacy that, at best,
supplements the analytic account.
159 Meares, Norms, supra note 158, at 399.
160 See Meares, Place, supra note 20, at 679.
161 See, e.g., Meares, Norms, supra note 158, at 402-03; Meares, Signaling, supra note
158, at 414-21; Meares, Social Organization, supra note 158, at 214.
162 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 25, at 67-72.
163 See Jean Hampton, Liberalism, Retribution and Criminality, in IN HARM'S WAY:
EsSAYS IN HONOR OF JOEL FEINBERG 159, 168-176 (Jules L. Coleman & Allen Buchanan eds.,
1994) [hereinafter Hampton, Liberalism]. Hampton contrasts what she calls metaphysical
liberalism with neutrality liberalism. I rely upon this distinction. See infra Part VII. See also
Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal ofRetribution, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1659, 1671-85 (1992) [hereinafter Hampton, Correcting Harms] (discussing
retribution as a means of conveying the moral meaning of an act).
164 Hampton, Liberalism, supra note 163, at 170 (emphasis removed).
165 Other moral liberals would include C.S. Lewis, Herbert Morris, and Henry Hart.
While Hampton and Morris disagree over some of the details of the moral liberal justification
for punishment, see Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 163, at 1660-61, they agree upon
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theorists are generally those influenced by the Rawlsian version of justice and use
some version of the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" to derive principles of
punishment. 166 Neutral liberalism requires punishment in response to the
breaking of these agreed-upon rules; such justifications tend to be utilitarian,
derived from the value of deterring individuals from rule-breaking or
rehabilitating those incapable (for whatever reason) of adhering to a system of
rules. 167
Even under the retributivist or moral liberalism version of legal liberalism,
the criminal law "method" operates as an enterprise in govemance using general
norms (or "directions," mostly prohibitions) to sanction the norm subjects for
disobedience, where such sanction includes a "judgment of community
condemnation."' 168 In other words, even under the retributivist model, culpability
must be imposed consequent to some form of general norm rather than on the
basis of some neighborhood standard. This feature of generality distinguishes
legal liberalism from the more community specific and discretionary approach to
investigation and punishment proposed by the social norms model.
A third model of criminal justice organization is penal welfarism or, more
loosely, the rehabilitative ideal. Some theorists consider that penal welfarism
combines features of crime control and due process rather than providing an
independent form of criminal justice legal process. For example, David Garland
suggests that penal welfarism "combin[es] the liberal legalism of due process and
proportionate punishment with a correctionalist commitment to rehabilitation,
welfare, and criminological expertise."' 169 For Garland, apparently, penal
the moral significance of punishment in establishing the individual as a moral being. See id at
1667-68; HERBERT MORRIS, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS
IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 31, 31-57 (1979) [hereinafter MORRIS,
Persons]; Herbert Morris, Some Further Reflections on Guilt and Punishment, 18 LAW & PHIL.
363, 363-78 (1999) [hereinafter Morris, Further Reflections]. So does Lewis. See C.S. Lewis,
The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 301-08 (Stanley E.
Grupp ed., 1971) (rejecting treatment model of punishment in favor of moral one that respects
moral personhood of offender). Hart shares this perspective in rejecting the therapeutic in favor
of a moral conception of criminal law concerned with the moral condemnation of the
community. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401,410 (1958).
166 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971); John Rawls, The
Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251 (1988); see also Jean
Hampton, Liberalism, supra note 163, at 170-176. For a current version of the Rawlsian
justification of punishment, see Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal
Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 307 (2004).
16 7 See, e.g., Hampton, Liberalism, supra note 163, at 170-76; Dolovich, supra note 166,
at 321.
168 Hart, supra note 165, at 402, 403, 404.
169 GARLAND, supra note 2, at 27. On the basis of this comment, Garland would appear to
place penal welfarism within the due process model of criminal justice procedure.
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welfarism is somewhat derivative, in orientation if not procedurally, of the due
process and crime-control models. Penal welfarism may, however, be understood
as a distinctive type of process or procedure that is not primarily, if at all,
concerned with proportionality, due process, or the type of correctionalism that is
distinctive of crime control. 170 In fact, one of the major due process criticisms
directed against penal welfarism has been its failure to consider issues of
proportionality in replacing punishment with treatment. 171
The underlying goal of penal welfarism is the reform of the delinquent
character practiced through a process of intervention in the life of the offender.
172
Rather than focus upon any particular form of investigation, penal welfarism
attempts to develop sociological and psychological criteria by which to identify
those individuals who are at risk, and then match the offender to treatment.
173
Penal welfarism thus empowers quasi-scientific expert authority and
knowledge, 174 requiring the specialization of crime-control and rehabilitative
modes of punishment under the guidance of criminological or penological
experts, 175 and the marginalization of non-specialist lay people, "lawyers and
moralists." 176 Rehabilitative or penal-welfarist procedures emphasize the role of
discretion in "the individualization of treatment based upon expert assessment and
classification." 177 Quasi-therapeutic disciplinary regimes replace traditional court
170 Penal welfarism is also a mode of thinking about punishment. It may be, as Garland
avers, that this sort of punishment has due process protections built in, id at 27, but, again, I
would dispute that claim.
171 See ALLEN, supra note 18. The juvenile court is generally regarded as the primary
exemplar of penal welfarism. The court-led attack on the juvenile court system demonstrates
the antagonism between penal welfarism and due process liberalism. See In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 15-21 (1967) (finding that the failing of juvenile court to protect juvenile rights is based in
unconstitutional rejection of the juvenile's right to due process).
172 Garland himself acknowledges that "[t]he real focus of attention was upon the
delinquent, the criminal character." GARLAND, supra note 2, at 42. Penal welfarism is thus
synonymous with the "rehabilitative ideal." See id at 35 ("In the penal-welfare framework, the
rehabilitative ideal ... was the hegemonic, organizing principle."); see also ALLEN, supra note
18, at 2 (describing the primary goal of the rehabilitative ideal as "effect[ing] changes in the
characters, attitudes, and behavior of convicted offenders."). My description of penal welfarism
relies upon Garland, but there is an extensive literature describing the rehabilitative ideal that
supports his description.
173 See GARLAND, supra note 2, at 40-46.
174 See GARLAND, supra note 2, at 34, 40, 46.
175 See Simon, supra note 1, at 237 (claiming that "[f]or much of the twentieth century
[the influence] ... of expert opinion... was reflected in the formalization of rehabilitation as an
official ideology of state punishment from the 1940s through the 1970s"). See also GARLAND,
supra note 2, at 34 (discussing the centrality of expertise to penal policy).
176 GARLAND, supra note 2, at 40.
177 GARLAND, supra note 2, at 34.
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procedures and provide the justification of and content for rehabilitative styles of
confinement or incarceration.' 78
By the 1980s, penal welfarism had fallen into a seemingly terminal decline,
thanks in large part to a strong rejection of the rehabilitative ideal and the
perception that "nothing works" to cure crime. 179 In recent years, however,
certain features of the penal-welfarist model have been resuscitated as part of a
"therapeutic jurisprudence" movement that emphasizes the social and
psychological impact of legal relationships upon the various participants in the
legal process. 180
Therapeutic jurisprudence primarily requires "the use of social science to
study the extent to which a legal rule or practice promotes the psychological and
physical well-being of the people it affects."'181 "Fundamentally, therapeutic
jurisprudence focuses on the 'sociopsychological ways' in which laws and legal
processes affect individuals involved in our legal system."' 182 The emphasis is on
looking outside legal doctrine "for promising developments in the clinical
behavioral sciences and tries to think creatively about how such work may be
imported into the legal arena... [it] looks not so much to law reform as to the
reform of practice: it concentrates on how existing law, whatever its nature, may
be therapeutically applied."'1 83
One of the major themes in therapeutic jurisprudence is that "social
adjustment [i]s a major goal of therapy."' 84 It is, however, not always clear what
constitutes social adjustment: possible candidates are 'psychological well-being,'
'restoration,' and 'self-esteem." ' 185 The process by which social adjustment is to
be achieved appears to be through the internalization of socially adaptive
178 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 251
(1991); Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modem America, 25
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1111, 1118 (2000); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980);
Lawrence M. Friedman, Dead Hands: Past and Present in Criminal Justice Policy, 27 CUMB.
L. REV. 903, 909 (1996-1997).
179 GARLAND, supra note 2, at 108-09.
180 See, e.g., LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 18; David B. Wexler, Putting
Mental Health into Mental Health: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 27,
27-28 (1992); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Criminal
Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 225 (1998).
181 Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, in LAW
IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 18, at 767.
182 Hora et al., supra note 8, at 444.
183 David B. Wexler, The Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Theory to
Practice, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 691, 696-97 (1999)
184 Slobogin, supra note 181, at 774.
185 Id at 780; see also id. at 792.
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norms. 186 Internalization is accomplished through requiring the offender to
"choose" the proffered treatment: the writings of Bruce Winick, a "'co-founder'
[along with David Wexler] of the movement," 187 have emphasized the
"'therapeutic value of choice," 188 and many legal institutions influenced by the
therapeutic movement engage in a form of "behavioral contracting" to ensure
compliance with (and internalization of) therapeutic norms. 189
Bringing together the emphasis on social science, social adaptation,
internalization, and contracting, drug courts have consistently emphasized the
importance of the disease model of addiction in dealing with drug offenders; in
practice, "[m]any of the DTC procedures reflect[] an understanding of addiction
treatment very similar in substance to the Twelve Steps treatment protocol
espoused by Narcotics Anonymous."190
B. Drug Court Procedure Under The Three Models: Is the Drug Court a
Real Court?
Under the prior versions of the three criminal justice models, the courts
maintained a neutral and objective orientation directed towards overseeing the
criminal justice process.' 9 1 For the due process and crime-control models, the
central issue surrounding the role of the court was at what point judicial oversight
of the criminal justice process would begin. 192 For penal welfarism, the issue was
what amount of judicial deference to expert advice was appropriate. The whole
point of the due process model was to cast the court as a neutral body that
interposed itself between the executive brand and the criminal defendant. The
crime-control model attempted to assure police discretion by delaying such
interposition until relatively late in the criminal justice process. On either due
process or crime-control models, the court was essentially neutral. Under the
186 Accordingly, one way in which to distinguish therapeutic jurisprudence from social
norms theories is to recognize that therapeutic jurisprudence requires the internalization of
norms, whereas social norms theories do not. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, andRegulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 376-86 (1997).
187 Slobogin, supra note 181, at 764.
188 1d.
189 See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, How Judges Can Use Behavioral Contracting, in JUDGING
IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 18, at 227-30. The NADCP recommends contracting with
offenders. See DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMM., supra note 45, at 7.
190 Hora et al., supra note 8, at 474 n. 155.
191 For example, the Supreme Court assented to the use of penal-welfarist expert advice in
setting punishment, but still required the court to adopt a neutral role in determining sentence.
See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,246-247 (1949).
192 See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-
23 (1964).
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penal-welfarist model, a neutral court determines what form of more or less
invasive "treatment."'1 93 Or "individualized, therapeutic justice"'194 is warranted
on the basis of expert advice. The court remains somewhat passive, imposing
psychosocial "mechanisms of power," 195 premised upon understanding 196 the
offender as a deviant or delinquent personality 197 and an object of scientific
knowledge and control.198
This current model of procedure is truly innovative. Under the traditional
penal-welfarist model of court procedure, although there were less due process
protections for offenders,' 99 the court's role was nominally passive. The offender
had less due process protections precisely so that the court could enable the expert
to work upon the offender more efficiently. Due process protections were lowered
to reduce the legal hurdles standing in the way of efficiently channeling offenders
into expert treatment.
The drug court does provide increased due process protections as compared
to prior penal-welfarist courts. Even offenders sentenced under the pre-plea
version of drug court have rights to a speedy trial and judgment that they must
waive as a condition of entry.200 In a post-plea diversion scheme, the defendant
has already admitted her guilt and waived her rights to a speedy trial and
determinate sentence. However, she has had the benefit of the full panoply of
193 Justice Stewart endorsed the medico-legal goals of the juvenile court system in his
dissent in Gault. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 78-81 (1997) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
194 John R. Sutton, The Juvenile Court and Social Welfare: Dynamics of Progressive
Reform, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 107, 110 (1985). See also Marcia Johnson, Juvenile Justice, 17
WHITTIER L. REv. 713, 718 (1996) (describing the juvenile court system as a "therapeutic
system ofjustice for children").
195 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, PowERKNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 39 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION 97 (1990). For an introduction to Foucault's
understanding of power, see id at 92-102.
196 See FOUCAULT, supra note 178, at 251.
[T]he offender becomes an individual to know. This demand for knowledge was not,
in the first instance, inserted into the legislation itself, in order to provide substance for the
sentence and to determine the true degree of guilt. It is as a convict, as a point of
application for punitive mechanisms, that the offender is constituted himself as the object
of possible knowledge.
Id.
197 See, e.g., Gault, 387 U.S. at 23-24 (discussing "disconcerting" use of the term
"delinquent"). Michel Foucault considers that the "carceral system" exists precisely to produce
individuals as "delinquent" as a "pathologized subject." FOUCAULT, supra note 178, at 277.
198 See FOUCAULT, supra note 178, at 251.
199 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
200 E.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1000.1 (a)(3) (Deering 2004).
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protections afforded by the criminal justice process, including the requirement
that she knowingly and intelligently waive her right to trial. The rights implicated
are those of an admitted criminal during and after the sentencing process.
The drug court movement does, however, envisage a much more active role
for the judge than the traditional penal-welfarist court. In drug court, the judge is
the expert; she is no longer an official tasked with balancing the opinions of
expert, prosecutor, and defender.201 The drug court judge adopts an active, rather
than passive, role, seeking to establish a direct, therapeutic relationship with the
offender. While penal and therapeutic experts still have a role to play in advising
on treatment options, therapeutic jurisprudence and penal welfarism
recharacterize the relationship between judge and offender as itself therapeutic-
indeed, the primary therapeutic relationship available to the offender. 20 2 The
judge is empowered to assess and enforce compliance with the various treatment
options based on this relationship, including more or less onerous sanctions.203
One of the distinctive features of drug court, then, is that it rejects the passive
model assumed by the crime-control and due process models, and takes a much
more active role. In this way, it is a quasi-expert institution in the manner of the
penal-welfarist model. Under that model, however, there was some sort of
deference to expert opinion; the court's expertise in sentencing was primarily
moral; therapeutic expertise was exercised through a probation officer's or
psychologist's contribution to the pre-sentence report, which the judge would take
into account when determining how to sanction the criminal.204
Drug courts present a much different situation, one in which the court is cast
as the penological expert. The relationship between judge and offender becomes
primary;205 the judicial encounter with the offender provides the raw data upon
which treatment decisions are based. Such a relationship is not incidental to the
drug court: it is essential, because it places the judge as a direct and powerful
"social influence" upon the offender.20 6 Accordingly, Judge Cooper's quasi-
201 See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-247 (1949).
202 Simmons, supra note 71, at 259; NOLAN, supra note 3, at 105. See generally id. at
100-06.
203 See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 196; Susan Turner et al., A Decade of Drug Treatment
Court Research, 37 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 1489, 1491 (2002).
204 See, e.g., Williams, 337 U.S. at 246-47.
205 See Hora et al., supra note 8, at 476-77, 531; NOLAN, supra note 3, at 43, 101-04.
206 The concept of social influence is taken from the social norms literature. "Social
influence" gives the concept an empiricist twist; it "is the term that social psychologists use to
describe the propensity of individuals to conform to the behavior and expectations of others."
Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 20, at 813; see also Kahan, supra note 120, at 352
("The concept of social influence refers to a pervasive and familiar phenomenon in our
economic and social life: namely, that individuals tend to conform their conduct to that of other
individuals."). Social influence plays an important role in the drug court theater. See NOLAN,
1514 [Vol. 65:1479
DRUG COURTS AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONISM
Pavlovian analogy of modifying an addict's behavior to training a pet is not a
misunderstanding of the relationship, but a rather blunt statement of it.20 7
Further, the courtroom theater central to the therapeutic understanding of the
court may also be presented in social norms terms. The courtroom practice views
the court as a model community, one that serves to emphasize the judge as
channeling community norms of correct behavior. This judicial function is
supplemented by the use of the jury box to serve as a penitent's bench for
relapsed offenders and ceremonies celebrating each stage of recovery. The
relative disempowering of the other courtroom players is thus essential to the
structure of the drug court as transmitter of norms of law-abiding behavior.
Dissent is suppressed so as to clearly express the message of law abiding behavior
and recovery; the relationship between judge-as-social-influence and offender is
prioritized; the judge is empowered with a great deal of otherwise private
information about the offender's drug habits and may supplement such
information by ordering the offender to immediately provide a urine sample.
Evaluations of the propriety of this style of court procedure vary depending
upon which of the criminal justice models one endorses. It is least likely to appeal
to due process liberal legalism, which seeks to impose some form of rule-like
constraint upon the courtroom practice of imposing sanctions. Nonetheless, the
type of sentence imposed may appeal to some legal liberalism scholars.20 8 Crime
control and due process models express different comfort levels with drug court
process, dependent in part upon the stage of the criminal justice process at which
the drug court operates.
Social norms versions of drug courts endorse the court's procedures on the
understanding that the institutions applying them "are not courts at all, but
diversion-to-treatment programs, which are supervised through regular (usually
monthly) quasi-judicial status hearings at which the drug court judge enters into a
dialogue with each defendant about his or her progress in the treatment/re-
habilitation program." 20 9 In this circumstance, the drug court "may be viewed as
'a specialized form of probation, available to a different class of defendants but
sharing many similarities with general probation and commitment for
addiction.' 210 This view has gained a certain currency. 21' On this view, drug
supra note 3, at 101-04. At least one judge has expressed the relationship between judge and
defendant in terms of "parenting." Id, at 103.
207 Cooper, supra note 91, at 23.
208 See, e.g., Hampton, Liberalism, supra note 163, at 159-82.
209 Boldt, supra note 13, at 1252 (quoting Caroline S. Cooper & Joseph A. Trotter, Jr.,
Recent Developments in Drug Case Management: Re-engineering the Judicial Process, 17
JUST. SYs. J. 83, 93 (1994)); see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 31, at 852.
210 People v. Cisneros, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 788 (Cal. App. 2000) (quoting People v.
Superior Court (On Tai Ho), 520 P.2d 405, 410 (Cal. 1974)).
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courts should be described as non-adversarial rehabilitation institutions that have
their procedures over-determined by the personality of the judge, transforming
them into glorified probation programs. Drug court advocates can then justify the
most controversial aspect of the court-its courtroom procedures-by claiming
these courts are outside the adjudicative realm. As such, drug courts are not
required to furnish the due process protections provided by fully-fledged
adjudicative institutions.
Dorf and Sabel appear to focus on the non-adversarial structure of drug courts
to support the claim that drug courts are non-judicial enterprises based upon the
observation that, at the sentencing stage, "[t]he treatment court judge adjudicates
no disputed issues."'212 Selecting this feature is potentially misleading: in a post-
plea program the absence of disputed legal issues is unsurprising. Under the
Brooklyn model, upon which Dorf and Sabel base their observations 213 and
which is a post-plea program, the parties have already agreed to a guilty plea. As
a practical matter, if there remained a dispute between the parties as to the terms
of the plea, no plea could or should be entered. Significant factual matters, such as
compliance with the terms of the program, however, remain. The outcome of
such disputes has important consequences for the offender's liberty interests.
These consequences are often not within the power of non-judicial officials to
decide.
It is true that the drug court judge may adopt many of the techniques
employed by probation officers or social workers in caring for drug-addicted
offenders. This is an essential part of his or her therapeutic role. Nonetheless, the
judge retains and exercises powers that are beyond the scope of any but judges
properly so called. His or her powers are judicial in important respects, and the
drug court retains many of the features indicative of a court. There are at least two
situations in which the drug court is required to act in a fully judicial or
adjudicative manner: during sentencing and again during the status hearing
process, where the court determines the consequences that flow from the
defendant's compliance or non-compliance with the rehabilitation program.
Furthermore, the power to dismiss the charge and remove all stigma of
criminality is as important a carrot as the power to imprison is a stick. Neither
may be wielded by a probation officer without the sanction of a judge.
211 Cooper & Trotter address this issue in an unduly vague manner. Certainly, in the
manner described by Cooper and Trotter (whom Boldt relies on for his assertion that drug
courts are not courts), the drug court appears in a form quite dissimilar to the usual variants:
they are "nonpunitive" and the harshest sanction appears to be termination of participation in
the drug court program. Cooper & Trotter, supra note 209, at 93. For example, Cooper and
Trotter make no mention of the option of short periods of incarceration that are usually
considered essential to the drug courts' role. See id. at 93-98.
212 Dorf& Sabel, supra note 31, at 852.
213 See id.
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What is at stake in the argument over the institutional status of drug courts is,
first, the propriety of creating a judicial institution to oversee rehabilitation and,
second, the procedures by which such an institution should be run, given the
powers therein exercised. 214 If drug courts are formally and factually courts, then
under the due process model at least, a different set of standards of behavior and
procedure apply to the court officials than apply to probation officials. Due
process, therefore, requires that the form of decision-making appropriate to the
liberty revocation process is adjudication.215 That process requires adversarial
argument by zealous advocates and is administered by an impartial judge.
Social norms theorists find it relatively easy to endorse the increased
discretion allotted to quasi-probation officials. They appear willing to tolerate
such discretion in the hands of judges so long as the judicial process is fully
transparent to the local social norms supposed to control the law enforcement
process.216 Generally, however, social norms theorists concentrate on the role of
the drug court as an experimentalist institution mediating between different forms
of treatment provider and different sources of community feedback.217 That is
perhaps because the therapeutic jurisprudence model that dominates most of the
drug courtroom practice emphasizes therapeutic expertise and the centrality of the
disease model in a manner that restricts the influence of community norms. The
differing impact of these different models, one based on rational choice theory,
one on the medical model of addiction, is the subject of the next section.
IV. Do DRUG COURTS "TREAT" ADDICTED OFFENDERS?
A central issue in the justification of the drug court as a penal institution is
how to characterize its procedures. I have suggested that the available critiques
change depending upon whether the court is primarily a penal-welfarist
therapeutic institution or a crime-control social norms one, or engages in due
process liberal legalism. The characterization of drug courts as primarily engaging
in treatment is often presented as the sole available explanation or justification. In
fact, as a seminal Supreme Court debate makes clear, therapeutic justifications,
when presented in the criminal context, must be understood as embodying other
extant criminal justice categories. Of the remaining justifications for drug court,
2 14 See Hoffman, Scandal, supra note 13, at 1473-79.
215 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,484 (1995); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
221-22 (1990) (decision to use restraints); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (transfer to
mental hospital).
2 16 Ensuring legal legitimacy through correlating legal and local norms is a major theme
for social norms theorists. See, e.g., Meares, Signaling, supra note 158, at 415-16; Meares,
Place, supra note 20, at 680; Meares, Norms, supra note 158, at 413-14; Meares & Kahan,
Inner City, supra note 20, at 816; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 31, at 879.
217 See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 31, at 847-51.
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the social norms version of crime control sits more comfortably with the invasive
practice endorsed by most of the courts. While there may be some due process
rationales supporting the drug court, these are harder to employ in light of the
procedure applied in particular courts. The task for the critic is therefore, first, to
understand the benefits and burdens of adopting a particular descriptive paradigm
and, second, to determine how well the drug court performs under each.
This section introduces the Supreme Court's debate in Robinson v.
California218 and Powell v. Texas.219 That debate engages with the dominant
treatment philosophy used in drug courts: the disease model of addiction. The
Robinson and Powell opinions interrogate the availability of the disease model as
a means of understanding criminal responsibility and its consequences for the
treatment or punishment of offenders. In contrast to the disease model, I introduce
a volitional model. Where the disease model is primarily compatible with penal
welfarism, the volitional model comports best with the crime-control version of
social norms or the retributive or moral liberalism version of the due process
accounts of criminal responsibility.220 While neither model wins out, there are
important outcomes for the treatment of addicts depending upon which model
predominates.
A. Drug Courts and the Disease Model ofAddiction
Most drug treatment programs understand addiction as a disease: a
biologically induced susceptibility to cravings for the addictive substance, 221
which may be more or less controllable, depending on the individual addict.
Under this disease model of addiction,222 the addict's propensity to the cravings
never subsides. Rather, her susceptibility is permanent, easily triggered, and
requires constant vigilance in order to remain under the addict's control.223 The
disease model of addiction, although enjoying some scientific support, is
currently controversial even among the medical community. 224 It has received its
218 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
219 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
220 See Hampton, Liberalism, supra note 163, at 168-76. Hampton contrasts what she
calls "metaphysical" liberalism with "neutrality" liberalism. I rely upon this distinction. See
infra Part VII.
221 See Hora et al., supra note 8, at 464-69.
222 See, e.g., Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245, 2296-2307 (1992).
223 Fingarette, Addiction, supra note 101, at 413-17, 419-26, 433-43; Fingarette, Perils,
supra note 101, at 808-12; see also Powell, 392 U.S. at 518 (discussing disease model of
addiction).
224 See, e.g., Powell, 392 U.S. at 522. For a discussion of addiction as explained by social
factors, rather than the disease model, see Gene M. Heyman, Is Addiction a Chronic, Relapsing
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strongest endorsement from a variety of twelve-step programs used to treat
alcohol and narcotic addiction, which in turn enjoy considerable support within
the criminal justice system. 225
The disease model emphasizes the congenital susceptibility of the addictive
character, in part to negate the responsibility of the addict for her addictive
behavior by describing addiction as an illness and refusing to condemn the addict
for having the illness.226 One way in which the disease model attempts to rebut
the moral responsibility of the addict is to identify addiction as a form of
"weakness of the will" or akrasia.227 "Here the claim is that the addict might
know perfectly well what he is doing, and might know perfectly well what he
ought to do, so that no defect of reason is involved; nevertheless his behavior is
not under his control, however that might be construed."228
Weakness of the will is often understood as a motivational failure: one might
recognize that, acting rationally, we ought to perform a particular act or resist a
particular temptation-ingesting addictive intoxicants, for example-and we
even posses the higher order desire to act rationally.229 We act against our will,
however, due to the difference between what one has the most reason to do, what
one ought to do, and what one is motivated to do, what one desires to do; that is,
when our motivations or desires fail to coincide with our reason then our higher
order desire to act rationally fails to guide the manner in which we act.230 On this
view, whether or not we act for good reasons depends upon an "alignment" of
reason and desire, and that "is not really something that is up to the agent to
determine." 231 This claim would work to justify the disease model of addiction by
suggesting that the addict's cravings are not subject to rational control but rather
Disease?, in DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG POLICY: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL DEPENDENCE
81, 81-117 (Philip B. Heyman & William N. Brownsberger eds., 2001).
225 PEELE & BUFE, supra note 101, at 30-38.
226 See Fingarette, Addiction, supra note 101, at 426-27, 433-43 (discussing role of
involuntariness in disease model); Fingarette, Perils, supra note 101, at 800-08 (same).
227 For an extended discussion of the manner in which addiction is a form of akrasia, see
R. Jay Wallace, Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections, 18 LAW &
PHIL. 621, 621-54 (1999).
228 Michael Louis Corrado, Addiction and Responsibility. An introduction, 18 LAW &
PHIL. 579,587 (1999).
2 29 See, e.g., Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J.
PHIL. 5 (1971); see also Boldt, supra note 222, at 2245, 2246-64 (discussing both Frankfurt and
Watson).
23 0 See, e.g., Boldt, supra note 222, at 2254-64 (discussing Frankfurt's volitional model
and Watson's normative model of rational reflection and free will). A stronger version of this
claim is made by David Hume, who asserted that "[r]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of
the passions .... DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, 415 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.,
Oxford U. Press 1979) (1739).
231 Wallace, supra note 227, at 635.
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stem from a pathological, biological, or characterological defect such that the
addict is congenitally incapable of acting in conformity with her higher-order
rational desire for sobriety when faced with the addictive stimulus.
The disease model of addiction is strongly endorsed by many drug court
judges.232 Both are focused upon understanding the addict's pathological
behavior as a disease and providing some form of civil, rather than criminal,
solution to his or her problems. The criminal law concepts of guilt and blame are
rejected because the moral stigma they impose impedes treatment. In its
therapeutic jurisprudence form, the disease model suggests that the addict has a
pathological character for which she is not responsible but which is amenable to
treatment. Like penal welfarism, the disease model may, on occasion, be
compatible with the administrative or due process models of crime control,
although these models may also operate to limit its operation in certain
circumstances. The disease model, however, incompletely accounts for the
experience of addiction even where akrasia is the dominant philosophical
justification for the addicts condition.
A problem with the disease model of addiction's explanation of weakness of
the will is that it assumes all weaknesses are the same.233 Instead, akrasia may
have to take account of a volitional aspect of the conflict between lower- and
higher-order desires. The disease model, like theories of akrasia more generally,
is an all-or-nothing account of responsibility. The akratic agent cannot choose
otherwise and so should not be blamed for his or her choices.
An alternative account depends upon a distinction between higher- and
lower-order desires. Our higher-order desires are those produced by rational
reflection on what it is best to do, all things considered. Higher-order desires
include our long-term goals or our attitude towards our long-term goals. Lower-
order desires represent what we unreflectively want or wish to do in the short
term, perhaps even though we know that such acts are not in our long-term
interest. Generally, we are not simply slaves to our desires but are able to choose
to act on them or not. This volitional aspect adds an important wrinkle to the
concept of akrasia,234 because it suggests that giving in to our desires is not
always something that we reject or disavow, but something that we choose or
endorse.235
232 The disease model undergirds the twelve-step recovery process dominating drug court
thinking. See Hora et al., supra note 8, at 511; Lafferty, supra note 101, at 26. Compare Winick
& Wexler, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIc KEY, supra note 101, at 108-09 (suggesting that
therapeutic jurisprudence need not endorse the disease model).
233 Id. at 636-67.
234 Wallace, supra note 207, at 636-67.
235 As Stephen Morse put it: "volitions are not wants or desires: on the best theory, they
are a species of intention." Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
1587, 1597 (1994). Thus, when we choose to act-when we intend to act in a particular
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Under the volitional account, the problem presented by weakness of the
will-and temptation more generally-is that giving in to the lower-order desire
may or may not be morally blameworthy, dependent upon the ability of choice-
volition-to tip the balance one way or another.
The volitional account does not negate the disease model. Individuals whose
higher-order desire is particularly weak or whose lower-order desire is extremely
strong are less likely to require the volitional component to tip the scales on a
given occasion. The volitional account does, however, suggest that some form of
moral condemnation may be appropriate where the strength of the competing
desires leaves room for the real possibility of rational choice. In this case, the
volitional determination to give in to the craving is the decisive factor.
Thus, while the addict may initially contract the disease involuntarily, it is not
clear that the addict's subsequent acts in "feeding" the disease are similarly
unchosen. 236 There are a variety of ways in which to understand the resulting
addiction that do not depend upon the complete abdication of will that is a feature
of the disease model. Instead, we can explain addiction as a rational, albeit short-
term, response to the cravings and the agent as responsible for her choice to take
the drugs. Under the social norms version of crime control or the due process
retributivist theory, that choice is blameworthy.
A competing description of the problem of addiction is that the satisfaction of
the desire or craving constitutes a rational choice to satisfy the addict's immediate
interest. Admittedly, one might want to argue that the addict incompletely or
incorrectly understands those interests. Nonetheless, a mistaken evaluation is not
an irrational one. Problems with evaluation can be solved simply by providing the
addict with a different, better understanding of his or her interests. That, in turn,
can be accomplished by providing additional incentives or disincentives to stress
the relative values of the available options.
The use of law to change incentives to encourage rational actors to engage in
law-abiding behavior is a major feature of social norms theory. Traditional
rational choice theories suggest that, given the onerousness of the sanction, if the
manner, that is, act on the basis of a volition-our act ceases to be one that is overborne by
akrasia and once again enters the realm or morality and responsibility.
236 There are a number of philosophical explanations of addiction that cover these
different viewpoints. In his introduction to the papers on addiction and legal responsibility
delivered at the Second North Carolina Workshop in Law and Philosophy, held September 25-
27, 1998, at the National Humanities Center near Durham, North Carolina, Michael Louis
Corrado identifies four different types of addiction: (1) rational addiction, where addictive
behavior is considered a pleasure-maximizing response to the craving; (2) addiction as duress,
where addictive behavior is still considered rational but understood as a pain-minimizing
response to the craving; (3) addiction as distortion, where addictive behavior is premised upon
an irrational and distorted understanding of the addict's interests; and (4) addiction as defect of
will, where the addict may understand that she is acting against her interests but be powerless to
(form the intention to) behave otherwise. See Corrado, supra note 228 at 583-85. The disease
model most closely matches addiction as a defect of the will.
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agent is rational she will conform her behavior to the legally determined
standards.237 Sociological theories attempt to determine the manner in which a
rational agent will understand and internalize the sanction as part of their general
attitude towards other, legal and non-legal, norms of conduct.238 The sociological
perspective gives weight to the meaning that the agent and the social groups that
engage in the practice place upon her actions and mediates individual assessments
of value.239
Accordingly, sociological theories seek to support law-abiding social norms
and undermine law-breaking ones.240 On the one hand, the government must
identify and reinforce socially authoritative individuals or institutions that exert a
positive social influence.241 On the other hand, the government must seek to
undercut those individuals or institutions that exert a negative social influence.
Somewhat strikingly, Meares and Kahan promote a range of strongly
interventionist law enforcement procedures, including church-state
237 See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50
STAN. L. REv. 1551, 1559 (1998) (noting that "[t]he rational-choice economist asks what
'rational man' would do in a given situation" as a means of predicting what individuals will do
in fact).
238 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CH. L. REv. 943,
1006 (1995).
239 See Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2181,
2181-83 (1996).
240 See Lessig, supra note 238.
241 Meares, Praying, supra note 158, at 1619.
[O]rganization leaders are located in various social networks and operate within different
spheres of influence. Bringing these institutions together can have an important impact on
the ability of a community to assert social order. Collaboration between leaders of different
groups would enable them to form "weak ties" with each other and would allow the
individual leaders to access resources to help their [communities] as well as to build a
stronger base to influence the public level of social control.
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partnerships, 242 youth curfews, and anti-loitering ordinances, 243 to achieve the
confluence of social and legal authority.244
Alternatively, one might take a retributivist, rather than treatment oriented,
approach to addictive behavior. The retributivist would argue that some kind of
moral norm precludes punishing an involuntary act. 245 Nonetheless, where the act
is voluntary one can only respect the agent's moral status by punishing. 246
Accordingly, although a diminished capacity for voluntary action may operate to
excuse, whether partially or completely, some forms of behavior or to mitigate
punishment, so long as the behavior is to some extent voluntary, then punishment
is appropriate. 247
Addiction, so understood, limits, rather than eliminates, responsibility. The
addict's cravings diminish but do not remove his or her capacity for meaningful
choice among a range of legal and illegal options. Thus, some versions of the
disease model do not suggest that the addict is unaware of the moral
consequences of her actions-that he or she is breaking the law or engaging in
anti-social behavior.248 Rather, the addict experiences a greater or lesser need to
satisfy the addictive cravings. The relative inability to resist the cravings may
therefore be less, or non-, blameworthy when ingestion can be presented as
242 Id. at 1617.
243 Kahan & Meares, Coming Crisis, supra note 20, at 1164.
Curfews can help to promote such community infrastructure by assisting adults in the
community-wide monitoring of teens. Enforcement of loitering laws and the restoration of
order can help to promote friendship networks by encouraging community adults to
engage in collective guardianship rather than solo efforts. The effect of curfews, gang-
loitering, laws, order-maintenance policing in restoring norms of order in the inner-city
thus deserves a critical share of the credit for the decline of crime rates in the 1990's.
Id. See also Meares, Place, supra note 20, at 695.
244 See Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 20; Kahan & Meares, Coming Crisis,
supra note 20.
245 See, e.g., HERBERT MORRIS, Punishment for Thoughts, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE,
supra note 165, at 24-26.
246 See MORRIS, Persons, supra note 165, at 31-57; Morris, Further Reflections, supra
note 165, at 363-78; Hampton, Liberalism, supra note 163, at 168-76; Hampton, Correcting
Harms, supra note 163, at 1671-85.
247 This approach receives much support from explanations of addiction that consider the
choice to take drugs a preference rather than a biological imperative. If drug use is
"ambivalent," providing "immediate positive immediate consequences... but delayed
adversive consequences," then drug use may be somewhat rational although not fully culpable.
See Heyman, supra note 224, at 103, 108-09 (suggesting that drug use is not rational in the
economist's sense).
248 This is true not only of the pleasure-maximizing or pain-minimizing conceptions of
addiction, but also of the distortion model, where the addict may know that she is breaking the
law but fail properly to account for that when considering her interests.
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justified or excused. That will depend upon whether the cravings or other
conditions so adversely affect the decision-making process as to significantly
distort choice or undermine the addict's will to resist. When there is minimal
justification or excuse and the cravings are moderate or few mitigating conditions
are present, however, ingestion will be more blameworthy.
Thus, although biological or psychological factors limiting the addict's ability
to refuse drugs are relevant, they need not provide the whole story. A variety of
social factors are also relevant. Responsibility will depend upon some
combination of the two-biological/psychological and social. Where social
factors predominate and responsibility-maximizing behavior is constrained, the
addict's response may still be rational. In this case, addictive behavior is not a
more or less automatic response to a stimulus in the manner proposed by the
strong therapeutic version of the medical model. Rather, under the social norms
rational choice model, the addict's behavior is susceptible to modification through
manipulating his or her evaluation of the interests at stake.249 Where biological or
psychological factors predominate, addictive behavior will be non-culpable (that
is, justified or excused) only where these factors overcome the addict's ability to
make a reasoned choice or the addict is otherwise permitted to ingest the addictive
substance. Accordingly, under the due process retributivist theory, punishment is
improper only when the addict's will is so totally overborne that her act is no
longer morally culpable.
1. Status and Choice: The Supreme Court Debate
The choice between the disease and volitional models of addiction has great
significance for the criminal law. If drug use is the behavioral component of a
disease, then it is non-culpable and should not be sanctioned. If drug use is
volitional then, on the social norms crime-control theory and the retributivist
version of due process, the offender ought to be punished, either as a means of
communicating and reinforcing social norms or as a means of characterizing the
offender as a morally autonomous being.250 Therapeutic penal welfarism, on the
other hand, presents addiction, like any illness, as unsought. In the case of
addiction, it is a propensity that is biologically or psychologically pre-determined
and so not fully within the addict's control. Accordingly, the addict should not be
249 For example, by increasing the criminal penalties for drug use, increasing the
likelihood that such penalties will be imposed through better policing, or increasing treatment
opportunities.
250 See, e.g., Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 20 (discussing legal and social
norms as communicating attitudes to crime); Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 163, at
1667-68 (discussing punishment as respecting the individual as a moral being); MoRIs,
Persons, supra note 165, at 31-57 (same).
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held morally culpable for his or her status as an addict.251 This penal-welfarist
perspective attempts to decriminalize the problem of addiction by explaining it as
a pathology requiring treatment rather than a rational choice permitting
punishment.
Another justification for the disease model may be provided by the neutral
liberal version of due process. Neutral liberalism, as we have seen, is
characterized by a process-oriented attempt to formulate the governing norms of
public justice independent of any particular moral perspective. 252 Neutral
liberalism therefore provides what H.L.A. Hart has called a "content
independent" justification for public norms:253 it is the process by which the
norms are formulated, rather than the content of those norms, that assures their
validity.254 Public norms may be-and are-accepted or justified by the public
for a variety of (sometimes conflicting) reasons.255
Under neutral liberalism, the purpose of punishment is therefore not tied to
any particular moral perspective and so non-moral. Moral sanctions would
undermine the neutrality of the rule-formulating process by privileging one
outcome or justification over the others.256 The justification for punishment, on
this view, is that the rules everyone agreed upon, or would have agreed upon,
during the process of rule-formulation have been broken; the purpose of
punishment is to ensure that everyone conforms to those norms that were, or
would have been, enacted by a neutral process.257
Neutral liberalism is thus compatible with the provision of an interventionist
safety net to catch and treat drug addicts. On the neutral liberalism model, some
form of social welfare safety net could and perhaps should exist for the worst off.
The worst off would include addicts unable to abide by society's public norms
due to some form of irresistible craving. So long as the agent is congenitally
251 See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 8, at 464-69.
252 See, e.g., Hampton, Liberalism, supra note 163, at 170-76; Dolovich, supra note 166,
at 316-46.
253 H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL
THEORY 254 (1982); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 35 (1986). Reasons
are content-independent if they are "intended to function as a reason independently of the nature
or character of the actions to be done." HART, supra, at 254.
254 HART, supra note 253; see also RAz, supra note 253.
255 See Hampton, Liberalism, supra note 163, at 170-76 (stating that neutral liberalism
entails rules justified as compatible with competing moral and religious perspectives); HART,
supra note 253, at 256-58 (stating that citizens accept content-independent norms for any
reason or no reason).
256 See Hampton, Liberalism, supra note 163, at 171-72.
257 See id. at 170-72.
2004] 1525
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
unable to follow the agreed-upon rules, some form of intervention is mandated
and may be justified by incapacitation or, more likely, rehabilitation.258
Both neutral liberal and penal-welfarist justifications are also compatible with
a variety of more or less incapacitatory treatments. For example, Alcoholics
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous both use the disease model to justify
perpetual surveillance through regular and time-consuming attendance at official
meetings. The potentially onerous nature of such a regime is supposed to be offset
by the therapeutic goals of treatment. Where such regimes involve more or less
extreme elements of surveillance and detention redolent of the administrative
model, such programs are justified as diverting offenders from prison. The
diversion claim enables such programs to evade due process concerns.
Simply put, the disease model, endorsed under the principles of therapeutic
jurisprudence by drug court judges,259 sits oddly with one of the central
requirements of the criminal law: that we inflict punishment only for voluntary
acts.260 By endorsing the disease model, the manner in which therapeutically
inclined drug court judges attempt to accommodate the criminal law is by
denying it away, identifying the problem of addiction as concerned not with
voluntary, but with involuntary acts.261 It is perhaps worth turning to the Supreme
Court cases that most directly address this issue. In Robinson v. California,262 the
Court held that a California statute making it a criminal offense to "be addicted to
the use of narcotics" 263 was a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment.264 Voluntariness was at the heart of Robinson:
the Court determined that the statute at issue failed to require a voluntary act and
strongly indicated that addiction was sufficiently involuntary to preclude criminal
liability.265 Robinson therefore established that a state may not use the criminal
law to punish an individual for having a particular status or condition but only for
criminally culpable acts.
The second, Powell v. Texas,266 concerned a Texas statute criminalizing
public intoxication.267 The Court distinguished between the status of being an
258 See Dolovich, supra note 166, at 370-74.
259 See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 8, at 464-69.
260 See Boldt, supra note 222, at 2304-08.
261 This, as we shall see, is Justice Douglas's view in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 671-78 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
262 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
263 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (repealed 1972).
264 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
265 Id.
266 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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addict or alcoholic and the voluntary acts taken by addicted individuals and
refused to preclude the State from using the criminal law to regulate public
behavior related to a pre-existing condition or disease. 268 Powell rejected the
claim that public intoxication consequent to alcohol addiction was involuntary
and instead adopted the (more or less retributivist) position that the original
decision to become intoxicated in public was sufficiently culpable as to render the
resulting behavior criminal.269
The difference between the Robinson and Powell opinions consists in their
attitude toward penal welfarism and the disease model of addiction. The Robinson
Court's 6-2 majority split into three different positions on the subject of the
propriety of the disease model and the provision of treatment for addiction.270
Justice Douglas wholeheartedly endorsed the disease model. 271 Justice Harlan
considered the disease model irrelevant.272 Justice Stewart's opinion takes a
position somewhere in between the two and could be considered a qualified
endorsement of the disease model of addiction.273 In Powell, on the other hand,
Justice Marshall 274 authored a plurality opinion, joined by Justices Warren,
Black, and Harlan, who had been in the Robinson majority. Justice Marshall
robustly rejected the application of the disease model to criminal acts. 275 Justice
White wrote separately, concurring in the result. He suggested that it may be
unconstitutional to punish involuntary acts caused by a particular disease or
condition.276 He concluded, however, that there was no evidence that Powell's
behavior was anything other than a voluntary act.277 Justice Fortas authored a
dissenting opinion in which the other half of the Robinson majority joined.278 He
endorsed a strong version of the disease model of addiction.279 Any act
267 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 477 (Vernon 1952). The relevant section of the statute read
as follows: "[W]hoever shall get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any public place,
or at any private house except his own, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars." Id.
268 Powell, 392 U.S. at 534-35.
269 Id.
270 Justice Frankfurter did not participate in the decision. See Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660,668 (1962).
271 See id at 671-78 (Douglas, J., concurring).
272 See id at 678-79 (Harlan, J., concurring).
273 See id at 667-68.
274 Marshall had taken the seat of Justice Clark, one of the Robinson dissenters.
275 Powell v. California, 392 U.S. 514, 522-26 (1962).
276 Id. at 551-52 (White, J., concurring in result).
277 Id. at 553 (White, J., concurring in result).
278 Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Brennan joined the dissent.
279 Powell, 392 U.S. at 558-59 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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attributable to the disease or condition, he believed, should be regarded as an
involuntary manifestation of that condition.280
The Robinson majority identified the problem with criminalizing addiction as
one of attaching a moralistic stigma to a status or condition that is not chosen and
for which the addict should not be held responsible.281 No matter which model of
addiction is chosen-some rational choice or moral responsibility model or the
disease model-the defendant in Robinson does not deserve punishment because
he has performed no act and so has done nothing to render him criminally
accountable. 282 The infirmity manifested in the statute was that it punished "a
person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic
drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there .... Even one
day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a
common cold. '28 3 The statute at issue in Robinson enables a majority to coalesce,
not around a particular view of addiction (as culpable or not) or a particular view
of the addict (as acting in a voluntary or involuntary manner) but around a view of
criminal responsibility as requiring, at a minimum, the performance of a
forbidden act or the non-performance of a required act.
The various theories of criminal justice discussed also turn on the criminal
character of action or inaction. Crime control social norms theories and neutral
and moral liberal versions of due process all depend upon the rational or moral
choice to act or not; one is a law-abider or law-breaker, rule-follower or rule-
breaker, or morally responsible or irresponsible being dependent upon how one
acts in the relevant circumstances. For therapeutic penal welfarism, however (at
least the disease model version of therapeutic jurisprudence), the issue is not that
one has to act to be culpable but that, even if Robinson had acted, moral or
rational choice categories of culpability are inappropriate. As an addict, Robinson
requires therapeutic treatment, not moralistic punishment.284
The disease model fits uncomfortably within a traditional criminal discourse
that measures responsibility on a volitional scale. Addiction could be considered
as an increased susceptibility to, and diminished ability to resist, cravings to
indulge in a particular substance. In that case, the addict could be characterized as
volitionally choosing to engage in addictive behavior.285 To rebut the volitional
approach, the disease model would have to show that addiction consists in more
than a susceptibility to an intoxicant. Rather, the addict must experience a total
280 Id. at 554-70 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
281 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,667 (1962).
282 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 245, at 24-26.
283 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
284 This is the whole point of Justice Douglas's concurrence. See Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 671-78 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
285 This, in essence, is the claim made in Justice White's concurrence in Powell. See
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,551-54 (1968) (White, J., concurring in result).
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inability to resist the substance-related cravings. Only then is the addict engaging
in the behavior definitive of addiction rather than an expression of volitional
choice.286 Thus, on the volitional model, our response to addiction is determined
by the intensity of the craving combined with the ability to tolerate such cravings.
As discussed, supra, the ability to tolerate the cravings may be considered more
or less illusory dependant upon those social circumstances bolstering or
diminishing that ability.287
In Robinson, Justice Stewart's majority opinion struggles to reconcile the
disease model and the volitional approach. Justice Stewart uses traditional
criminal categories of excuse and voluntariness of action as a framework in which
to discuss the issue of responsibility and choice. Both of these categories fit
squarely within the volitional approach. They therefore partake of crime-control
or due process modes of justification and excuse. Excuse and voluntariness,
insofar as they admit of degrees of culpability, sit uneasily within the penal-
welfarist rhetoric of pathology and treatment.
For example, "attorney disbarred from the practice of law in the State of
California" is a status. While the state may regulate the activities of disbarred
attorneys from California qua disbarred attorneys from California (for example,
by prohibiting their practicing law in another state), the state may not impose a
criminal sanction upon them simply for having that status.
One way in which to read Robinson is therefore to suggest, as Justice Harlan
does, that there is a due process limit upon the state's power to denominate certain
acts as criminal. Criminalizing a pre-existing status is "an arbitrary imposition
286 This is the claim staked by Justice Fortas' dissent in Powell. See id at 558 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Fortas distinguishes between the 'social' drinker," among others, and the
"'chronic alcoholic' who... cannot 'resist the constant, excessive consumption of alcohol."' Id.
For Fortas:
The sole question presented is whether a criminal penalty may be imposed upon a
person suffering the disease of "chronic alcoholism" for a condition-being "in a state of
intoxication" in public-which is a characteristic part of the pattern of his disease and
which, the trial court found, was not the consequence of appellant's volition but of "a
compulsion symptomatic of the disease of chronic alcoholism."
Id.
287 It is also worth noting that culpability is determined, not only by the intensity of the
craving and the innate ability to tolerate or resist them, but also by the type of substance craved.
While the failure to resist is usually somewhat blameworthy, our moral condemnation depends
in part upon the social harms associated with the substance. For example, an individual may
crave water or exercise. That individual may become somewhat bloated and spend more time
than her compatriots in the restroom or the gym. Generally, however, we would see her craving
as non-harmful and not worthy of censure, and perhaps even worthy of praise. Where the
craving is for chocolate, tobacco, or alcohol, our awareness of the harmful effects on the
individual and on society, through treating the diseases associated with over-consumption,
generally encourages us to condemn a failure to resist the craving.
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which exceeds the power that a State may exercise in enacting its criminal
law." 288 The criminal law punishes acts, not propensities or desires,289 and even
though such propensities may be a good indicator of future wrongful acts, the
criminal law may not intervene until such a desire has been acted upon.290
Harlan's concurrence constitutes a strong rejection of the penal-welfarist
justification underlying the majority's opinion on due process grounds. The
criminal law generally does not punish individuals for simply having good or bad
character: their ethical status is irrelevant, at least when determining whether they
are guilty of an offense. Of course, the state can criminalize the acts that lead to
disbarment. However, for example, Florida cannot then punish all disbarred
attorneys from California who move into that state simply for having previously
been disbarred in California and nothing more. Under Robinson, the California
attorney would have to act, for example, by holding herself out as able to practice
law.
Accordingly, under any of the crime-control models' understanding of
addiction, both Justice Douglas in Robinson and Justice Fortas in Powell are
correct to insist that a person's status or condition should not, of itself, incur the
stigma of the criminal law.291 The problem is that, under the crime-control or due
process models of criminal justice, once the individual acts, she moves into the
realm of moral choice and her status or condition provides a limited range of
justifications or excuses for those acts. In the case of addiction, there is no claim
that the drug addict's ingestion of the addictive substance or the alcoholic's
appearance in public is justified: so long as these acts are voluntary, these are not
blameless acts.292 Rather, the claim made by proponents of the disease model of
addiction is that the addict or alcoholic is to be excused because she is ill and
should receive treatment. Whether the addict is only partially responsible or, in
rare cases, completely non-responsible for his or her acts, the presence of some
degree of pathology removes her totally form the sphere of moral condemnation
and places her firmly within the therapeutic paradigm. 293
288 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,679 (1962) (Harlan, J., concurring).
2 8 9 See id at 679 (Harlan, J., concurring).
290 The use of propensities to incapacitate criminals using civil commitment was declared
constitutional in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); see Carol S. Steiker, Supreme
Court Review: Foreword: The Limits Of The Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
771, 781-92 (1998).
291 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 678 (Douglas, J., concurring); Powell, 392 U.S. at 567 (Fortas,
J., dissenting).
292 The whole thrust of insisting that the act is compelled or involuntary is to suggest that
it is not really an act at all.
293 The claim is either that the addict acts without volition, under some form of duress, or
involuntarily, as an automaton. The duress analogy has some proponents in the discussion of
the intoxication defense. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Addiction and Criminal Liability, 18
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Justice Douglas's opinion attempts to nullify the volitional argument by
presenting the addict as lacking the requisite type of choice or control and so
totally unable to resist her craving.294 He fully endorses a strong version of the
medical model's characterization of addiction and addictive behavior as
involuntary. 295 He compares narcotic addiction to the early English treatment of
the insane. 296 Condemned by society as responsible for their condition, the insane
were scourged to encourage them to regain their reason. 29 7 Douglas's comparison
is telling. Taken alongside Justice Stewart's suggestion that narcotics addiction is
a disease like the common cold,298 it appears that punishing narcotic addicts for
taking drugs is like punishing a flu-sufferer for sneezing-just as barbarous, in its
way, as the sixteenth-century beatings.
It is not clear, however, except under the most unbridled versions of penal
welfarism, that we always regard the ill or insane as blameless in the face of their
disease. Generally, we hold individuals responsible for taking medication to
meliorate their condition, especially when that condition has socially ham-ful
results. The commonplace criminal law example is the epileptic car driver who
fails to take his medication: he is responsible for any harm resulting from the
involuntary acts that result. Put differently,
[T]he chronic alcoholic who proves his disease and a compulsion to
drink is [not] shielded from conviction when he has knowingly failed to
take feasible precautions against committing a criminal act .... On such
facts the alcoholic is like a person with smallpox, who could be
convicted for being on the street but not for being ill, or, like the
epileptic, who would be punished for driving a car but not for his
disease.299
Accordingly, to resist this volitional challenge, Douglas must maintain a strong
version of the disease model, one that comprehensively rejects the agent's ability
to choose otherwise and responsibility when taking drugs.
Due process provides yet another way to reconcile the different modes of
responsibility presented in Robinson. Like the disease model, due process
reserves criminal condemnation for the culpable performance of certain acts
rather than for certain types of individuals. Under due process, as under the
LAW & PHIL. 655 (1999). The idea that the addict is an automaton is the extreme form of the
disease model.
294 See Robinson v. Califomia, 370 U.S. 660, 676-77 (Douglas, J., concurring).
295 Id. at 671 (Douglas, J., concurring).
296 Id at 668-69.
297 Id. at 668 (Douglas, J., concurring).
298 Id. at 667.
299 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 550 (1968) (White, J., concurring in result).
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disease model, it does not matter that someone has a particular character or
propensity or occupies a particular status. A person's character is, or should be,
irrelevant for the criminal law. What matters is the manner in which they act.
Penal welfarism therefore fails to account for all the permissible responses to
addictive behavior. Partial responsibility leaves us with the problem identified by
Justice White in Powell: we may still wish to deter or punish the addict for her
morally culpable choice.300 We could do so as a means of providing
responsibility-maximizing reasons for avoiding consumption of the forbidden
substance or for engaging in the prohibited behavior. Non-responsibility creates a
different issue: the state may wish to prevent future re-offense by some form of
therapeutic incapacitation.
Therapeutic incapacitation remains an option for both the therapeutic justice
version of penal welfarism and for neutral liberal due process. Under both
theories, the addict's limited or total incapacity to follow public norms cannot be
morally blameworthy; some other response is required. For both therapeutic
jurisprudence and neutral liberalism, treatment, not punishment, is the proper
option.
Involuntary confinement as a therapeutic response places us in a quandary,
however. As Justice Marshall indicates in Powell,30 1 and Justice Black elaborates
in concurrence, 302 short periods of punishment may be less invasive of liberty
than long periods of incapacitating treatment. This is the paradox that faces
liberals forced to choose between a penal-welfarist style of invasive diversion and
an administrative, incapacitatory mode of punishment as the two current altemate
approaches to drug treatment.
2. Confinement: Treatment or Punishment
There is a second debate staked out in Robinson and Powell, one that
concerns the consequences of adopting a medico-legal response to the fact of
addiction. If the disease model of addiction is correct, then at least some addicts
are incapable of acting to control their craving. Their acts, when taken to satisfy
the cravings, are involuntary or unwilled. These are the people who, though they
should not be punished, require some form of social control to prevent them from
coming into contact with the addictive substance. If addiction is not to be
controlled using rational, responsibility-maximizing stimuli or some form of
pharmacological or psychological treatment, then some form of liberty-
constraining restraint would appear to be required. Only some more or less severe
form of incapacitation will remove their ability to engage in addictive behavior.
300 Id. at 550 (White, J., concurring in result).
301 See id at 533.
302 See id. at 539-41 (Black, J., concurring in result).
1532 [Vol. 65:1479
DRUG COURTS AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONISM
The issues then become: What are the permissible treatment options short of
restraint and, if restraint is required, how severe should it be?
What is permissible would appear to depend first upon whether the addict's
need for treatment is judged from the perspective of either the disease or
volitional model. Under the disease model, where the addict is found to be unable
to act so as to control her cravings,303 society may intercede and treat the
addiction by some form of compulsory therapeutic response. Because the desire
to ingest the addictive substance is not subject to control, some type of
incapacitating confinement may be mandated. If there are no rational,
psychological, or pharmacological means for so doing, then the individual must
be removed from her proximity to the substance. For proponents of a strong
disease model of addiction, 3°4 or at least a model that considers the addict as
acting in an involuntary manner,30 5 therapeutic involuntary confinement is the
primary form of treatment program. Confinement may not be the first step in a
compulsory-treatment program, but it will be an acceptable next step.306
Programs adopting a strong version of the disease model are structured around
more or less coercive incapacitation or enforcement of abstinence. 307
The volitional model, on the other hand, distinguishes between those who are
able to resist their cravings to some extent or other and those who are not. As
Justice Clark recognized in his dissent in Robinson, there is a difference between
the "incipient, volitional" addict308 and those who have 'lost the power of self-
303 This is the defect of will understanding of addiction. See supra note 236.
304 In other words, Justices Douglas and Fortas.
305 This would include Justice Stewart in his majority opinion in Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660,667 (1962).
306 Justice Stewart suggests that:
In the interest of discouraging the violation of... laws [against the unauthorized
manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics], or in the interest of
the general health or welfare of its inhabitants, a State might establish a program of
compulsory treatment for those addicted to narcotics. Such a program of treatment might
require periods of involuntary confinement. And penal sanctions might be imposed for
failure to comply with established compulsory treatment procedures.
Id. at 664-65. But note that under the strong disease model of addiction, penal sanctions are
inappropriate, because nothing can deter the irrational and weak-willed behavior of the addict
See also FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 397.675-397.6977 (West 2001) (setting forth involuntary
confinement procedures as part of Florida's drug diversion statute).
307 Abstinence should really be understood as a form of incapacitation, as it removes the
addict from the addictive stimulus, thus effectuating a limited form of incapacitation. Thus,
alcoholics should avoid situations that would increase the likelihood that they would drink, and
so avoid bars, cocktail parties, etc.
308 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 680 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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control.' 309 The incipient, moderately rational addict can respond to reason-
affecting stimuli; the out-of-control addict can no longer do so. 3 10 This distinction
is precisely the one that is resisted by proponents of a strong version of penal
welfarism or the disease model of addiction. They attempt to establish that no
addict should be subject to social stigma for engaging in acts definitive of her
disease or condition.
Where some form of involuntary confinement is used to force the somewhat
rational type of offender into treatment, however, the confinement itself does not
function as treatment, unless as some form of drying out period;311 confinement
treats only insofar as it removes the addict from the addictive substance. Where
the addict is non-rational and unable to control her cravings, involuntary
confinement may work as a form of treatment-through-incapacitation by
removing the addict from the irresistible stimulus causing the addictive
craving.312 The issue then becomes whether incarcerative incapacitation is the
appropriate means for removing the temptation or whether some less restrictive
form of treatment is appropriate. That will turn upon the rational capacity of the
offender to resist cravings and the availability of other means of preventing the
offender from giving in to the cravings. If there are less restrictive means,
confinement ceases to serve a treatment purpose and becomes punitive.
There is a fine line between treatment and punishment, civil and criminal
incapacitating responses. Although there are a variety of ways in which an
individual may be subjected to involuntary confinement, and Justice Stewart
appears to endorse some form of coerced treatment before resorting to
involuntary confinement, nonetheless, the Robinson Court does not choose
among them or provide any principled means (or even justification requiring us)
309 Id. at 681 (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5350 (repealed
1965)).
3 10 The gist of Justice Clark's dissent is that involuntary confinement and imprisonment
are forms of liberty-denying incarceration; the criminal form is undertaken for treatment
purposes so that an individual who has, in the past, manifested signs of narcotics addiction can
be subjected to a ninety-day period of arrest and monitoring to confirm her status as an addict.
Id. at 680-85 (Clark, J., dissenting). In this instance, what is offensive is not so much the
criminal stigma associated with the arrest but detention without diagnosis. Put differently, under
the California statute at issue in Robinson, a person who has been diagnosed as a narcotic addict
is subjected to some form of preventative detention, whether for criminal or therapeutic
purposes, without any required showing that she is currently an addict. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11721 (repealed 1972). That, in itself, is both morally and ethically offensive, as well as
violative of the United States Constitution's requirement that a deprivation of liberty may only
be imposed after due process of law.
311 See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 528 (1968) ("It would be tragic to return large
numbers of helpless, sometimes dangerous and frequently unsanitary inebriates to the streets of
our cities without even the opportunity to sober up adequately which a brief jail term
provides.").
312 If the cravings cannot be controlled, then the means to satisfy them can.
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to do so. Subsequent courts have developed three factors that appear decisive
when policing this line. First, whether the individual does in fact suffer from a
medically recognized disease. Relevant to this determination is whether there is
broad medical consensus over the existence or definition of the disease or
condition and the status within the medical profession of the scientific community
claiming disease status for the condition. 313 Also relevant may be the addict's
ability to choose to act so as to avoid the threatened restriction upon liberty-the
greater the volitional aspect, the less likely it is that the condition requires
treatment. The second factor is the process used to diagnose the disease. That
process must be "neither arbitrary nor erroneous,"314 and may not be taken by
executive officials who are also involved in determining whether to punish the
individual (although a judicial determination may not be required), but must be
taken by a medical professional. 315 These are both potential due process
constraints on penal welfarism. The third factor is the type and amount of
incapacitation to be imposed, its intensity and duration.
We may be suspicious of the disease model on the grounds that it
incompletely describes addiction or too quickly mandates therapeutic
incapacitation of the incipient addict. The problem is one of how to determine the
proper degree of incapacitation and surveillance for addicts. Those addicts for
whom the medical model accurately describes their condition suffer from an
irresistible biological propensity to satiate their craving. If they are to be treated,
they must be removed from every opportunity to do so. For everyone else, the
medical model incompletely describes the permissible range of responses. Either
the biological propensity is resistible, and so the goal is to provide mechanisms by
which to effectuate resistance, or the individual does not experience cravings at
all, and so is not an addict.
The major task facing both proponents and critics of drug courts, then, is to
match the range of potential responses to the various degrees of addiction. The
penal-welfarist urge to treat pathological offenders has the potential, if unchecked,
313 See, e.g., Powell, 392 U.S. at 522-26 (discussing lack of consensus in medical
community over definition of disease of alcoholism, and the "unintelligible" distinctions
between factors that determine whether the addict possesses or lacks the control definitive of
the disease). Compare In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1967) (criticizing "arbitrar[y]" basis of
"benevolent[ ]" determination of delinquency). 'The idea of crime and punishment was to be
abandoned. The child was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from
apprehension through institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive." Id at 15-
16.
314 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 228 (1990); see also Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19;
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492-93 (1980) (demonstrating the standard applied when
determining whether to transfer the inmate from prison to mental hospital).
315 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 231 ("Notwithstanding the risks that are involved, we
conclude that an inmate's interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by
allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical professionals rather than ajudge.").
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to turn into an administrative regime of incapacitation. When the offender is not
an addict or has her addiction under sufficient control such that treatment is
unnecessary, then treatment simply incapacitates rather than cures. The antidote is
to determine which offenders need or respond to particular treatments and which
do not or to abandon treatment altogether in favor of some retributivist form of
punishment.
V. MATCHING OFFENDER TO TREATMENT
Offenders who enter drug court316 have often learned a range of socially
maladaptive behaviors designed to feed their habit no matter what the
consequences for their relationships with others, including friends or family.
317
The range of treatment responses to these behaviors is highly varied and more or
less eclectic, depending upon the treatment program. Depending upon the
preferred criminal justice model, one may reject treatment as an inappropriate
response to criminal conduct, require treatment as part of punishment so as to
restore the offender to full moral status, require treatment to function as a form of
choice-restructuring process, or regard treatment as the only means of staving off
the otherwise unavoidable or irresistible addictive behavior.
In this section, I investigate some of the preconceptions surrounding the
different treatment programs provided through drug courts. Generally, the
assumption is that the worst that could be said about such treatments is that they
are ineffective; but at their best they offer a road to a new and sober lifestyle.
Instead of a means to a cure, however, I claim that drug treatment can function as
a means of social control. This is especially the case with treatment that must be
at least moderately incapacitative, directed at keeping the addict away from the
addictive substance.
A. Drug Courts and Treatment
There are multiple therapeutic programs that can claim some success in
treating addicts. Although some therapies are particularly successful with discrete
addict types, for example, treatment communities with more youthful addicts,
even they, like most other treatment providers:
316 In this section, the references to drug court programs focus primarily on the Oakland,
California and Miami, Florida drug courts (and California and Florida drug court statutes more
generally), in large part because these are the two oldest programs in the nation.
3 17 See, e.g., Sam Torres, Ph.D., & Robert M. Latta, Training the Substance Abuse
Specialist, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2000, at 52, 52 (emphasizing addicts' manipulative, game-
playing behavior); Torres, supra note 83, at 20-21 (emphasizing the same).
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Draw[] heavily from history and tradition, ... apply[ing] [a] ... blend of
medical theory, moral instruction, and psycho-behavioral therapy in their
attempts to rehabilitate drug offenders....
... [T]he addictions field wrestles with questions surrounding morality, personal
accountability, and volition.... [This leads to] a fragmented approach to status
and conduct, rehabilitation and retribution, and, finally, compassion and
punishment.3 18
While many treatment providers insist that there is an important distinction
between coerced and uncoerced treatment, that consensus is breaking down.3 19
Currently, drug court practitioners prefer to relocate the distinction as one
between incarcerative and non-incarcerative treatment regimes. Coercion,
however, may not be the problem some critics imagine: generally, the choice is
not between coercion and non-coercion but between differently coercive
therapeutic regimes. 320
As Timothy Edwards suggests, the major distinction is more one of when
coercion occurs-at the outset, to force the offender into a treatment regime, or as
part of the therapy itself: "In this regard [Edwards argues], a careful assessment of
the relationship between compulsion and overall treatment efficacy must involve
an acknowledgment that coercion is applied before and during treatment. There is
a vast difference between being compelled into participating and being compelled
into participating in a specific way." 32 1 In drug court, therefore, the issue is not
one of coercion versus non-coercion. Because the offender has volunteered to
enter the drug court rehabilitation program,322 issues of coercion during treatment
predominate.
318 Edwards, supra note 93, at 309-10.
3 19 See, e.g., Larry 0. Gostin, Compulsory Treatment for Drug-dependent Persons:
Justifications for a Public Health Approach to Drug Dependency, 69 MILBANK Q. 561, 580
(1991) ("The intuition that compulsory treatment will fail because drug-dependent people must
be self-motivated in order to benefit is simply not borne out by the relevant data." (citations
omitted)); see also Carlo C. DiClemente, Motivation for Change: Implications for Substance
Abuse Treatment, 10 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 209-13 (1999) (showing coerced treatment as
effective as uncoerced).
320 Edwards, supra note 93, at 328-33.
321 Edwards, supra note 93, at 334.
322 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.1(b) (West 2004) (requiring offender's consent to
divert to drug court); id at § 1000.2 (requiring court hearing to review offender's consent to
enter drug court); see also People v. Reed, 120 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Cal. App. 1975) (discussing
consent requirement under California deferred entry or judgment diversion program); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 948.08(2) (West 2004) (requiring entry into drug program to be approved by "the
administrator of the program and the consent of the victim, the state attorney, and the judge who
presided at the initial appearance hearing of the offender").
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The decision to participate in a treatment regime may change after the
original decision to enter. The addict may recognize that treatment is indeed
beneficial and retrospectively, voluntarily endorse the coerced choice to enter by
continuing to participate. Alternatively, the addict may drop out after having
voluntarily entered the program. "The significant factor appears to be not the
voluntary or mandatory nature of the treatment, but rather the characteristics of
the treatment provided, whatever the impetus to seek care." 323 For example, the
high dropout rates for therapeutic communities provide some indication of the
coercive nature of such regimes even when the addict volunteers for treatment. 32 4
Furthermore, while there is evidence that some treatment is better than
none,32 5 it appears that much more research is required to determine what aspects
of rehabilitation are effective. Broadly, treatment may be separated into five
different components: (1) the use of chemical or medicinal substances to treat
addiction or its symptoms, (2) quarantine or incapacitation as a means of isolating
the addict from the drug, (3) psychological or characterological initiatives to
effect a change in the addictive personality, (4) the infliction of various sanctions
and rewards to restructure the addict's ordering of preferences, and (5) the
provision of education or vocational training to strengthen the addict's links to
society.326 In detoxification, for example, the offender is isolated from the
addictive substance and given some form of medicinal treatment to lessen the
effects of withdrawal. 327 Narcotics Anonymous self-help regimes are generally
characterized by their blend of emotional or characterological suasion and support
combined with an emphasis on abstinence as a style of quarantine, although such
programs may provide some amount of drug education. Therapeutic communities
impose extreme forms of incapacitation, psychological therapy, and sanctions,
usually for extended periods of time.328
Drug courts claim to treat addicts primarily in two ways: first, by a style of
courtroom practice that ensures offenders get with the program and, second, by
matching addicts with treatment providers so that addicts receive an
individualized assessment of their treatment needs and are directed to providers
323 David F. Chavkin, "For Their Own Good": Civil Commitment ofAlcohol and Drug-
Dependent Pregnant Women, 37 S.D. L. REV. 224, 248-49 (1991/92).
324 See generally, Edwards, supra note 93, at 319-20 (discussing high attrition rates in
therapeutic communities).
325 Ethan G. Kalett, Twelve Steps, You're Out (Of Prison): An Evaluation of "Anonymous
Programs" as Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 129, 139 (1996) ("[Oiffering some
treatment is better than offering none at all, perhaps because it forces the substance abuser to
acknowledge her problem at some level.").
326 See, e.g., Meyer & Lutes, supra note 87.
327 Id. at 662.
328 Id.
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who are able to meet those needs. 329 The treatment team's evaluation of the
offender's needs may also be informed by the therapeutic judgments of the
various treatment providers to whom the offender is referred.330 Both the process
of in-court treatment and matching offender to treatment provider are conducted
under the court's broad discretion. Thus, after the initial screening process
dominated by the prosecutor's discretion and in which the court plays a reactive
role, the subsequent determination of appropriate treatment places the court at the
center of the decision-making process. The decision to match offender with
treatment is at the heart of the experimentalist approach championed by Michael
C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel.331
B. Drug Courts Screening Procedures
All drug courts use some form of screening procedure to weed out classes of
offenders as unsuitable and ineligible for the rehabilitation program. Different
courts, therefore, use different screening criteria to obtain the type of offenders
that they wish to treat. 332 Most courts, however, screen out offenders with a
history of violent crime; many screen out offenders who have engaged in drug
dealing rather than drug use.333 Both these criteria generally respond to the crime-
control demand that only offenders who do not pose a threat to the community
should be diverted from prison. Where treatment is available in jail or prison,
such a screening process may not prejudice the therapeutic needs of real addicts
who need treatment but do not fit these criteria-they can receive treatment in a
more secure setting. These generally accepted criteria suggest, however, that need
for treatment may not be the prime determinant of who gets into drug court: they
are to be balanced, in the first instance, against incapacitatory goals.
There are generally two opportunities to engage in screening: when the
prosecutor decides to refer an offender to drug court, which may happen pre- or
329 See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 8,
330 Natasha H. Williams, The Adult Drug Court Model: The Effect of Structural
Differences on Program Retention Rates (February 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
331 See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 31.
332 See, e.g., People v. Barrajas, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 124 (Cal. App. 1998) (discussing
criteria for diversion under CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000-1000.5 (West 2004)); People v.
Esparza, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 380-82 (Cal. App. 2003) (discussing application of the
Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, codified in CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1210,
1210.1, 3063.1, and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11,999.4 (West 2004)); see also FLA.
STAT. ANN. 11 J. Cir. § 97-15, Appendix A (detailing Miami-Dade County Drug Court
regulations).
333 See Hora et al., supra note 8, at 507-80.
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post-plea bargain, depending on the drug court,334 and when determining which
treatment program is suitable for the offender.335 In most jurisdictions, the district
attorney prosecuting the case makes the initial determination to divert defendants
to the drug court program. At this stage, the procedure fits strongly within the
crime-control model, and drug courts do not interfere with the large discretion
enjoyed by the prosecutor at the charging state of proceedings. The prosecutor
exercises the sole power to recommend that a defendant be diverted to drug court,
subject to statutory constraints. 336 If the prosecutor decides that the criteria do not
apply, the defendant has no further recourse and must proceed through the
criminal justice system in the normal manner.337
334 Drug courts channel offenders into treatment at a variety of different stages of the
criminal justice process. There are, however, two general channeling policies: deferred
prosecution and post-adjudication diversion. Deferred prosecution drug courts require that the
defendant waive her right to a speedy trial and enter treatment as soon as possible after being
charged. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 476; Boldt, supra note 13, at 1255. Both the Miami and
Oakland courts are deferred prosecution drug courts. Under the post-adjudication model, the
defendant is, in fact, convicted, either after trial or after a plea bargain. In that event, an
incarcerative sentence is deferred pending completion of a drug treatment program. See
Murphy, supra note 4, at 476. Currently, thirty percent of drug courts divert offenders at the
pre-trial stage and before a plea agreement ("pretrial/pre-plea"); sixteen percent are pre-trial and
post-plea; twelve percent are post-conviction sentencing institutions; and the rest, forty-two
percent, are some combination of the above. NOLAN, supra note 3, at 41.
335 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.705(2) (West 2004) (permitting director of
rehabilitation program to refuse entry to offenders).
336 See, e.g., People v. Covarrubias, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475,477 (Cal. App. 1993).
The district attomey, pursuant to the separation of powers principle of our state
constitution "... . ordinarily has sole discretion to determine whom to charge, what charges
to file and pursue, and what punishment to seek." The prosecutor has [a] dual role. He or
she is the defendant's adversary but at the same time, is the ".. guardian of the
defendant's constitutional fights ......
Id. (citations omitted). See also People v. Sturiale, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865, 867 (Cal. App. 2000)
(showing when a prosecutor determines diversion); State v. Upshaw, 648 So. 2d 851, 852 (Fla.
App. 1995) (demonstrating that a state attomey has sole discretion to prosecute).
337 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000(b) ("The sole remedy of a defendant who is found
ineligible for deferred entry of judgment is a post-conviction appeal."). A Califomia court has
held:
Because the district attomey's preliminary screening does not involve the court, it is not a
judicial act .... Tlhe trial court has no power to conduct a judicial review of the
determination .... [and has] no power to overrule the district attorney's determination that
[the defendant] was ineligible for a deferred entry ofjudgment.
Sturiale, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868; see also People v. Paz, 266 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (Cal. App.
1990) ("If the district attorney, upon reviewing the available records, determines that a
defendant has a prior conviction for an offense involving a controlled substance, the defendant's
exclusion from the diversion program is automatic.").
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The statutory criteria that form the basis for the prosecutor's decision to offer
the option of referral to drug court do not depend upon determining that the
offender is in fact an addict, as opposed to a possessor, user, or solicitor of drugs.
Furthermore, there are good reasons for non-addicts to wish to enter the program:
in California, successful completion of the process not only results in the pending
criminal charges being dismissed,338 but also, if the defendant successfully
completes the post-plea program, "the arrest upon which the judgment was
deferred shall be deemed to have never occurred. '339 The same is true of the
Florida program. 340 Accordingly, depending upon the diversion statute, when the
offender graduates from drug court, he or she can deny that she was charged at
all.
Like the court, the drug court treatment provider also has an opportunity to
screen out a limited range of ineligible defendants.341 The limitations placed upon
the screening process make explicit some of the values underlying both the drug
court itself and the treatment to be provided. For example, if the goal of treatment
is to cure addicted offenders, the treatment provider should have the opportunity
to screen out non-addicts or addicts who do not respond to the treatment provided.
Generally, however, the screening decision is limited by a variety of factors that
Upon the prosecutor's recommendation for diversion, however, the court arranges a
hearing at the defendant's arraignment to determine whether it should endorse or reject the
district attorney's recommendation to divert the defendant to drug court. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1000(b); see also id. § 1000.3. In California, if the defendant is eligible for diversion, the drug
court conducts the diversion referral and plea or waiver hearing. Hora et al., supra note 8, at
491. In the Oakland F.I.R.S.T. program, the court does so at the time of arraignment, and the
defendant proceeds immediately from the hearing, walking five minutes up the street to the
probation office, to enter rehabilitation. Id at 473-74. Such a hearing is required only where
there is a dispute over the facts surrounding the diversion recommendation; absent a factual
dispute, "[n]o hearing is necessary." Paz, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 472. At the initial screening,
therefore, drug courts respond to the administrative concerns of the prosecutor: with the
exception of statutes like the SACPA, the initial decision to send offenders to drug court rests
with the prosecutor. Every other decision at the screening stage is a response to her decision to
refer. Even under the SACPA, the prosecutor enjoys wide discretion over charging crimes.
Thus, if the prosecutor is able to obtain a felony conviction on a non-drug offense, the offender
will be completely precluded from drug court under the SACPA.
338 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.3 (West 2004).
339 Id. § 1000.4(a). ("The defendant may indicate in response to any question concerning
his or her prior criminal record that he or she was not arrested or granted deferred entry of
judgment for the offense....")
340 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.08(6)(c)(2) (West 2004) (requiring dismissal of charges on
successful completion of program); Upshaw, 648 So. 2d at 852-53 (dismissing charges after
completion of program despite State's belated claim that Upshaw was ineligible for diversion).
341 See, e.g, FLA STAT. ANN. §§ 397.705(2)(b), (c) (permitting director of treatment
facility to refuse to admit offender or discharge offender where offender is beyond the safe
management of the treatment facility).
2004] 1541
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
include the statutory regulations and legal decisions elaborating the purpose and
procedures to inform screening. Accordingly, the treatment providers' evaluations
of individual offenders may have to accommodate the manner in which a
particular court or legislature understands the conception of addiction and the
range of appropriate treatments, as well as a prosecutor's decision to screen in
non-addicts or the mildly addicted. These legal influences may severely
circumscribe the treatment providers' ability to refuse treatment to those they do
not consider addicts.
There are, however, certain incentives for treatment programs to take non-
addicts. 342 The progiam completion rate of the non-addict is likely to be higher
than the addict. The non-addict is less prone to relapse, and recidivism is likely to
be reduced as the non-addict is better able to adapt to the abstinence generally
required by drug court.343 These front end issues-the impact on completion and
recidivism rates of addicts as compared to non-addicts-have not been addressed
in the sociological studies of drug courts, yet are vital to understanding the claim
that drug courts work.344
1. Coercion and Treatment
To perform this highly useful allocation of treatment to the offender, the drug
court must be able to review, evaluate, and coordinate the different available
treatment options. Usually, the probation department's pre-sentence report
provides the necessary information, 345 although it is unclear how much
34 2 See, e.g., STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND
CLASSIFICATION 53 (1985).
343 In both California and Florida, non-addiction is no bar to entry into drug court
programs. See Smith v. Florida, 840 So. 2d 404, 405, 406 n. 1 (Fla. App. 2003) (holding that
where the defendant was determined not to be an addict by the treatment provider, she would
nonetheless have had to undergo treatment had she signed a drug court agreement during the
plea colloquy); see also People v. Esparza, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 380 (Cal. App. 2003) (finding
defendant's claim that he was not an addict not a decisive factor in determining eligibility for
California drug court program).
344 There is no evidence that drug courts monitor the degree of addiction of those who
enter drug courts. Drug courts have a strong disincentive from doing so: the program is
supposed to be therapeutic, and the therapeutic rationale disappears when the offenders are not
addicts.
345 Meyer & Lutes, supra note 87, at 657 (noting that courts require pre-sentence report to
be prepared whenever there is a felony conviction or the court orders a report consequent to a
misdemeanor conviction); see also Torres, supra note 83, at 18.
[T]the medical model begins with an examination, which is conducted during the
preparation of the presentence investigation (PSI) report. The diagnosis also may be
contained in the PSI, but it may be scrutinized more closely during the prison classification
process or by the supervising probation officer before or after the initial interview. Once
the examination and diagnosis have been completed, a treatment plan is developed either
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information is routinely available at the arraignment hearing, which is when
offenders are diverted under the Oakland model.346
It is at this point that the difference between the social norms version of crime
control and the therapeutic jurisprudence version of penal welfarism is at its most
apparent. For therapeutic jurisprudence, the goal is to match the offender to the
appropriate treatment given the available treatment options. Under the therapeutic
model, treatment occurs in two locations: the courtroom and the clinic.
Therapeutic jurisprudence, as adopted by drug court judges, constitutes as the
primary therapeutic relationship that between judge and offender. In many courts,
the judge meets with the treatment providers prior to the court session. Once in
the courtroom, it is the judge that controls the therapeutic interaction. The purpose
of the treatment provided is to ensure that the offender internalizes a set of
attitudes to drugs and her status as an addict.347
Internalization is content-dependent. It matters, under the therapeutic model,
what norms the offender accepts and why she accepts them. That is the whole
point of "getting with the program" and "telling the right story." 348 In order to
ensure that drug court offenders internalize the proper therapeutic understanding
of their condition, they are "pressure[d]... to tell... stor[ies] about themselves
according to the treatment paradigm." 349
The social norms version of crime control takes a radically different approach
to the provision of treatment. As we have seen, the social norms theorists are
somewhat wary of the drug court's innovative courtroom procedures, preferring
to characterize drug court as a form of probation. The demotion of courtroom
practice as a central feature of the drug court's practice is made possible by two
other features of the social norms theory: the fact that social norms need only be
accepted, rather than internalized, and the potential for drug courts to function as
an experimentalist institution.
I have already provided a brief account of "acceptance" in the context of
neutral liberal justifications for punishment. Richard McAdams argues that peer
pressure-what he calls "esteem"--functions to regulate behavior by providing a
process for enforcing social norms.350 Individuals wish to attract the endorsement
of their peers and avoid their censure; accordingly, they tend to adopt norms that,
by the institution or by the probation officer responsible for supervision. When the
treatment plan is developed, a prognosis is made regarding relapse, or the probability of
recidivism.
Id.
346 "To have the greatest chance of success, courts must... [perform] an initial
screening ... soon after arrest." Brown, supra note 86, at 87-88.
347 McAdams, supra note 186, at 376-86 (discussing internalization of norms).
348 See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 123-26.
349 Id. at 126.
350 See McAdams, supra note 186, at 367-76.
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for whatever reason, their peers endorse and avoid those they censure.351 The
conforming agent need not have any opinion as to why certain norms are favored
or disfavored and need not adopt the beliefs of the peers whose norms she adopts.
All that matters is that her behavior in fact conforms to that stipulated by the
informal social norms.352
Experimentalism provides an independent ground for approving drug courts.
The experimentalist vision for drug courts depends upon characterizing them as
more like an administrative institution than a court. Although such a
characterization is, as I have suggested, flawed, experimentalism nonetheless
provides an important and attractive rationale for drug courts. Doff and Sabel
suggest that drug courts are unique because, in addition to the treatment team, a
variety of affected communities, including probation officers, service providers,
and the addicts themselves, provide feedback on the efficacy of particular
treatments for particular addicts.353 These different sources of feedback permit
the court to distinguish which types of rehabilitation are most effective for
particular types of addicts and which treatment providers are best at administering
those treatment regimes. While acknowledging that, as yet, there are significant
lacunae in the information available to the drug court judge, nonetheless, Doff
and Sabel believe more effective information gathering will overcome these
problems.
If Doff and Sabel are correct, then drug courts represent a significant
improvement on most treatment provided through probation or parole, 354
particularly because drug courts specialize in addiction.355 Probation and parole,
which are the traditional non-custodial options, are often regarded as
insufficiently well-structured to perform the task of supervising an offender in a
treatment program and imposing the graduated sanctions necessary to retain the
offender within the treatment program, although there are a variety of options,
such as intensive supervision probation and specialized drug treatment programs,
351 See id at 367-76; see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 354 (1997)
[A] person's beliefs about whether other persons in her situation are [engaging in law-
abiding behavior] plays a much more significant role in her decision to comply [with legal
norms] than does the... expected punishment for evasion. Likewise, the perception that
one's peers will or will not disapprove exerts a much stronger influence than does the
threat of a formal sanction on whether a person decides to engage in a range of common
offenses-from larceny, to burglary, to drug use."
Id.
352 See McAdams, supra note 186, at 367-76.
353 See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 31, at 841-52.
354 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 91, at 22.
355 See Torres & Latta, supra note 317, at 52-53 (discussing creation of training process
specifically designed to address substance abuse).
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that attempt to ensure that offenders obtain some form of treatment.356 In the civil
commitment context, previous attempts to match offenders to treatment had
mixed success, largely dependent, it appears, on the quality of treatment and the
efficacy of the allocation of treatment to offender.357
Drug courts may, however, present some institutional impediments to the
proper functioning of the Dorf and Sabel model. For example, while there is some
evidence that the diagnostic information required to fit treatment to offender is
readily available,358 it is not clear that drug courts are able to take full advantage
of that information. First, treatment options may be constrained by the range of
providers affiliated with a particular court program. 359 Second, space in treatment
programs is limited and so offenders are likely to be referred to programs based
upon the availability as well as the propriety of the particular treatment regime.360
"In these instances, it is unlikely that treatment referrals will be made based solely
on decisions regarding individual diagnosis and appropriateness of a given
treatment modality; rather, the individual offender frequently will be referred to
that provider with whom the treatment court has reserved beds."361
A second complicating factor is that treatment providers may compete for
those offenders least likely to disrupt the treatment program or most likely to
succeed regardless of the rehabilitative regime. 362 The criteria for measuring
efficacy must therefore include some evaluation of the addict's amenability to
treatment that is independent of the treatment provider. That evaluation may be
complicated by the manner in which a particular court endorses the disease model
of addiction: under a strong version of the medical model, all addicts exhibit the
same pathology. The court's ability to distinguish or interest in establishing the
addict's susceptibility to cravings based on prior history may be limited: under the
medical model, even one exposure to the addictive substance indicates the
potential for a lifetime of serious drug dependency.
Furthermore, feedback from the larger community of drug offenders, which
potentially includes non-addicts, addicts, and the friends and families of these
356 See, e.g., Meyer & Lutes, supra note 87, at 658.
357 See, e.g., Sana Loue, The Criminalization of the Addictions: Toward a Unified
Approach, 24 J. MED. & L. 281, 317-320 (2003) (discussing California and New York
experiments with involuntary commitment for drug offenses); Chavkin, supra note 323, at 236-
39 (discussing same).
358 See Boldt, supra note 13, at 1226-27 (discussing availability of information on
efficacy of different treatment modalities for different types of addicts).
359 For example, my local drug court, the Hampden County Juvenile Drug Court, located
in Springfield, Massachusetts uses only one treatment provider. See Hampden County Juvenile
Drug Court Policy and Procedures Manual (on file with author).
360 See id at 1228.
361 Id.
362 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 342, at 53.
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offenders, may be tainted by self-interest. 363 Non-addicted offenders may enter
the system on the understanding that the charge will be dismissed on completion.
These offenders are not concerned with whether treatment works but how
onerous the program is. 364 For the addict community, assuming that the addict
population of a particular jurisdiction is relatively cohesive and shares
information among its members in a relatively efficient way,365 that community
may be more interested in staying addicted than becoming cured. Accordingly,
the addict community may evaluate treatment on their ability to work the system
rather than their ability to work a cure. 366 Moreover, as Dorf and Sabel
acknowledge, other factors, such as family disputes, can affect referrals to
particular institutions.367
Under the social norms version of crime control, neither of these issues is
terribly problematic. On the one hand, social norms theorists are simply not
interested in degenerate social norms.368 The values of law breakers just do not
count.369 The point of treatment is to require offenders to accept law-abiding
norms and while community feedback is important, the legislature is the proper
arbiter of those norms and the court is charged with reinforcing them. On the
other hand, referral consequent to family disputes may serve to accomplish the
process of norm-reinforcement. So long as the spouse, sibling, child, or other peer
endorses law-abiding norms, their reason for doing so is irrelevant. Furthermore,
by supporting such norms, the court can ensure their transmission into the
community.
Finally, even if experimentalist feedback does identify the best treatment
programs and providers for each type of offender, we are back to the problem of
supply and demand: it is by no means clear that there will be enough providers
supplying effective treatment to accommodate all the offenders that require the
treatment. There is, however, a paucity of information currently available to
detemine whether drug courts are performing their allocative function efficiently.
The lack of information may be caused by a more general conceptual confusion
of or complacency over who is an addict and who is not and what counts as
363 See, e.g., Cole v. State, 714 So. 2d 479, 485 (Fla. App. 1998) (involving a wife who
filed involuntary commitment petition because husband's "personality chang[ed] from loving to
mean and vicious"). The court of appeals voided the petition and granted a writ of prohibition
on a contempt of court charge due to severe improprieties in filing the petition. Id at 492.
364 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 840 So. 2d 404 (Ct. App. Fla. 2003). The defendant withdrew
from drug court once she realized how onerous the drug court procedures would be. Id at 405.
365 Torres, supra note 83, at 20.
366 Id.
367 Dorf& Sabel, supra note 31, at 871-72.
368 Simon, supra note 146, at 48-74.
369 Simon calls this the "citizen perspective" in contrast to the "victim perspective" held
by liberal legalism. Id. at 48-49.
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treatment and what does not, as well as the inherent difficulty in studying the
courts' consistency in applying allocative criteria to the various offenders passing
through their courts. Of course, addiction matters more, at least in theory, for the
therapeutic version of penal welfarism than for the social norms theory of crime
control; for social norms theorists, the point is simply to reach law-breakers rather
than addicts. Nonetheless, if the experimentalist justification is to predominate
and drug courts are to function so as to efficiently match treatment to offender,
then the necessity of better systems for gathering and sharing information about
treatments and providers amongst members of the treatment team and ultimately
amongst the various drug courts is obvious.
2. Treatment and Incapacitation
The efficacy of allocation of offender to treatment regime is relevant,
however, only on the assumption that treatment is the central goal of the drug
court. If incapacitation is the central purpose, for example, then no matter how
bad the treatment offered, so long as it fulfils the goals of detention and
surveillance, it will fit the requirements of incapacitation. Of course, multiple
purposes may compete within the same drug court: it may engage in a degree of
incapacitation as well as treatment. Furthermore, as Boldt demonstrates, the drug
court's failure to provide adequate treatment may result from inadequate
resources or treatment options rather than the adoption of a particular penal
philosophy.370 If the claim, however, is that drug courts treat offenders, then drug
court advocates must address the issue of over- and under-inclusiveness: whether
drug courts operate to screen out offenders who require treatment and screen in
those who do not.
Under the moral liberal version of due process, volitional accounts of
addiction support the retributivist desire to respect the offender's moral agency
through punishment. Punishment may be modified by various excuses, some of
which will depend upon the offender's lowered capacity to act rationally or
responsibly. Where the offender lacks any moral or rational capacity, punishment
is inappropriate. Treatment, therefore, works in conjunction with punishment to
restore the offender to full capacity. Treatment, however, is never required as a
condition of punishment but may be offered in addition to it.
Accordingly, where the addict is more or less rational, some form of
compelled treatment program is certainly justified, under the social norms version
of crime control, to manipulate the rational ordering of the available choices so as
to encourage participation in treatment or to reinforce socially acceptable choice.
When the available options have been re-ordered to ensure that the social harm-
choosing to satisfy one's addiction-is placed significantly lower on the scale of
rational orderings and yet, despite the re-ordered interests, the addict still chooses
370 See Boldt, supra note 13, at 1228.
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the social harm, then punishment is not only justified but required under both the
social norms version of crime control and due process models of addiction.371
Confinement, as a method of or pre-requisite for treatment, is offensive only
to the moral liberal due process model. Moral liberalism requires that the
punishment be limited to that degree sufficient to respect the offender's moral
autonomy; where confinement lasts longer than morally appropriate, then
treatment itself is inappropriate. Social norms theorists need not adopt this
approach; so long as treatment is effective in reshaping the offender's behavior
and re-enforcing norms of law-abidingness, then continued treatment could be
justified. Under the therapeutic jurisprudence model employed by drug courts,
treatment is always mandated. The offender, as addict, is perpetually on the brink
of relapse; the question is not whether to treat, but what degree of treatment to
impose on a given occasion. With its emphasis on isolation from addictive
stimuli, the drug court version of therapeutic jurisprudence retains confinement as
a significant option.
So far, however, we have considered confinement when used in a manner
disproportionate to the treatment required; detention may also be offensive when
disproportionate to the harm posed. The therapeutic justification for involuntary
confinement depends upon removing the addict from access to the stimulus. A
harm-focused justification for imposing different levels of incapacitation would,
however, depend, in part, upon the consequences of relapse. If the social harm
consequent to relapse is slight, then the justification for engaging in severely
incapacitating confinement is lessened. Accordingly, the drastic treatment
response of involuntary confinement must be managed in a manner that
minimizes impinging upon the addict's liberty rights. Otherwise therapeutic
incapacitation risks treating addicts on the basis of a status or condition they are
powerless to change and imposes an extremely onerous constraint on their liberty
rights without considering alternatives which, though they may be more costly for
society, need not be more costly to manage in terms of posing a danger to society.
Courts often apply due process considerations, recognizing that there is a
qualitative difference between treatment and punishment,372 in part dependent
371 Failure to punish would undermine the re-ordering of the interests. If there was no
punishment following discovery of the social harm, there would be no reason to threaten
punishment.
372 "Forced administration of antipsychotic medication may not be used as a form of
punishment." Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 241 (1990) (Stephens, J., concurring); see
also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,493-94 (1980).
None of our decisions holds that conviction for a crime entitles a State not only to
confine the convicted person but also to determine that he has a mental illness and to
subject him involuntarily to institutional care in a mental hospital. Such consequences
visited on the prisoner are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically
suffered by a person convicted of crime. Our cases recognize as much and reflect an
understanding that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not within the range of
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upon the effect that each is supposed to have upon the individual. In at least the
retributivist versions of punishment, confinement and coercion are ends in
themselves, designed to mete out to the criminal the degree of harm she has
visited upon society. Punishment is therefore limited in both duration and type. 3 7 3
Put differently, retributivist theories of punishment place substantive limits on the
type of behavior that may be punished.374 Only behavior that manifests the
relevant quantity and quality of social harm should be subjected to punishment.
Neutral liberal justifications of incapacitation may also be limited. Neutral
liberalism, it should be remembered, uses some form of participative process to
determine public values; that process is conducted from a position of ignorance
about the beliefs one will ultimately adopt and the social status one will ultimately
enjoy.375 Accordingly, when determining the appropriate punishment for a given
social harm, neutral liberalism focuses primarily on deterrence and rehabilitation
rather than the morally loaded position of retributivism. 376
From a neutral liberalist perspective, the substantive limits on punishment are
determined not by the content of some moral theory but by the proper process of
rule-enactment. 377 One is punished for one's failure to follow socially agreed-
upon norms and the quantity and quality of punishment is in turn determined by a
set of socially agreed-upon norms. This does not mean, however, that there are no
limits upon punishment. For example, deterrence goals take at least two general
forms: individual and social. 378 Where deterrence is also directed towards the
particular circumstances of the individual, the goals of punishment are to avoid
conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual. A criminal
conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an individual's right to freedom from
confinement for the term of his sentence, but they do not authorize the State to classify him
as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording
him additional due process protections.
Id.; Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22.
373 Limitation by type is generally at issue where due process is a consideration affecting
punishment. The law recognizes that there must be some "concept[ ] of dignity, civilized
standards, humanity, and decency" that places a limit on punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has prohibited punishments that involve the "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Similarly, force may
not be used as a means of penal control "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm." Id. at 320-21; see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). And,
prison conditions, though uncomfortable, may not be inhumane. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825,832 (1994).
374 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 165.
375 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 166, at 316-46.
376 Hampton, Liberalism, supra note 163, at 170-76.
3 7 7 Id.
378 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 166, at 383.
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inflicting unnecessary harm upon the individual and ultimately to benefit her and
society.379 Individual deterrence in this form is compatible with treatment or
rehabilitation: both are directed towards the welfare of the individual offender.
Individual deterrence and rehabilitation, therefore, require choosing the least
restrictive means to effectuate their goals. Where incapacitation goes beyond the
least restrictive means or utilizes burdensome restrictions not necessary to the
treatment program, the treatment process may be transformed into a punitive
one.
380
From the perspective of social utility, incapacitation has its limits as a
utilitarian justification: as with all utilitarian balances of benefit and harm, where
the individual's liberty interest outweighs the harm to society that justifies
incapacitation, then the individual should be released. The difficulty comes when
the symptoms of the disease are a criminally proscribed social harm and the
treatment is incapacitation through confinement. In this case, both criminal
sanction and treatment share similar goals. In the case of criminal sanction,
however, the due process liberty interest is subject to administrative penological
considerations. 381 Furthermore, a diverse series of punitive options that are more
379 Id. at 379-85.
380 Such considerations were at issue in two cases, Powell and Gault, in which Justice
Fortas appears to take divergent positions regarding the amount of deference due to the expert
determination that the defendant is suffering from a disease or condition. In Powell, Justice
Fortas appeared to endorse the determination that alcoholism was a medical "condition he is
powerless to change," and so defer to an expert's determination of the issue, the result of which
could be a long period of involuntary confinement in a civil institution. Powell v. Texas, 392
U.S. 514, 567 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting). In Gault, Justice Fortas was much less willing to
defer to the expert determination about such a condition and instead suggested that "[u]nder our
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1,28 (1967). Justice Stewart, on the other hand, accepted the expert designation of narcotic
addiction and delinquency as conditions in both Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667
(1962), and Gault.
Whether treating with a delinquent child, a neglected child, a defective child, or a
dependent child, a juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of
the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal court. The object of the one is
correction of a condition. The object of the other is conviction and punishment for a
criminal act.
Gault, 387 U.S. at 78-79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The difference between Justice Fortas' opinions in Gault and in Powell, then, resides in the
types of attributes he identifies as a condition, and, therefore, as a medical decision immune
from due process considerations. The issue then becomes one of what sort of process is required
before a court will accept that the individual suffers from a condition. That in turn may depend
upon whether the condition is a medically-recognized one. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 533; see
also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 231 (1990).
381 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (showing prison regulations valid so
long as furthering penological goals).
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or less restrictive are permissible to effectuate the goals of deterrence and
retribution. Nonetheless-and this is the insight of Justices Marshall and Black in
Powell-the inherent retributivist limitations on punishment (the requirement of
some form of proportionality) may render even punishment that has
incapacitation as its primary goal less constricting of liberty than therapeutic
confinement.382 In the therapeutic sphere, when the treatment itself is abstinence
or incapacitation, there is no upper limit on the time spent in an institution to
effect a cure. 383
Furthermore, under a neutral liberal justification of incapacitation the major
determinant in the balance between individual liberty and the protection of society
will be determined by the particular justification of punishment which attempts to
balance the conflicting interests of an individualized estimation of the harm
presented by that type of behavior and the ability to police such addicts. This
calculation may well be an economic one: the financial cost of permitting the
offender-patient to roam free without adequate-meaning round-the-clock-
supervision is too costly.384
VI. Do DRUG COURTS DIVERT OFFENDERS FROM PRISON?
Even if drug courts properly engage in some form of treatment-based
incapacitation, the diversion claim suggests they receive less time in prison under
the drug court model than the offender would otherwise receive. In this section, I
provide a brief assessment of the drug court's claim to divert offenders from
prison.
A. Drug Courts and Diversion
Stanley Cohen provided an early and prescient description of the difference
between various types of diversion and the manner in which therapeutic diversion
operates to channel offenders into rather than out of the criminal justice
system.385 Traditional or true diversion provides the police with a binary choice:
either screen the offender out of the system or send them on a course that leads to
382 See, e.g., MORRIS, Persons, supra note 165, at 31-57 (1979); Lewis, supra note 165, at
301-08; Hart, supra note 165, at 410.
383 This point is a staple of retributivist theories of punishment. See, e.g., Lewis, supra
note 165, at 301-08 (rejecting treatment model of punishment in favor of moral one that
respects moral personhood of offender).
384 See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Holistic Retributivism, 88 CAL. L. REv. 991, 996-97 (2000)
(emphasizing importance of economic cost to calculus of punishment).
385 STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND
CLASSIFICATION 41-54 (1985).
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court and prison.386 At each stage of the criminal justice process, where the
offender is not processed "up" she is processed "out.' ' 387 The new form of
diversion, centered as it is around private, non-punitive therapeutic mechanisms
of social control, provides a third option: channeling away from court but into a
therapeutic system of social control.388
Cohen uses the metaphor of a fishing net to describe how the new systems of
therapeutic "deviancy control" work, with the therapeutic institutions as the net
and potential offenders as the fish.389 According to Cohen, under the therapeutic
system of diversion:
(1) there is an increase in the total number of deviants getting into the system in
the first place and many of these are new deviants who would not have been
processed previously (wider nets);
(2) there is an increase in the overall intensity of intervention, with old and new
deviants being subject to levels of intervention (including traditional
institutionalization) which they might not have preciously received (denser nets);
(3) new agencies and services are supplementing rather than replacing the
original set of control mechanisms (different nets). 390
This process is facilitated by the competing classificatory goals of treatment
providers and criminal justice professionals, primarily police and prosecutors.
"While clinicians target drug addicts for treatment in an effort to improve their
subjective life experience, the criminal justice system casts a wide net in an
attempt to facilitate objective improvements in the assumed relationship between
drug use, crime, and public safety."'391 Accordingly, a system initially targeted at
386 Id. at 52.
387 Id at 52-54.
388 Id. at 52-54.
389 Id. at41.
390 Id at44.
391 Edwards, supra note 93, at 288. Edwards continues:
Unlike traditional classification schemes that target addiction for diagnosis and treatment,
the criminal justice system is forced to widen its net in an attempt to curtail drug-related
crime. A wide variety of individuals are introduced to treatment as a result. Many of these
individuals are at a point where outside pressure to seek help is minimal. Some are young,
first-time offenders who have been slated for treatment because of a perceived nexus
between drug use and criminal activity. Others are steeped in denial or otherwise incapable
of assessing or evaluating the competing pressures that are brought to bear when coercion
is applied. As compulsory treatment processes widen the net of eligible offenders for
treatment, the role of coercion has been redefined from natural consequence to a quasi-
therapeutic agent that introduces the offender to treatment and forces compliance during
his stay.
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drug addicts comes primarily to serve drug users who may or may not be
addicted. Treatment programs, in an effort to demonstrate effectiveness, start
cherry picking the low-risk candidates who would have been screened out of a
traditional diversion system and channeling up and into the criminal justice
system the high-risk candidates they were originally designed to serve.392 The
system diverts not away from prison, but into a variety of systems of social
control.393
The voluntary account, as we have seen, supports two rationales for engaging
in treatment. One is premised upon rational choice theory: the social norms
theorist believes that invasive practices, including treatment regimes, are justified
so long as they are effective at inhibiting offenders' anti-social behavior.394
Treatment functions as a less formal or non-legal set of norms operating upon the
offender, and treatment centers provide an alternative community using peer
pressure to ensure behavior conforms to the appropriate norms of law-
abidingness.
In light of the court's power to match offenders to more or less incapacitating
treatment regimes, it is worth reiterating the centrality of diversion from prison
among the liberal justifications for establishing and supporting drug courts.3 9 5 If
Id.
392 See Edwards, supra note 93, at 287-88
In the criminal justice system, where a wide variety of individuals are slated for one-
dimensional treatment programs, non-addicted individuals are forced into treatment while
many addicted persons are required to participate in treatment that does not, and indeed
cannot, effectuate meaningful recovery. As addicts are blamed for the inevitable failure of
this process, treatment facilities sidestep the coercive influences that they so willingly
apply to addicted persons. Here, the relationship between net-widening and institutional
accountability serves as a serious obstacle to specific and meaningful applications of
compulsory treatment processes.
Id.
393 COHEN, supra note 385, at 52-54.
394 See Simon, supra note 146,48-74.
395 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 86, at 80-81, 87-88 (noting high rates of imprisonment
and punitive sentences as a result of the War on Drugs, and suggesting that drug courts
intervene to treat felons); Feinblatt et al., supra note 137, at 291-92 (identifying problem to be
addressed by drug courts as the burgeoning court dockets and prison population resulting from
the War on Drugs); Goldkamp, supra note 33, at 943-44 (discussing Miami felony drug court);
McColl, supra note 57, at 476-77 (discussing same); Hunter, supra note 137, at 419-20
(pointing to savings made by using drug courts to divert drug offenders from prison); Hora et
al., supra note 8, at 462-66 (noting explosion of caseload and prison population due to War on
Drugs and suggesting that drug courts are part of a solution to this problem by "[b]reaking the
[c]ycle of [d]rugs and [c]rime"). Even where, as with Hora et al., the link between drug courts
and diversion from, specifically, prison is not explicitly made, it is strongly implied by
suggesting that drug courts respond to the problem of prison overload by addressing addiction.
That implication can only be correct, however, if it can be demonstrated that catching
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that justification is to be borne out in practice, the court's eligibility criteria must
promote the diversion of individuals who are otherwise likely to spend a
significant amount of time in prison rather than those likely to receive non-
custodial sentences or sentences that require less institutional confinement than
that meted out in drug court. By contrast, drug courts will fail as diversionary
institutions to the extent that they treat primarily those individuals who would not
receive a custodial sentence in any event, or where the drug court's treatment
regime proves to be more incapacitatory than the alternatives.
To assess the diversionary claims of drug courts, I shall consider the two
oldest drug court programs in the nation: the courts in Dade County, Miami, and
in Oakland, California. These programs differ in that Florida drug courts
historically favored the pre-plea model,396 whereas Oakland, operating within the
limitations imposed by the California diversion statute, favored a post-plea
model.397 Both, however, screen out similar types of offenders from the treatment
program.
Under the Florida drug court statute, only offenders with no record of
violence are eligible for drug court. Offenders who have been convicted of, at
most, one prior misdemeanor and who are currently charged with a misdemeanor
or third-degree felony are eligible, as are those charged with a second- or third-
degree felony for purchase or possession of a controlled substance. 398 In
nonviolent drug users, many of whom have no prior record, are likely to graduate on to other
drugs likely to result in prison sentences, and that the establishment of a drug court does not
have a net-widening effect.
396 Under the Florida statute, the drug court is to serve as a "pretrial intervention
program[ ] for persons charged with a crime, before or after any information has been filed or
an indictment has been returned in the circuit court." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.08(1) (West
2004).
397 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.1(b) (West 2004); see also Terry v. Superior Court, 86
Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 655 (Cal. App. 1999); People v. Cisneros, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 785 (Cal.
App. 2000). California provides a statutory diversion scheme whereby the defendant is
"diverted to a rehabilitation program with judgment deferred and criminal charges dismissed
upon successful completion of the program." Id.
398 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.334(1) (permitting each judicial circuit in the state to
establish a drug court). The eligibility criteria for drug court provide that:
(2) Any first offender, or any person previously convicted of not more than one
nonviolent misdemeanor, who is charged with any misdemeanor or felony of the third
degree is eligible for release to the pretrial intervention program ....
(6)(a) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, a person who is charged with a
felony of the second or third degree for purchase or possession of a controlled substance
under chapter 893, prostitution, tampering with evidence, solicitation for purchase of a
controlled substance, or obtaining a prescription by fraud; who has not been charged with a
crime involving violence, including, but not limited to, murder, sexual battery, robbery,
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California, a similar set of restrictions apply: the offender must have committed a
nonviolent crime, have no prior conviction for an offense involving controlled
substances, and have not participated in a diversion program or been convicted of
a felony within five years of the offense charged.399 Furthermore, the offender
must be charged with one of a specific list of offenses.400
caracking, home-invasion robbery, or any other crime involving violence; and who has
not previously been convicted of a felony nor been admitted to a felony pretrial program
referred to in this section is eligible for admission into a pretrial substance abuse education
and treatment intervention program ... for a period of not less than 1 year in duration,
upon motion of either party or the court's own motion, except:
2. If the state attorney believes that the facts and circumstances of the case suggest the
defendant's involvement in the dealing and selling of controlled substances.
Id. § 948.08.
Successful completion of the program mandates dismissal of the charges "in which
prosecution is not deemed necessary." Id § 948.08(5)(c). Some of the more notable individuals
eligible for diversion to drug court under the Florida statute include Noelle Bush, Governor Jeb
Bush's daughter. See Dana Canedy, Daughter of Gov. Bush Is Sent to Jail in a Drug Case, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 18, 2002, at A 18; see also Jeb Bush Weeps as Drug Remarks Turn Personal, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2002, at Al 8 (stating that Noelle Bush was to be diverted to drug court after
falsifying prescription for pain-killer). Another was Rush Limbaugh. See Letter to Roy Black,
Esquire, Limbaugh's Attorney, from the Florida State Attorney, at
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/rushletters3.html (Sept. 5,2004).
399 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000(a).
400 That list is contained in the diversion statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000(a). Those
offenses include: possession of toluene, CAL. PENAL CODE § 381; possession of a controlled
substance, punishable as either felony or misdemeanor, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11,350 (West 2004); possession of a controlled substance that is not a narcotic, punishable as
a misdemeanor, see id at § 11,377; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4060 (West 2004); soliciting
another to possess a controlled substance, CAL. PENAL CODE § 653fd); possession of marijuana
or concentrated cannabis, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (making possession of
concentrated cannabis or marijuana a misdemeanor and mandating that three or more prior
convictions for possession, when added to current possession of less than 28.5 grams of
marijuana, require diversion to drug treatment program); possession of marijuana while driving
an automobile, CAL. VEH. CODE § 23,222(b) (West 2000); cultivation and processing of
marijuana for personal use, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11,358; possession of
paraphernalia for ingesting narcotics, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11,364; being present in
a room where a controlled narcotic is being used, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11,365;
forging or altering a prescription to obtain a narcotic drug, if the narcotic is for personal use
secured by fictitious prescription, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11,368; being under the
influence of specified controlled substances, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11,550
(punishable as a misdemeanor); or appearing in public under the influence of a drug or
controlled substance, CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(f).
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Most drug court programs last a minimum of one year.401 Yet many of the
offenses that render an offender eligible for entry to drug courts in both Florida
and California are misdemeanors. In Florida, those offenses that are felonies are
not punishable by a prison sentence.402 In California, eligibility for drug court is
determined by two statutes: the deferred entry ofjudgment program40 3 and a post-
conviction mandatory diversion program under the Substance Abuse and Crime
Prevention Act of 2000 (SACPA).404 The deferred entry of judgment program is
the older of the two, pre-dating the drug court movement.405 Under the deferred
entry of judgment program, only those persons charged with one of 12 specified
drug offenses may participate in a drug education and treatment program in lieu
of undergoing a criminal prosecution,40 6 and none of the listed offenses would
401 For example, diversion under the California deferred entry of judgment program lasts
between eighteen months and three years. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.1(a)(3). Diversion
under SACPA lasts for between one year and eighteen months. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1210.1(c)(3); People v. Esparza, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 381 (Cal. App. 2003).
402 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.08 (West 2004). The Florida Drug Court screening statute
limits eligibility to drug court to offenders who have committed a misdemeanor or third degree
felony, or at most a second degree felony for purchase, possession, or solicitation of a controlled
substance under chapter 893 of the criminal code. Id. For purposes of Florida's sentencing
guidelines, most third degree felonies are generically given an offense level of one and second
degree felonies an offense level of four; none of the drug felonies upon which eligibility for
drug court depends have an offense level above five. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.0.12,
921.0.13. If convicted for these felonies alone, the offender may not be incarcerated in a state
prison. See id. § 921.0.14. And, the court "shall ... accord[ ] weight in favor of withholding a
sentence of imprisonment" when the offender's conduct "neither caused nor threatened serious
harm" and when "[t]he defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or had
led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present
crime." Id. §§ 921.001(b)(1), (6). Accordingly, those eligible for drug court would otherwise
receive light jail sentences if any custodial sentence was imposed.
The statute replaces the former diversion statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 397.12 (repealed
1993). That statute was held to permit diversion for felony purchase and possession of cocaine
within 1,000 feet of a school in violation of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(1)(e)(l). See Scates v.
State, 603 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. 1992). The Scates court held that the diversion statute "[did] not
limit itself to possessory offenses under chapter 893." Id. This was a departure from prior
appellate decisions. See State v. Edwards, 456 So. 2d 575 (Fla. App. 1984) (holding that FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 397.12 permits diversion only for possession felonies listed under chapter 893);
State v. Raphael, 469 So. 2d 812, 813 (Fla. App. 1985) (holding the same). It was immediately
distinguished, with some contortions, by the lower courts. See State v. Manning, 605 So. 2d
508, 510-11 (Fla. App. 1992).
The new statute appropriately limits itself
403 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000-1000.8 (West 2004).
404 Id. §§ 1210-1210.5.
405 California has had a drug diversion program extending back to 1972. See B.W. v.
Board of Med. Quality Assurance, 215 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Cal. App. 1985).
406 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000(a); 2001 OPs. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 85, OPINION No. 01-
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result in imprisonment in a state prison. Under the SACPA, which is concerned
with offenders convicted of offenses relating to drug possession, only nonviolent
offenders may be diverted to drug court, but every nonviolent offender charged
solely with drug possession must receive, in the first instance, a non-custodial
sentence.
40 7
The additional criteria imposed for diversion to drug court in both Florida and
California-that the offense committed be nonviolent, that there be no recent
record of violence, that there be only a limited history of prior convictions for
drug use-suggest that any potential sentence, even for the felony charges, would
fall far short of the usual maximums and potentially require detention for a matter
of days rather than months.408 While any jail time is onerous, the sort of sentence
to be imposed under the Florida and California statutes bears no relation to the
lengthy sentences that cause most concern to most opponents of drug sentencing
laws.
207. Among the drugs the possession of which precludes eligibility to drug court is PCP. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11,550(g) (West 2004) (prohibiting eligibility for possession
of drug listed in CAL. PENAL CODE § 11,055(e)(3)). "The diversion law is confined to
prosecutions for enumerated narcotics offenses; it does not extend to other crimes even when
charged concurrently with an enumerated narcotics offense." Harvey v. Superior Court, 117
Cal. Rptr. 383, 384 (Cal. App. 1974)
407 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1210, 1210.1; see also Rosenblum, supra note 70, at 1220-21
(claiming that "[t]hese initiatives eliminate judicial discretion in sanctioning as well as
prosecutorial discretion in the determination of which defendants will participate in the
program"). Rosenblum is not quite correct in her claim on prosecutorial discretion: the option of
a non-custodial sentence may simply be another factor to be considered in the prosecutor's
charging decision, and may result in the prosecutor bringing additional charges to render simple
possession unavailable. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (stating that an offender is not eligible
for probation under the SACPA if convicted for a non-drug misdemeanor or any felony); see
also People v. Esparza, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 382-83 (Cal. App. 2003). ("The statute does not
include any language applicable to defendants on probation for nondrug crimes. All of the
provisions barring incarceration for probation violators refer solely and explicitly to defendants
on probation for drug crimes. It is the underlying offense that controls."); People v. Goldberg,
130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 192, 196 (Cal. App. 2003).
In Esparza, the California Court of Appeals held that a court's discretion in sentencing was
also relevant. In that case the trial court sentenced the defendant to a prison term for, among
other things, vandalism. The appellate court noted that:
This is not to say that the trial court could not have exercised its discretion to reinstate
defendant's probation on the vandalism case in order to permit defendant to take advantage
of the Proposition 36 programs in the felony drug case. The important point, however, is
that the trial court was not required to do so.
Esparza, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382.
408 Judges interviewed by Nolan confirm this point. See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 56 ("'I
have people in my program who have already spent more time in jail than they would have
spent had they just pled straight .... ' (quoting Judge Strickland of Roanoke, Virginia)).
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The sentences required under the Florida and Califomia statutes are not an
alternative to the draconian sentences mandated by the War on Drugs but
primarily to sentences that are little more than slaps on the wrist for low-level
offenders.409 More lengthy sentences in drug court as opposed to prison may be
bad enough, depending upon the type of incapacitation imposed by the drug
court; however, there is a severe risk that drug courts operate to channel into the
court those offenders who would otherwise escape the criminal justice system.
Timothy Edwards and Judge Morris Hoffman have been two outspoken critics of
this net-widening process.410
In terms of incapacitation, Timothy Edwards argues that, as of the year 2000,
there is still a paucity of the much-needed empirical research on the relation
between coercion and therapy.4 1 One measure of the coercive or incapacitative
nature of drug courts is the type of rehabilitation program available; another is
what type of offender is matched with what program. Depending upon whether
an offender is evaluated under the disease or volitional paradigm, his or her
suitability for treatment may vary. Some treatment regimes, such as therapeutic
communities, self-evidently require a great deal of incapacitation and coercion as
part of their therapeutic program. Others do not. On a given occasion, it may be
difficult to determine with great specificity which treatment regimes are
409 To be sure, matters are different in other jurisdictions. In New York state, in particular,
the Rockefeller Drug Laws result in notoriously high sentences for relatively minor amounts of
drug possession. In such circumstances, the incarcerative effects may well outweigh any
reservations appropriate to the length of a drug court program. As we shall see, a retributivist
approach would account for such differences in assessing the desirability of diversion to drug
court over the comparative prison sentence.
410 See Hoffman, Scandal, supra note 13, at 1503-04; Edwards, supra note 93, at 338-39,
287-88.
411 See Edwards, supra note 93, at 336-37. He suggests:
[T]here is a need for a 'typology' of pressures that can be applied to the addict and an
increasingly refined understanding of the differential effects of such pressures. Further,
there is a need to study the interaction effects of coercive strategy and patient
characteristics.
.. As it stands, most of the existing research "has failed to take... into account [the
complex relationship between various types of coercion and individual offender
characteristics]--either in theoretical terms, or simply in acknowledging the diversity of
criminal justice and treatment settings in which legal pressure is used, and the individual
differences among treatment-mandated offenders." Again, the literature does not address
the very real probability that coercion encourages attrition and false compliance, thus
leaving researchers with an incomplete account of total effects of coercion on treated
populations. The gap in existing research would be filled by studies that identify those
individuals who respond well, or not at all, to varying gradations of coercion, and the type
of treatment that is most effectively backed by the criminal sanction. At present, this
information does not exist.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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predominantly therapeutic and which are better described as coercive, which
offenders are pathological and which rational.4 12
Furthermore, while many of the extant studies focus on various treatment
programs, there is little investigation of the incapacitatory nature of the drug
treatment process itself. 413 For example, drug testing is supposed to incapacitate.
Its purpose is to ensure addicts do not use drugs. Testing can be accomplished in a
manner that is time consuming and may be part of a program designed to remove
the addict from his or her community--often on the theory that the addict's
community is the most serious barrier to rehabilitation and the greatest cause of
relapse. Taken together, these treatment tactics may have an extremely
incapacitatory impact.414
The court may also use a variety of incapacitatory sanctions to enforce
compliance. These sanctions, as we have seen, are often imposed as part of a
contract between court and offender, although as we have also seen, the court
exercises tremendous discretion in determining whether the offender has breached
the contract and is self-consciously not bound by the requirements of due process
when making that determination. Rather, the role of the contract is to ensure the
requisite consent to the program and to justify all subsequent coercive steps.
Under the therapeutic model, the contract provides the first stage of behavior
modification by requiring the offender to internalize the norms that will be more
or less coercively applied should she fail to abide by the terms of the contract.4 15
If measured purely on the invasive ability to supervise and incapacitate
potentially law-breaking offenders: from the crime-control perspective, too, far
from being a disaster, drug courts appear, superficially at least, to be a major
success. It is immaterial whether the individuals selected for drug court are
addicts or whether they are cured.4 16 All that matters is that they end up in the
appropriate form of carceral regime, whether inside or outside of prison, and that
they spend a significant amount of time there. The available research somewhat
supports the drug courts' success by this measure. Drug court advocates often
maintain that offenders spend more time in drug court than they would in
prison.417 According to Judge Hoffman, many individuals who would avoid the
412 Id. at 336-37.
413 Id. at 363-67.
414 See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 6, at 510-11,484, 495, 501 (noting that frequent drug
testing is part of drug court program).
415 See, e.g., Winick, supra note 189, at 227-30.
416 Indeed, under the neo-rehabilitative version of administrative crime control, these
offenders are incapable of cure.
417 See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 56.
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criminal justice system altogether are now caught in its net for more or less
lengthy periods of time.418
It is by no means obvious, then, that drug courts result in less time spent
under court supervision than in a traditional court system. In fact, drug courts
began and operated for many years under the pre-existing diversion statutes-
statutes already in force at the height of the War on Drugs' incarcerative zeal.4 19
The diversionary justification of drug court thus depends upon arguing that
differences on the scale of days in prison justify the drug court model rather than
differences in years. This is a perfectly logical position. Nonetheless, given the de
minimis nature of the potential sentence, drug courts are not in the vanguard of
the fight against exceptionally punitive drug sentences. Drug courts are not
emptying the prisons of nonviolent narcotics addicts sentenced to lengthy prison
sentences, at least not in Florida and California.
In considering whether drug courts require less confinement than a jail
sentence, it is important to recognize that jail and prison are not the only locations
of incapacitation in the criminal justice system.420 Part of the drug courts' appeal
may be the manner in which they disperse and transform detention and
surveillance, moving them outside the jail and into a set of more or less privately
provided settings. These different treatment sites may be inherently incapacitatory
and require the offender to remain under observation in a designated place, such
as a probation center or drug clinic, for more or less extended periods of time.421
In addition, these incapacitatory sites require expenditures of travel time.
Although travel may be less onerous because unsupervised, it still serves some of
the goals of incapacitation.
The phenomenon of net-widening ought not to surprise social norms theorists
eager to exploit the experimentalist potential of administrative agencies in general
and drug courts in particular.422 The experimentalist posture is designed to render
administrative agencies more sensitive to the particular norms and needs of the
local communities served by the various administrative offices, and less in thrall
418 Hoffman, Scandal, supra note 11, at 1503--04; see also NOLAN, supra note 3, at 202-
203.
419 To divert people from lengthy terms in prison, new statutes would be required that
permitted diversion for felonies with high mandatory minimum sentences. The Scales court
held that the Florida diversionary statute permitted discretion to the judge to divert despite a
minimum three-year sentence required in a different chapter of the code. Scates v. State, 603
So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla. 1992) (holding that because the word "mandatory" did not appear
alongside the requirement of a three-year minimum sentence, the alternative existed of
participation in a drug rehabilitation program). That decision was abrogated by legislation
within one year.
420 See, e.g., Boldt, supra note 13, at 1242 (noting that therapy can, from the perspective
of the offender, appear punitive).
421 See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 41,44-45.
422 See, e.g., Dorf& Sabel, supra note 31.
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to the influence of bureaucrats and repeat players.423 As my colleague Jamieson
Colbum has pointed out, however, the problem with experimentalism in the
administrative context is that it fails to account for the manner in which different
but interacting agencies preserve their own area of competence and institutional
agenda through rule "cascades" that determine institutional priorities and
interpretations of the overarching administrative rules or regulations.424 Simply
put: in selecting drug courts as a model of experimentalist responsiveness to local
norms, social norms theorists may well ignore the manner in which the police,
treatment providers, and other executive or quasi-administrative agencies fail to
adopt the court's administrative or therapeutic goals, instead using the court to
pursue their own administrative or bureaucratic interests. In this manner,
diversion works to "widen the net" by providing the police and prosecutor with a
costless alternative to dismissal for those cases that would not go to court.4 25
VII. EVALUATING DRUG COURTS
Heretofore, I have been concerned to describe the different ways in which
drug courts fit under each of the three models of criminal justice: crime-control,
penal-welfarist, and due process and their modem variants. My claim is that drug
courts appeal to a wide audience of criminal justice professionals and policy-
makers because they are presented as an alternative to incarceration that works to
divert, to treat, and to incapacitate all at the same time. The drug courts' appeal,
therefore, depends on their claim to promote, at significant points, the values
represented by one or other--or all--of the three crime-control categories.
In this section, I consider how the dominant justification of drug courts in
legal practice-the therapeutic model articulated by drug court judges-fares
under the social norms and legal liberal versions of crime control and due process.
A. Three Models of Evaluation
Social norms and neutral legalist theories appear compatible with one major
justification of drug court: it is a participative institution that operates with the
consent of the offenders in its care. So long as the offender consents to and
participates in the drug court process, then there is no problem: under the social
norms version of crime control the court and offender participate in promoting
law abiding social norms; under the neutral liberalism model, the legitimacy of
the process depends upon equal participation in the norm creation process. It is
choice that confers legitimacy. Thus if the offender, while aware of the drug
423 See, e.g., Dorf& Sabel, supra note 45.
424 See Jamison E. Colbum, "Democratic Experimentalism ": A Separation of Powers for
Our Time?, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 287,335-42,383-92 (2004).
425 This is essentially Cohen's point. See COHEN, supra note 385, at 41-55.
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court's procedural shortcomings, still chooses to enter the drug court program, she
should not object to the courtroom practice once she has started the program; if it
is not what she thought it would be, she can always drop out and return to the
traditional court system. On both models, then, consent appears to remedy any
substantive defect in the legal process afforded.
Both social norms and therapeutic conceptions of criminal justice insist upon
responsiveness to the needs or norms of the community and the offender. This
participative responsiveness justifies greater executive and adjudicative discretion
and intervention so long as the drug court process manifests the requisite quality
and quantity of participation as a sufficient guarantee of legitimacy. The issues for
due process advocates, however, are participation in what; is participation
meaningful; and who gets to assess and ensure the appropriate level of
participation? Accordingly, from the liberal legal perspective, the major objection
to drug court is with the power of the judge-as-expert; problems arise when the
offenders' views are discounted as inappropriately law-breaking or in conflict
with the dominant therapeutic discourse or as antithetical to the social influence of
the judge or the therapeutic relationship between judge and offender.
1. Participation: Empathy, Heroism, and the Judge-as-Expert
The due process critique is primarily concerned with providing a series of
checks and balances on the power of the state, as asserted by the prosecution and
the judge. Generally, the judge is constrained to a passive role, adjudicating the
adversarial contest between the prosecution and a defense counsel charged with
the task of zealously representing his or her client. Neutral liberals would require
even sentencing to conform to an objective, pre-determined standard. Moral
liberals permit the judge some discretion in sentencing on the grounds that the
judge is as much an expert in determining moral accountability as anyone. 426
Furthermore, because the process is public and the judge is required to justify the
sentence during an adversarial proceeding, there are constraints of transparency
upon the process. The judge, on either model of legal liberalism, maintains her
neutrality and rejects the notion that she is somehow more expert in determining
the appropriate punishment than the law person.
Under the social norms version of crime control, judicial discretion is to be
delayed as long as possible so as to promote police and prosecutorial discretion
and sensitivity to local norms on the ground. Where judges act in a discretionary
manner, they ought to do so in a way that is transparent to those local norms. In
turn, these norms determine the manner in which the court is to treat the offender.
Judged by these standards, drug court practice is a failure. The current drug
court model presents serious problems for due process and social norms
advocates. One way of explaining the worrisome aspects of the courtroom
426 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 382, at 301-08.
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procedures is to borrow the practices of "empathy" and "heroism" identified by
Charles Ogletree as central to re-invigorating the practice of law in the criminal
sphere.427 Empathy is other-directed, requiring "an identification with another
person in distress." 428 Heroism is self-directed, comprising "the desire to take on
'the system' and prevail, even in the face of overwhelming odds."429 These ideals
are, first of all, "motivation[al]." 430 Empathy and heroism, however, may justify
highly invasive types of court procedure when unchecked by some due process
separation of roles.
Drug courts must be understood as self-consciously empathetic and heroic
institutions. They arose in direct response to the War on Drugs,431 and the hugely
increased drug-related caseload that initiative has spawned.432 Prior to drug court,
the major effort to cope with drug cases was primarily managerial: 433 the
expedited434 or differentiated435 case management system. Under the expedited
case management model, drug prosecutions were 'fast track[ed]' ... in one
courtroom or division of a criminal court."'436 The overriding goal of case
427 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1239, 1271-79 (1993).
428 Id. at 1268.
429 Id. at 1243.
430Id at 1275.
431 See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 44-45.
432 See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 3, at 45 (relating court and prison overcrowding to
genesis of drug courts); McColl, supra note 57, at 477 (discussing "the heavy caseload
weighing down urban courts").
433 Prior to the 1980s, the only pre-existing alternative to incarceration was a due process
era program of diversion entitled Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime ("TASC"). See
Developments in the Law, supra note 63, at 1899, 1902-07. A range of agencies within the
criminal justice system, including prosecutors and probation officers as well as judges, were
able to "refer out" offenders to various TASC treatment centers. Id. at 1903-04. These state-
regulated agencies then monitored the individual offenders' progress through treatment and
"act[ed] as liaisons between courts and independent drug treatment programs." Id. at 1903.
Although TASC had a strong rehabilitative element, that rehabilitation was subject to court
monitoring, although the court had no direct involvement in the course of treatment. Id. The
hands-off, diversionary approach of TASC did not fit well within the administrative severity
revolution focused on increased criminalization and punitive detention of drug users.
434 See Goldkamp, supra note 21, at 946.
435 See Hoffman, Scandal, supra note 1I, at 1461.
436 Boldt, supra note 11, at 1210. These courts transformed the manner in which drug
cases were processed, resulting in much faster dispositions. See Goldkamp, supra note 21, at
946. By creating a division of an existing trial court specializing in drug cases, the drug
caseload was consolidated to enable the "concentrat[ion] [of] expertise in one courtroom, and
[to] reduce the time to disposition through effective case management." McColl, supra note 42,
at 471.
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management courts was the "reduction of the pending drug caseload. '437 These
expedited courts, however, only streamlined the court process rather than
addressing the size of the drug-related caseload faced by the court system.
In reaction to their increasingly negative experience of the criminal justice
system, a growing cadre of judges438 recognized that an alternative to traditional
case processing methods was required to cope with drug cases.439 The drug court
was explicitly envisaged as a direct response to the proliferation of court
caseloads, the "revolving door" style of drug prosecution, and the progressive
prison overcrowding resulting from the War on Drugs.440 "[T]he common refrain
from drug court officials [is] 'What we were doing before simply was not
working.'"441
The drug court attempted to engage in the therapeutic rehabilitation of
addicted offenders. This is an expressly empathetic and heroic enterprise. The
therapeutic posture of the drug court permits the judge to envision themselves as
risk-taking administrators at the forefront of the struggle to undo the damage of
both drug abuse and the War on Drugs. Many drug courts were started by judges:
some receive funding secured by the judges from private sources. 442 In all of
these courts, as a hero of the oppressed, the legal agent finds reasons for attacking
or disregarding social or legal norms that prevent her succeeding in this mission;
as an empathic individual, she justifies such reasons in terms of her client's needs
437 McColl, supra note 42, at 472.
438 See generally Hunter, supra note 137; Hon. William P. Keesley Feature: Drug
Courts, S.C. LAW., July-Aug. 1998, at 32; McColl, supra note 57; Murphy, supra note 4; Hon.
Steven I. Platt, Drug Court Experiment: Policy Choice-Political Decision, MD. B.J., Jan.-Feb.
2001, at 44. See also Hora et al., supra note 8, at 462-68; NOLAN, supra note 3, at 42 ("In the
case of the drug court movement .... the major agents of change are ... the judicial[ ] actors
themselves. 'The Drug Court Movement is essentially ajudge-led movement."' (quoting Philip
Bean, America's Drug Courts: A New Development in Criminal Justice, 1996 CRIM. L. REV.
718, 720)).
439 See Hora et al., supra note 8, at 470-71. ("[T]he theory of the drug court is that
caseload pressure should be relieved from other court functions, and resources be saved as a
result of an efficient and effective treatment approach."' (quoting John S. Goldkamp, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, JUSTICE AND TREATMENT INNOVATIONs: THE DRUG COURT MovEMENT-A
WORKING PAPER OF THE FIRST NATIONAL DRUG COURT CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 1993 30
(1994)).
440 See, e.g., Hora supra note 8, at 456-57 ("The genesis of the DTC movement
developed in response to the increasingly severe 'war on drugs' crime policies enacted in the
1980s, coupled with the resulting explosion of drug-related cases that subsequently flooded the
courts."); McColl, supra note 42, at 475; NOLAN, supra note 3, at 44.
441 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 44.
442 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 42.
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or goals, as a necessary component of ensuring that the client succeeds against the
system.443
Under the empathetic and heroic model of drug court practice, problems arise
when the self-directed and other-directed aspects of the legal agent's reconstituted
identity do not check each other, but combine to provide justifications for bending
or ignoring rules of behavior, legal practice, or ethics.4" The potential for the
legal agent to "lose sight of the external moral limitations on her conduct '445
increases when the legal agent's heroic empathy is not directed towards
individual clients but only towards clients as types, manifesting a particular
pathology the legal agent understands or empathizes with only as an expert
qualified to determine the real conditions that have placed the client in his or her
current crisis. Adopting the expert role undermines the major check on the heroic
personality: the empathetic requirement of humility in the face of the client's
statement of his or her interests.
In the role of authoritative expert, the legal agent may not "hear [her client's]
'complex, multivocal conversations' ... and ... integrate [her client's goals] into
an evaluation of potential solutions." 446 Where conceptual or practice-related
justifications permit the agent, in the guise of expert, to discount the interests or
outcomes that the actual client identifies as important, there is a tremendous
potential for the self-directed motivational component to dominate the agent-
client relationship.
Finally, it is important to note that Ogletree's endorsement of the twin ideals
of heroism and empathy arise in the context of an adversarial contest in which the
legal agent is pitted, on behalf of his or her client, against another legal agent.
Heroism and empathy apply paradigmatically in the due process context. The
major external checks on empathetic and heroic agents are the jury and, where she
is not acting under one of the above-mentioned roles, the judge. Both of these are
supposed to assess the merits of a situation in a dispassionate and impartial
manner. In drug court, however, impartiality is rejected as a judicial virtue and
replaced with a partial representation of the best interests of the client.
443 Ogletree, supra note 427, at 1276.
444 Ogletree also notes that the
heroic motivation may also have its less benign aspects [as when] ... criminal defense
attorneys are often drawn to their work by a kind of voyeuristic desire to experience the
'darker side' of society-to interact with criminals and to learn about their exploits....
[Furthermore,] many of our heroic images ... embody... traits... that... tend to exclude
certain groups.
Id. at 1276.
445 Id at 1278.
446 Id. at 1274-75 (quoting Lucie E. White, Revaluing Politics: A Reply to Professor
Strauss, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1331, 1338 (1992).
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Where empathy and heroism drown out the voice of the drug court offender,
the participative guarantee of legitimacy essential to social norms and neutral
legalist theories evaporates. It is impossible to say, in a general way, that all drug
courts fail the empathy and heroism test: however, the anecdotal evidence
provided by many studies of actual drug court practice, including the drug court
judges' own testimony, suggests that the focus on contracting-as-coercion-and-
consent, "courtroom theater," and "telling the right story"447 all operate to mute
the real voice of the participant and potentially the local lay community, as
opposed to the community of treatment providers. This silencing undermines the
localist, participative justification at the core of the social norms embrace of drug
courts
Furthermore, for social norms advocates, the consequences of excluding local
participation are dire. Legitimacy is a two-way process that requires both that
social groups accept the law as generally legitimate and that the law reflect local
norms. In this way, groups that accept the law's legitimacy are more likely to
follow legal norms no matter what the content of the norm and to informally
reinforce these norms in their communities without government intervention.
Groups that perceive the law as lacking in legitimacy question the content of
individual norms and may conform their conduct to the law only when the
sanction attached to non-compliance is sufficiently severe and imminent.448
Accordingly, the task of the criminal law is both to ensure its own legitimacy by
mirroring social norms specifying appropriate behavior 449 and to create new
norms of appropriate conduct for groups that accept the institutional legitimacy of
the law. Participation in the norm creation and norm enforcement process is a
central tenet of the social norms theory;450 to the extent that the drug court is an
expert institution, it is distanced from legitimacy-conferring local participation.
a. Aesthetic Considerations
Due process arguments have often been used to limit the impact of judicial
discretion in the trial process. Some of these concerns are directed at the provision
of an unbiased hearing after notice to the parties. But other arguments-ones that
may be denominated aesthetic-concem the type of ceremony afforded the
parties: the aesthetic considerations are relevant, not only the expressive impact of
447 See NOLAN, supra note 3, at 123-26 (stressing the expectation that the participant
accept and express particular views in court).
448 See, e.g., Meares, Place, supra note 20; Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 20.
449 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert,
76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 205-06 (1996); Paul H. Robinson, Supreme Court Review: Foreword:
The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 693,693-95 (1993).
450 Meares & Kahan, Inner City, supra note 20, at 832.
1566 [Vol. 65:1479
DRUG COURTS AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONISM
the proceeding and what it communicates about the values underlying the hearing
itself "The issue is not the court's integrity but the criminal process' integrity as a
self-regulating legal order.... A public trial, if fairly conducted, sends its own
message about dignity, fairness, and justice that contributes to the moral force of
the criminal sanction."'451
While these aesthetic considerations are particularly the province of liberal
legalism, with its focus on discretion-constraining rules, social norms theorists too
should be solicitous of such ceremonious rituals. After all, the social norms
emphasis on legitimacy and the social meaning of the criminal law are both
impacted by the appearance of impropriety in courtroom procedure.452
Another set of related values are those caught under the rubric of "structural
due process" and which apply to the manner in which the state respects and
acknowledges the parties and the procedures through which we expect the state to
speak. 453 If the aesthetic concerns address "the business of limit-setting" in the
court's conduct towards a criminal defendant,454 the structural concerns codify
those limits by requiing a particular form of participation when, particularly, the
individual's liberty is on the line. The issue of courtroom behavior is important
from the due process aesthetic perspective because of the message such behavior
communicates to the offender or the world at large about the court's regard for the
law and the defendant. As Justice Brandeis has famously put it in his dissent in
Olmstead v. United States:
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself, it invites anarchy. To declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means--to
451 Arenella, supra note 28, at 203, 219.
452 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 119, at 615-17; Kahan & Posner, supra note 119, at 380-
83; Lessig, supra note 238, at 1006.
453 Neil MacCormick defines legalism as:
[T]he stance in legal politics according to which matters of legal regulation and
controversy ought so far as possible to be conducted in accordance with predetermined
rules of considerable generality and clarity, in which legal relations comprise primarily
rights, duties, powers and immunities reasonably clearly definable by reference to such
rules, and in which acts of govemment however desirable teleologically must be
subordinated to respect for rules and rights.
Neil MacCormick, The Ethics Of Legalism, 2 RATIo JuRIs. 184, 184 (1989). MacCormick
considers legalism as a limit on the "way[s] of conducting government," such that the
government may not act on the basis of extra-legal moral, or therapeutic, principles but only act
on the basis of antecedently promulgated rules and rights. Id. at 185-86. The government's way
of conducting itself thus expresses important features about the manner in which it values its
citizens.
454 Uviller, supra note 27, at 1138.
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declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of the private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. 455
Here, "'aesthetic' means a lot more than ornamental. '456 It concerns the
ability of the legal system both to project its claim to legitimacy and thereby to
demand our respect and allegiance. That ability, it appears, need not appeal across
a legal system: our willingness to find the law worthy of respect such as to
compel our obedience may be limited to the criminal justice system or the tax
system or some other discrete area of law.457 An essential component of the
demand for respect is that the government manifest its respect for law in the
manner it treats those brought under its purview. As social norms theorists remind
us, "[1]egitimacy... is rather uniquely in government control. '458 The theater of
the courtroom, on this view, is not a place for acting out or for acting on the
parties but rather for acting with due respect for their individuality and humanity.
"Due process plays an important role in this structure."459 At the very least, it
requires the court to treat the offender as an agent capable of rational choice, and
thereby guarantees the offender's continued participation in the process of
treatment and punishment required by neutral liberal theories of justice.
The importance of due process protections for creating legitimacy is
amplified when we recognize that many of the offenders entering drug court are
socially disadvantaged or members of racial minorities or both. Statistical
evidence suggests that poorer offenders are more likely to agree to go to drug
court than rich ones.460 The increased likelihood of the poor to plea or waive
rights to enter drug court is perhaps a reflection of the "differential impact of
inadequate assistance of counsel" during the plea process.461 The differential
impact of the criminal justice system on poor individuals may be exacerbated for
minorities, who are much more likely to receive incarcerative sentences than non-
minorities.462 Such factors may lead poor and minority defendants to accept
diversion into drug court where others would not. It is, however, impossible to be
any more precise or avoid broad generalizations because there is a paucity of
455 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
456 Uviller, supra note 27, at 1138 n.3.
457 We may be justified in disobeying particular laws, on this view, not because the legal
system on balance is a bad one. Compare JOHN FINNs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS
(1980); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW (1964); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW (1979). Rather, we may be justified because the criminal law is, on balance, so bad that we
are not obliged to follow its prescriptions.
458 Meares, Norms, supra note 158, at 399.
459 Uviller, supra note 27, at 1138 n.3.
460 See, e.g., Bedrick & Skolnick, supra note 50, at 43.
461 Boldt, supra note 222, at 2318.
462 Id. at 2318-19; see also Brown, supra note 86, at 73-75.
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research on the impact of race and poverty on drug court procedures. The
circumstantial evidence does, however, suggest that drug courts screen in people
who are not addicts, but who, for a variety of reasons, calculate that their chances
of successfully participating in treatment will lead to dismissal of the charges
against them.
Transforming the judicial treatment of, in particular, poor and minority
criminal defendants was an essential part of the Warren Court's procedural
revolution. Then, as in drug court, the courts practiced penal-welfarist techniques
upon the poor and disposed, individuals for whom society had no regard. In drug
court, the issue is not only to establish when and if court solicitude for effecting a
therapeutic transformation is converted into something less benign, but to
consider whether the system of rewards and punishments and the unbridled
discretion enjoyed by the courts is more pantomime than theater. That
determination has to be made on a case-by-case, or judge-by-judge, basis. Where
the pantomime is preferable to imprisonment, it may be thought worth the price
of diversion. Nonetheless, and especially when racial and class issues are added
into the mix, the drug court's procedure may inflict a cost on the dignity of the
offender or the legal system that is too high to pay.46 3
b. Structural Considerations
The requirement of participation is, however, meaningless until given some
form of content. The provision of a hearing is potentially useless unless the
structure of that hearing is such that it ensures participation in the process. That, in
short, is one of the major neutral liberal critiques of drug court.
Structural due process analysis comports with neutral liberalism by going
beyond the various substantive and procedural critiques that may be leveled
against the drug court. On the substantive end, penal welfarists and due process
advocates would agree that drug addicts are entitled to treatment, so long as the
period of rehabilitation is not too excessive, nor seeks to undermine the identity of
463 Professor William Stuntz has suggested that dignity may not be a significant interest in
criminal procedure, especially when compared with defendants' privacy rights. William J.
Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 1016, 1037
(1995) (suggesting that a consistent protection of dignity rights would undermine the present
system of criminal procedure). Instead, he suggests, courts generally do not focus on "the
indignity of being publicly singled out as a criminal suspect," id at 1064, or the "stigma" of
being publicly targeted by the police. Id. at 1066. Rather, the courts focus upon privacy and
information gathering, to the exclusion of other dignitary interests. Id. at 1065. While that may
be the prevalent, current focus on criminal procedure, I would suggest that, in the context of the
Warren Court's jurisprudence, a notion of individual dignity, generally articulated through
concepts of autonomy, respect, equality, and freedom from undue government interference, was
at the heart of a jurisprudential and moral outlook that resulted in the reform, not only of
criminal procedure, but of the various institutions more or less directly linked with the criminal
justice system, including juvenile courts, prisons, and mental institutions.
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the individual. Similarly, so long as proportionality is not at issue, the onerous
nature of the sentence imposed may be acceptable to due process advocates and
adherents of the administrative model alike. On the procedural end, due process
demands that the government hear the drug court defendant464 and that the
hearing embody a fundamentally fair method of ascertaining the truth of the
matter at hand.465 In the drug court as currently constituted, some form of hearing
is provided and, depending on the judge, it may be perfectly neutral and unbiased.
Accordingly, the greatest concern is not the absence of procedural protections.
Rather, it is the structure of the drug court process that is problematic.
The Supreme Court's opinions in Kent v. United States,466 In re Gault,46 7
and In re Winship468 comprise a full-blown rejection of a prior, welfarist-style
court from the due process model's structural perspective. The Court was
disturbed by the penal-welfarist uncoupling of the process of adjudication from
the decision to deprive a juvenile of her liberty. Mn Gault, for example, the Court
found that, in the guise of protecting parent, or parens patriae, the juvenile court
system had instead adorned itself with "unbridled discretion" over the juveniles in
its custody.469 This arrogation of power without due process limits, however,
"resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness." 470 Rather than
simply providing a hearing, the Court sought to reattach a fully developed notion
of due process to the juvenile justice court. Central to that process was some
conception of the manner in which the juvenile could participate in the
proceedings.471 The Court saw its task as one of fleshing out the appropriate form
of participation-upon what basis a democratic society could justify depriving a
child of her liberty.
At the center of the Supreme Court's evaluation of the juvenile court's penal-
welfarist procedures was Kent's concern that the state provide the requisite
ceremony before depriving juveniles of liberty.472 An unbiased hearing, by itself,
is not enough. Rather, the court cannot "reach[ ] a result of such tremendous
464 On the necessity of a hearing, see Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 281-83 (1975).
461 Id at 289.
466 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
467 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
468 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
469 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18; see also id at 15-16 (discussing rejection of inquiry into
guilt or innocence and replacement with inquiry into, "'[w]hat is he, how has he become what
he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career').
470 Id. at 19. On the parens patriae and judicial arbitrariness, see also Kent, 383 U.S. at
554-55.
471 Kent, 383 U.S. at 553-54.
472 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
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consequences without ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance
of counsel, without a statement of reasons. '473 Especially where liberty rights are
at stake, the process utilized by the court must be one in which the government
treats the defendant as a participant in a democratic process. The structural due
process analysis, especially insofar as it is focused upon the form of policy
application, is therefore especially helpful in revealing what is so unsettling about
drug court procedure and policy. Simply put, there are some areas of law "where
governmental policy ... application [is] ... required to take a certain form, to
follow a process with certain features, or to display a particular sort of
structure."
4 7 4
The due process critique thus concerns itself, not only with the provision of a
hearing, but the structure of the hearing provided and constrains the tribunal to act
in a particular way-to recognize that the enterprise of governing by means of
published rules requires that decision be rendered based upon those rules. The
court cannot rule on the basis of assumptions or arguments not presented by the
government or simply choose to ignore the citizen's arguments.475 Rather,
structural due process demands a particular form of response from the
adjudicative institution, whether it is a court, a sentencing tribunal, or a parole
revocation hearing: a response that respects the parties' demand for rational
engagement with the arguments presented, placing judge, prosecutor, and
defendant in a "kind of reciprocity" with each other,476 constrained to defend and
discuss their different positions in terms that respect the others' arguments and
reasons, and to respond to them with arguments and reason of their own.477
473 Id.
474 Tribe, supra note 464, at 291 (emphasis added); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz
Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the
Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REv. 110, 192 (1999) (discussing City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)).
475 See, e.g., Kent, 383 U.S. at 561 (requiring trial court to undertake review of actual
arguments presented rather than rest upon assumptions that there may be adequate reasons for
the parties' actions).
476 FULLER, supra note 457, at 39-40.
As the sociologist Simmel has observed, there is a kind of reciprocity between
government and the citizen with respect to the observance of rules.... When this bond of
reciprocity is finally and completely ruptured by government, nothing is left on which to
ground the citizen's duty to observe the rules.
Id. (citing THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL § 4, at 186-89 (1950)).
477 See Kent, 383 U.S. at 561 ("Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court
should review. It should not be remitted to assumptions.... Accordingly, we hold that it is
incumbent upon the Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a statement of the
reasons or considerations therefor.").
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In such a relationship, "the processes and rules that constitute the
[adjudicative] enterprise and define the roles played by its participants matter
quite apart from any identifiable 'end state' that is ultimately produced.... [I]n
many cases it is the process itself that matters most to those who take part in
it."'478 The process matters because it is a form of "dialogue between the state and
those whose liberty its laws confine, a dialogue in which the continuing
legitimacy of a law turns on the current willingness and ability of the state to
come forth with rational justifications for the law's continued enforcement. '479
Due process protections afford the defendant, in presenting arguments to the
tribunal, the opportunity to take part in its determination and requires that, at a
minimum, the tribunal consider those demands in rendering its verdict.
c. Due Process and the Judicial Role
The therapeutic approach not only undermines various checks upon judicial
restraint, it also promotes confusion over the use of punishment and the status of
the addict in the criminal justice system. The particular treatment methodology
used in drug courts does not attempt to separate punishment from treatment but
rather conflates the two.480 Drug courts muddle the determination of when it is
proper to impose punishment by permitting the re-characterization of punishment
as treatment appropriate for curing the addict. Adopting a retributivist
understanding of punishment and treatment would dispel the muddle by requiring
us to determine when punishment is not violative of an individual's interests or
rights but a means to restore the individual to a position where she can
appropriately choose her interests or properly exercise her rights.
The type of retributivism I am proposing here is what might be called a
humble or "holistic" retributivism.481 It requires us to consider whether the
offender has sufficient volitional capability to act as a rational or responsible
human. If so, we are precluded from simply ignoring the offender's moral
culpability and turning to the perspective of treatment. Instead, we must at least
478 Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits
of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 631 (1973).
479 Tribe, supra note 464, at 301; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). Although
primarily concerned with institution of the jury, rather than administration itself, the Court
stressed, "[t]he opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of justice
[is] ... one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury system." Id. at 406 (citing
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968)). Where that participation is undermined-
in this case-by "racial discrimination in the selection ofjurors [it] 'casts doubt on the integrity
of the judicial process,' and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt." Id. at 411
(quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,556 (1979)).
480 See Edwards, supra note 93, at 288.
481 Husak, supra note 384, at 994-1000 (describing the holistic aspects of retributive
justice).
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consider the relevant social harm--often, in the case of drug court offenders,
simple drug possession--and determine what, substantively, we think the
appropriate punishment should be.
It may be that, like Randall Kennedy, the disparate impact of drug abuse on
certain addicts in general and minority communities in particular justifies the
imposing a severe sentence for drug crimes.482 Kennedy reminds us that many of
the individuals-including minorities-who supported the crack cocaine
legislation believed disparate sentencing laws were justified given the effect on
the urban, minority communities they represented. 483 Such a justification may be
insufficient to harshly punish the offense of possessing drugs like marijuana or
even justify the year-long period of drug court supervision. Under the retributivist
model, then, moral considerations are always relevant in determining both the
moral status of the offender and of the institution punishing her. Any form of
detention or confinement must be justified by reference to the offender's moral
status and the harm suffered by the community, both in terms of imprisoning and
in terms of setting free the offender. The content of that moral status may be
contested; that does not mean that the attempt to determine that status is futile or
useless. Rather, it manifests the necessary degree of institutional respect for the
individual and her situation.
Drug courts may comport with due process by adopting appropriate criteria
to match offenders with treatment regimes. The traditional role of due process has
been to provide a limit on the manner in which the quasi-therapeutic regimes
employed by penal welfarists act upon the person of the offender. Publishing the
available sanctions is one step along the due process road. Excluding non-addicts
from treatment or recognizing that, for non-addicts, treatment is punishment is
another step. The due process approach to drug courts demands, however, that
courts rigorously interrogate the therapeutic principles upon which they are
founded so as to constrain the power of the judge and regard the process of
treatment as potentially harmful rather than uniformly therapeutic. This type of
self-reflection is one that drug court advocates, caught up in the evangelical phase
of the movement, have proved unwilling to do.
Rather than transform herself into a therapeutic agent, the due process model
suggests that the power of a judge should be limited to the consistent imposition
of sanctions.484 Where treatment is necessary and appropriate, the judge's role is
to match offender to treatment, according to the advice of an expert. The expert,
in turn, must be required, if the offender asks, to justify her choice of treatment
482 See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1255 (1994).
483 Id. at 1260-61; Randall Kennedy, A Response to Professor Cole's "Paradox of Race
and Crime", 83 GEO. L.J. 2573, 2575 (1995); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1283, 1295 (1995).
4 84 See, e.g., Hampton, Liberalism, supra note 163, at 168-76.
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modality. This returns the judge to her role as passive arbiter of the equities. Even
this narrow set of powers permits the court to function along the lines suggested
by Professors Dorf and Sabel, as an experimentalist institution supervising
competition among treatment providers to provide the most effective
rehabilitation program. Because the due process model places great stress on the
type of offender channeled into treatment and the type of treatment offered, due
process places the same, or even greater, stress on collating the sort of information
Dorf and Sabel regard as essential to the experimentalist project, requiring as it
does a broader data set to properly evaluate the impact of drug courts. But the due
process model also suggests that we must do more than hope that drug courts are
better than the alternatives. Due process cannot tolerate an exercise of judicial
power that undermines the participative aesthetic and structural values upon
which our courts rest.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Drug courts clearly engage in moderate forms of incapacitatory discipline
under the rubric of therapy. Some drug court judges acknowledge that offenders
spend more time in prison as a result of electing drug court than if they simply
chose to proceed through the criminal justice system. Even outside prison, drug
courts require offenders to spend large amounts of time at institutions connected
with the court. Judge Susan Bolton, of the Phoenix, Arizona, drug court makes
the point well:
We make them spend at least three hours a week in our group [therapy sessions].
We make them spend at least two more hours a week in a 12-step meeting. We
make them do their community service hours. We require them to report all the
time to their probation officer. We require them to call TASC on a daily basis.
And if they don't do what they are required to do, they suffer a consequence. 485
Drug courts are designed to incapacitate. That is an essential component of
their treatment program. Perhaps it must be so, given the nature of drug addiction.
Nonetheless, given their incapacitory function, drug courts put opponents of the
tough-on-crime, War on Drugs movement in a quandary. Either they must reject
drug courts outright on principled grounds.486 Or, they must develop a more
sophisticated approach to incapacitation.
My proposal has been to focus on maintaining the autonomy and dignity of
the offender in the criminal justice process, as well as the dignity and integrity of
the process itself. These are particularly due process concerns. They may compete
with other due process considerations, such as ensuring that the punishment is
485 NOLAN, supra note 3, at 55 (alteration in original).
486 See Hoffman, Scandal, supra note 13, at 1477.
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commensurate with the crime. They may also compete with penal-welfarist or
administrative values. Nonetheless, autonomy and dignity provide one scale upon
which to measure the trade-off between incapacitation in prison and
incapacitation in a drug court.
It may well be that drug courts are, by and large, preferable to prison. It may
be that certain prisons, or certain periods of confinement, are preferable to a drug
court's therapeutic regime. That conclusion cannot be reached without much
more information pertaining to both local prison or jail conditions and the types of
treatment meted out in drug court.
If the drug court suggests that traditional courts fail to engage in any
meaningful manner with offenders, then the due process model can be used to
refine that critique. Traditional courtroom practice should become more personal
or empathetic in ways that recognize and respect the offender's dignity and
humanity. The lesson of drug courts is that our courts of criminal justice should
be concerned with understanding and demonstrating a commitment to the
particularized and respectful treatment of every individual brought before the
court. The judge can still take the lead and can still preserve a group effort of
respect and engagement but can do so in a way that does not rest upon
befriending the offender. The failure to do so is in part a result of the tremendous
pressures on our criminal courts to process offenders but is also in part due to a
failure of the judicial imagination.
The problem for the drug court advocate, then, is whether the therapeutic
judicial role is a sufficient price to pay for the type of diversion and treatment
offered by drug courts. Many, though not all, drug courts endorse a version of
judicial practice that, on the one hand, gives the judge huge discretion over the
manner in which the offender is treated and, on the other hand, constrains the
offender to interact with the judge in a narrowly circumscribed manner. This is
not empathy. The problem is that the best-intentioned judges, the most sincere
advocates of the disease model of addiction, are the ones most likely to transform
this process into a deeply invasive and incapacitating form of supervision based
primarily upon the offender's consent. The issue of consent diverts attention from
the front-end problems of net-widening: channeling otherwise exempt offenders
into the system and requiring extensive treatment programs for those that may
least need it. Further, the emphasis on diversion and rehabilitation avoids the
major issue surrounding the War on Drugs: whether its goals or methods are
substantively justified at all.
Adopting the drug court compromise as a way of combating the effects of
drug legislation is a deeply problematic means of stanching the flow of low-level
offenders into our criminal justice system. It works, if at all, by redirecting
offenders into a treatment system that may pose significant, perhaps increased,
hardships on offenders. In the face of these practical and political problems, the
traditional criminal justice system--punishment, incarceration, and all-may be
preferable to the invasive and often incapacitatory judge-led attempts to
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rehabilitate offenders through internalizing norms that many in society find unfair
and unwarranted.
